學術產出-期刊論文
| 題名 | Radical internalism meets radical externalism or: Smithies’ epistemology transcendentalised |
| 作者 | 鄭會穎 Cheng, Tony |
| 貢獻者 | 哲學系 |
| 日期 | 2022-02 |
| 上傳時間 | 2-十二月-2022 15:23:28 (UTC+8) |
| 摘要 | In The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (2019), Declan Smithies has carried out a thorough radical internalist programme. Along the way, he compares and contrasts many different views, including a group he calls “radical externalism”. From the labels, it might seem that radical internalism and radical externalism must be very different in their core commitments. In this short note, I will single out a version of radical externalism—factivism, more specifically John McDowell’s version (McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press., McDowell, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55:877–893, 1995, McDowell, J. (2011). Perception as a capacity for knowledge. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.)—and argue that actually this version has many similarities with Smithies radical internalism. Where there are differences, they do not obviously lie at the internalist/externalist juncture. The main point of this comparison is that philosophical positions that seem very different can share much common ground, and in seeing this, one can be in a better position to understand the crucial points of disagreement. |
| 關聯 | Asian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1, pp.1-10 |
| 資料類型 | article |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-022-00013-7 |
| dc.contributor | 哲學系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 鄭會穎 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Cheng, Tony | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2022-02 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2-十二月-2022 15:23:28 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 2-十二月-2022 15:23:28 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 2-十二月-2022 15:23:28 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/142664 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | In The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (2019), Declan Smithies has carried out a thorough radical internalist programme. Along the way, he compares and contrasts many different views, including a group he calls “radical externalism”. From the labels, it might seem that radical internalism and radical externalism must be very different in their core commitments. In this short note, I will single out a version of radical externalism—factivism, more specifically John McDowell’s version (McDowell, J. (1994). Mind and world. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press., McDowell, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55:877–893, 1995, McDowell, J. (2011). Perception as a capacity for knowledge. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.)—and argue that actually this version has many similarities with Smithies radical internalism. Where there are differences, they do not obviously lie at the internalist/externalist juncture. The main point of this comparison is that philosophical positions that seem very different can share much common ground, and in seeing this, one can be in a better position to understand the crucial points of disagreement. | |
| dc.format.extent | 106 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Asian Journal of Philosophy, Vol.1, No.1, pp.1-10 | |
| dc.title (題名) | Radical internalism meets radical externalism or: Smithies’ epistemology transcendentalised | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1007/s44204-022-00013-7 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-022-00013-7 |