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題名 Radical internalism meets radical externalism or: Smithies’ epistemology transcendentalised 作者 鄭會穎
Cheng, Tony貢獻者 哲學系 日期 2022-02 上傳時間 2-Dec-2022 15:23:28 (UTC+8) 摘要 In The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (2019), Declan Smithies has carried out a thorough radical internalist programme. Along the way, he compares and contrasts many different views, including a group he calls “radical externalism”. From the labels, it might seem that radical internalism and radical externalism must be very different in their core commitments. In this short note, I will single out a version of radical externalism—factivism, more specifically John McDowell’s version (McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press., McDowell, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55:877–893, 1995, McDowell, J. (2011). Perception as a capacity for knowledge. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.)—and argue that actually this version has many similarities with Smithies radical internalism. Where there are differences, they do not obviously lie at the internalist/externalist juncture. The main point of this comparison is that philosophical positions that seem very different can share much common ground, and in seeing this, one can be in a better position to understand the crucial points of disagreement. 關聯 Asian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1, pp.1-10 資料類型 article DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-022-00013-7 dc.contributor 哲學系 dc.creator (作者) 鄭會穎 dc.creator (作者) Cheng, Tony dc.date (日期) 2022-02 dc.date.accessioned 2-Dec-2022 15:23:28 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 2-Dec-2022 15:23:28 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Dec-2022 15:23:28 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/142664 - dc.description.abstract (摘要) In The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (2019), Declan Smithies has carried out a thorough radical internalist programme. Along the way, he compares and contrasts many different views, including a group he calls “radical externalism”. From the labels, it might seem that radical internalism and radical externalism must be very different in their core commitments. In this short note, I will single out a version of radical externalism—factivism, more specifically John McDowell’s version (McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press., McDowell, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55:877–893, 1995, McDowell, J. (2011). Perception as a capacity for knowledge. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.)—and argue that actually this version has many similarities with Smithies radical internalism. Where there are differences, they do not obviously lie at the internalist/externalist juncture. The main point of this comparison is that philosophical positions that seem very different can share much common ground, and in seeing this, one can be in a better position to understand the crucial points of disagreement. dc.format.extent 106 bytes - dc.format.mimetype text/html - dc.relation (關聯) Asian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1, pp.1-10 dc.title (題名) Radical internalism meets radical externalism or: Smithies’ epistemology transcendentalised dc.type (資料類型) article dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.1007/s44204-022-00013-7 dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-022-00013-7
