學術產出-Periodical Articles

Article View/Open

Publication Export

Google ScholarTM

政大圖書館

Citation Infomation

題名 Rules for Party Subsidies and Electoral Volatility in Latin America
作者 蘇彥斌
Su, Yen-Pin
貢獻者 政治系
關鍵詞 party system; public subsidies; party laws; electoral volatility; Latin America; sistema de partidos; subsidios públicos; leyes de partidos; volatilidad electoral; América Latína
日期 2022-05
上傳時間 20-Oct-2022 15:57:38 (UTC+8)
摘要 Prior research has argued that public subsidies for parties matter for explaining electoral volatility, but the empirical results have been inconclusive. This article addresses this puzzle by examining how different rules for direct state funding affect different types of electoral volatility, using data from lower chamber elections in eighteen Latin American countries from 1978 through 2014. Focusing on volatility caused by new party entry and old party exit (party replacement volatility) and volatility caused by vote switching among existing parties (stable party volatility), it finds that countries with less strict eligibility thresholds for party subsidies tend to have lower levels of party replacement volatility. However, the empirical analysis does not provide sufficient evidence that the eligibility thresholds for party subsidies matter for predicting stable party volatility. Overall, this article suggests that less strict eligibility thresholds for party subsidies help produce stable party systems by reducing risks associated with party replacement volatility.
關聯 Latin American Research Review, Vol.57, No.1, pp.151-169
資料類型 article
DOI https://doi.org/10.1017/lar.2022.9
dc.contributor 政治系
dc.creator (作者) 蘇彥斌
dc.creator (作者) Su, Yen-Pin
dc.date (日期) 2022-05
dc.date.accessioned 20-Oct-2022 15:57:38 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 20-Oct-2022 15:57:38 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 20-Oct-2022 15:57:38 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/142438-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Prior research has argued that public subsidies for parties matter for explaining electoral volatility, but the empirical results have been inconclusive. This article addresses this puzzle by examining how different rules for direct state funding affect different types of electoral volatility, using data from lower chamber elections in eighteen Latin American countries from 1978 through 2014. Focusing on volatility caused by new party entry and old party exit (party replacement volatility) and volatility caused by vote switching among existing parties (stable party volatility), it finds that countries with less strict eligibility thresholds for party subsidies tend to have lower levels of party replacement volatility. However, the empirical analysis does not provide sufficient evidence that the eligibility thresholds for party subsidies matter for predicting stable party volatility. Overall, this article suggests that less strict eligibility thresholds for party subsidies help produce stable party systems by reducing risks associated with party replacement volatility.
dc.format.extent 98 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) Latin American Research Review, Vol.57, No.1, pp.151-169
dc.subject (關鍵詞) party system; public subsidies; party laws; electoral volatility; Latin America; sistema de partidos; subsidios públicos; leyes de partidos; volatilidad electoral; América Latína
dc.title (題名) Rules for Party Subsidies and Electoral Volatility in Latin America
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1017/lar.2022.9
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1017/lar.2022.9