學術產出-Theses
Article View/Open
Publication Export
-
題名 巨型科技業者從事金融服務之監理
The Supervision of BigTech in Finance作者 游舒惟
Yu, Shu-Wei貢獻者 臧正運
Tsang, Cheng-Yun
游舒惟
Yu, Shu-Wei關鍵詞 巨型科技業者
大型科技業者
金融科技
金融監理
BigTech
FinTech
Financial regulation日期 2023 上傳時間 6-Apr-2023 18:06:00 (UTC+8) 摘要 巨型科技業者向金融服務領域的擴張正在快速進行，而且是跨領域和跨國境的，鑑於巨型科技業者的全球足跡，再加上他們龐大的客戶群，政策制定者需要解決監理巨型科技業者的問題。然而，目前仍未見監理者對巨型科技業者從事金融服務有一套完整的監理方法，對此，本研究首先分析國際上幾個知名的巨型科技業者，視其所提供之金融服務及其提供金融服務的模式，同時參考了國際組織的文獻，統整出巨型科技業者從事金融服務可能會產生的五個主要風險，並進一步提出五個監理面向去應對此些風險，此外，本研究亦分析了美國、歐盟和中國於此五個監理面向所採取的舉措，瞭解不同國家或地區針對巨型科技業者從事金融服務所選擇的監理態度和監理方法，從中汲取可以學習的監理方法，以及尚可改進的部分。最後，本研究參考了上述三個國家或地區的監理方法、國際組織的文獻以及學者們的監理建議，針對本文所提及之五個監理面向為監理建議，希冀能提供監理者更多的監理想法，並促進對金融市場和消費者的保護。
BigTechs are now expanding to the financial sector, and they are cross-sectoral and cross-border by their nature. According to BigTechs’ global footprint and their huge customer bases, policy makers need to tackle the question of regulating BigTechs.At present, there is no comprehensive supervisory approach for BigTechs engaged in financial services. As a result, this thesis first analyzes several well-known BigTechs in the world, and depends on the financial services they provide, the mode of providing financial services, and international organizations’ papers to unified the five main risks that BigTechs may have in financial services, and summarize five aspects of supervision to deal with these risks. Besides, the thesis also examines the measures taken by the United States, the European Union and China in these five aspects of supervision, understanding the supervisory attitudes and supervisory approaches chosen by different jurisdictions for BigTechs engaged in financial services, and learning from the worth learning supervisory approaches, as well as observing the parts that can still be improved.Last but not least, the study refers to the supervisory approaches of the three jurisdictions mentioned above, the literature of international organizations, and the supervisory recommendations of scholars, proposing supervisory approaches for each aspect of supervision. It is hoped that it will provide supervisors with more ideas about supervision and promote the protection of financial markets and consumers.參考文獻 中文部分（依筆畫順序）一、 期刊論文1. 宋皇志，大數據之競爭法議題——以限制競爭為中心，政大法學評論，第163期，2020年10月。2. 姜權祐，臉書發行虛擬加密貨幣Libra對全球金融市場之影響，彰銀資料，第68卷第9期，2019年9月。3. 徐曼慈，美國眾議院發布「數位市場下之競爭調查」報告，公平交易委員會電子報，第170期，2021年5月5日。4. 洪德欽，歐洲聯盟法的法源，華岡法粹，第57期，2014年12月。5. 彭贵才、娄金炜，跨部门协同法治化/定位、困境与进路，青海民族大学学报（社会科学版），第4期，2021年。6. 楊宏暉，搭售行為之法律分析，公平交易季刊，第12卷第1期，2004年1月。7. 廖元豪，美國聯邦交易委員會法第五條與其他反托拉斯法之關係—兼論我國公平交易法第二十四條之適用範圍，公平交易季刊，第8卷第4期，2000年10月。8. 魏杏芳，電子商務、轉售價格維持與演算法──由歐盟產業調查與華碩案談起，公平交易季刊，第27卷第4期，2019年11月。英文部分（依字母順序）一、 英文專書1. ARMOUR JOHN, DAN AWREY, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, JEFFREY N. GORDON, COLIN MAYER, AND JENNIFER PAYNE, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION (2016).2. CORMEN THOMAS H., CHARLES E. LEISERSON, RONALD L. RIVEST., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS (2009).二、 期刊論文1. Alford Duncan, Supervisory Colleges: The Global Financial Crisis and Improving International Supervisory Coordination, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 57 (2010).2. Arner Douglas, Ross Buckley, Kuzi Charamba, Artem Sergeev & Dirk Zetzsche, Governing FinTech 4.0: BigTech, Platform Finance, and Sustainable Development, 27 Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 1 (2022).3. Beneke Francisco & Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, Remedies for algorithmic tacit collusion, 9 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 152 (2021).4. Ezrachi Ariel & Maurice E. Stucke, Sustainable and Unchallenged Algorithmic Tacit Collusion, 17 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 217, 218 (2020).5. Hanley Daniel, How Self-Preferencing Can Violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle 2 (2021).6. Kim Pauline T., Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 189 (2017).7. Kroll Joshua A., Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 633 (2017).8. León Carlos, Clara Machado, Freddy Cepeda and Miguel Sarmiento, Too-connected-to-fail institutions and payment system`s stability: assessing challenges for financial authorities, Borradores de Economia 1 (2011).9. Malgieri Gianclaudio, Property and (Intellectual) Ownership of Consumers’ Information: A New Taxonomy for Personal Data, Privacy in Germany - PinG, n. 4 133 (2016).10. Petit Nicolas, Theories of Self-Preferencing Under Article 102 TFEU: A Reply to Bo Vesterdorf, Competition Law & Policy Debate 1 CLPD 1 (2015).11. Schwarcz Steven L., Systemic Risk, 97 Georgetown Law Journal 193 (2008).12. Stucke Maurice E. & Ariel Ezrachi, Two Artificial Neural Networks Meet in an Online Hub and Change the Future (Of Competition, Market Dynamics and Society), University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 323 (2017).13. Turow Joseph, Michael Hennessy & Nora A. Draper, The Trade-off Fallacy – How Marketers Are Misrepresenting American Consumers and Opening Them up to Exploitation, University of Pennsylvania-Annenberg School for Communication Working Paper (2015).14. Vesterdorf Bo, Theories of Self-Preferencing and Duty to Deal - Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 1 Competition Law & Policy Debate 4 (2015).15. Wachter Sandra & Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI, 2019 Columbia Business Law Review 494 (2019).16. Werbach Kevin & David T. Zaring, Systemically Important Technology, TEXAS Law Review (forthcoming 2022).三、 國際機構與非政府組織報告1. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Implications of fintech developments for banks and bank supervisors (February 19, 2018), available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d431.htm.2. Bank of International Settlement (BIS), Big techs in finance: on the new nexus between data privacy and competition (October, 2021), available at https://www.bis.org/publ/work970.pdf.3. Bank of International Settlement (BIS), Whom do consumers trust with their data? US survey evidence (May 27, 2021), available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull42.pdf.4. Crisanto Juan Carlos, Johannes Ehrentraud & Marcos Fabian, Big techs in finance: regulatory approaches and policy options, FSI Briefs No.12 (2021), available at https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsibriefs12.pdf.5. Crisanto Juan Carlos, Johannes Ehrentraud, Aidan Lawson & Fernando Restoy, Big tech regulation: what is going on?, FSI Insights on policy implementation No. 36 (2021), available at https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights36.pdf.6. Ehrentraud Johannes, Jamie Lloyd Evans, Amelie Monteil & Fernando Restoy, Big tech regulation: in search of a new framework, Financial Stability Institute Occasional Paper No 20 (2022), available at https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers20.pdf.7. Financial Stability Board (FSB), BigTech in Finance Market Developments and Potential Financial Stability Implications (December, 2019), available at https://www.fsb.org/2019/12/bigtech-in-finance-market-developments-and-potential-financial-stability-implications/.8. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Personalised Pricing in the Digital Era, Background Note presented at the joint meeting between the Competition Committee and the Committee on Consumer Policy on the Personalised Pricing in the Digital Era, Pairs, available at https://www.oecd.org/competition/personalised-pricing-in-the-digital-era.htm.9. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age (2017), available at www.oecd.org/competition/algorithms-collusion-competition-policy-in-the-digital-age.htm.10. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Algorithms and Collusion-Note from the European Union (2017), available at https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)12/en/pdf.11. Zamil Raihan & Aidan Lawson, Gatekeeping the gatekeepers: when big techs and fintechs own banks-benefits, risks and policy options, FSI Insights on policy implementation No. 39 (January 20, 2022), available at https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights39.pdf. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
法律學系
109651039資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109651039 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 臧正運 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Tsang, Cheng-Yun en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 游舒惟 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Yu, Shu-Wei en_US dc.creator (作者) 游舒惟 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Yu, Shu-Wei en_US dc.date (日期) 2023 en_US dc.date.accessioned 6-Apr-2023 18:06:00 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 6-Apr-2023 18:06:00 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 6-Apr-2023 18:06:00 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0109651039 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/144065 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 法律學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 109651039 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 巨型科技業者向金融服務領域的擴張正在快速進行，而且是跨領域和跨國境的，鑑於巨型科技業者的全球足跡，再加上他們龐大的客戶群，政策制定者需要解決監理巨型科技業者的問題。然而，目前仍未見監理者對巨型科技業者從事金融服務有一套完整的監理方法，對此，本研究首先分析國際上幾個知名的巨型科技業者，視其所提供之金融服務及其提供金融服務的模式，同時參考了國際組織的文獻，統整出巨型科技業者從事金融服務可能會產生的五個主要風險，並進一步提出五個監理面向去應對此些風險，此外，本研究亦分析了美國、歐盟和中國於此五個監理面向所採取的舉措，瞭解不同國家或地區針對巨型科技業者從事金融服務所選擇的監理態度和監理方法，從中汲取可以學習的監理方法，以及尚可改進的部分。最後，本研究參考了上述三個國家或地區的監理方法、國際組織的文獻以及學者們的監理建議，針對本文所提及之五個監理面向為監理建議，希冀能提供監理者更多的監理想法，並促進對金融市場和消費者的保護。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) BigTechs are now expanding to the financial sector, and they are cross-sectoral and cross-border by their nature. According to BigTechs’ global footprint and their huge customer bases, policy makers need to tackle the question of regulating BigTechs.At present, there is no comprehensive supervisory approach for BigTechs engaged in financial services. As a result, this thesis first analyzes several well-known BigTechs in the world, and depends on the financial services they provide, the mode of providing financial services, and international organizations’ papers to unified the five main risks that BigTechs may have in financial services, and summarize five aspects of supervision to deal with these risks. Besides, the thesis also examines the measures taken by the United States, the European Union and China in these five aspects of supervision, understanding the supervisory attitudes and supervisory approaches chosen by different jurisdictions for BigTechs engaged in financial services, and learning from the worth learning supervisory approaches, as well as observing the parts that can still be improved.Last but not least, the study refers to the supervisory approaches of the three jurisdictions mentioned above, the literature of international organizations, and the supervisory recommendations of scholars, proposing supervisory approaches for each aspect of supervision. It is hoped that it will provide supervisors with more ideas about supervision and promote the protection of financial markets and consumers. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究動機與目的 1第一項 研究動機 1第二項 研究目的 1第二節 研究範圍與方法 2第一項 研究範圍 2第二項 研究方法 2第一款 文獻回顧及歸納 2第二款 比較法分析 3第三節 研究架構 3第四節 研究限制 4第二章 巨型科技業者提供之金融服務 5第一節 「巨型科技業者」之定義 5第二節 國際上著名巨型科技業者及其所提供之金融服務 6第一項 Alphabet 6第二項 Apple 10第三項 Meta Platforms 12第四項 Amazon 15第五項 百度集團 18第六項 阿里巴巴集團 20第七項 騰訊集團 23第八項 小結 27第三節 巨型科技業者提供金融服務帶來之風險 29第一項 反競爭行為 29第二項 系統性風險 30第三項 個人資料保護 31第四項 演算法歧視 31第五項 合併監理的障礙 32第六項 小結 32第三章 巨型科技業者提供金融服務涉及之監理面向 34第一節 競爭法面向 34第一項 濫用市場地位 34第一款 搭售 34第二款 自我偏好 35第三款 價格歧視、個性化定價 36第二項 暗默勾結 37第二節 金融穩定面向 38第三節 個人資料保護面向 38第四節 演算法歧視面向 40第五節 監理協作面向 41第六節 本章小結 42第四章 美國針對巨型科技業者涉及不同監理面向提出之監理方式 43第一節 競爭法面向 43第一項 美國競爭法面向之監理 43第二項 針對巨型科技業者涉及競爭法面向之監理 44第三項 小結 53第二節 金融穩定面向 56第一項 美國金融穩定面向之監理 56第二項 針對巨型科技業者涉及金融穩定面向之監理 58第三項 小結 60第三節 個人資料保護面向 61第一項 美國個人資料保護面向之監理 61第二項 針對巨型科技業者涉及個人資料保護面向之監理 67第三項 小結 68第四節 演算法歧視面向 69第一項 美國演算法面向之監理 69第二項 針對巨型科技業者涉及演算法歧視面向之監理 71第三項 小結 75第五節 監理協作面向 76第一項 美國監理協作面向之監理 76第二項 針對巨型科技業者涉及監理協作面向之監理 80第三項 小結 81第六節 本章小結 81第五章 歐盟針對巨型科技業者涉及不同監理面向提出之監理方式 83第一節 競爭法面向 83第一項 歐盟競爭法面向之監理 83第二項 針對巨型科技業者涉及競爭法面向之監理 84第三項 小結 85第二節 金融穩定面向 86第一項 歐盟金融穩定面向之監理 86第二項 針對巨型科技業者涉及金融穩定面向之監理 88第三項 小結 91第三節 個人資料保護面向 91第一項 歐盟個人資料保護面向之監理 92第二項 針對巨型科技業者涉及個人資料保護面向之監理 93第三項 小結 95第四節 演算法歧視面向 96第一項 歐盟演算法歧視面向之監理 96第二項 針對巨型科技業者涉及演算法歧視面向之監理 99第三項 小結 101第五節 監理協作面向 101第一項 歐盟監理協作面向之監理 101第二項 針對巨型科技業者涉及監理協作面向之監理 103第三項 小結 104第六節 本章小結 104第六章 中國針對巨型科技業者涉及不同監理面向提出之監理方式 105第一節 競爭法面向 105第一項 中國競爭法面向之監理 105第二項 針對巨型科技業者涉及競爭法面向之監理 106第三項 小結 109第二節 金融穩定面向 110第一項 中國金融穩定面向之監理 110第二項 針對巨型科技業者涉及金融穩定面向之監理 111第三項 小結 112第三節 個人資料保護面向 113第一項 中國個人資料保護面向之監理 113第二項 針對巨型科技業者涉及個人資料保護面向之監理 116第三項 小結 117第四節 演算法歧視面向 118第一項 中國涉及演算法歧視面向之監理 118第二項 針對巨型科技業者涉及演算法歧視面向之監理 119第三項 小結 120第五節 監理協作面向 120第一項 中國涉及監理協作面向之監理 120第二項 針對巨型科技業者涉及監理協作面向之監理 122第三項 小結 122第六節 本章小結 122第七章 巨型科技業者提供金融服務之建議監理方式 124第一節 競爭法面向 124第二節 金融穩定面向 125第三節 個人資料保護面向 127第四節 演算法歧視面向 130第五節 監理協作面向 131第六節 本章小結 133第八章 結論與建議 134參考文獻 136 zh_TW dc.format.extent 3293487 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0109651039 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 巨型科技業者 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 大型科技業者 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 金融科技 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 金融監理 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) BigTech en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) FinTech en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Financial regulation en_US dc.title (題名) 巨型科技業者從事金融服務之監理 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Supervision of BigTech in Finance en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文部分（依筆畫順序）一、 期刊論文1. 宋皇志，大數據之競爭法議題——以限制競爭為中心，政大法學評論，第163期，2020年10月。2. 姜權祐，臉書發行虛擬加密貨幣Libra對全球金融市場之影響，彰銀資料，第68卷第9期，2019年9月。3. 徐曼慈，美國眾議院發布「數位市場下之競爭調查」報告，公平交易委員會電子報，第170期，2021年5月5日。4. 洪德欽，歐洲聯盟法的法源，華岡法粹，第57期，2014年12月。5. 彭贵才、娄金炜，跨部门协同法治化/定位、困境与进路，青海民族大学学报（社会科学版），第4期，2021年。6. 楊宏暉，搭售行為之法律分析，公平交易季刊，第12卷第1期，2004年1月。7. 廖元豪，美國聯邦交易委員會法第五條與其他反托拉斯法之關係—兼論我國公平交易法第二十四條之適用範圍，公平交易季刊，第8卷第4期，2000年10月。8. 魏杏芳，電子商務、轉售價格維持與演算法──由歐盟產業調查與華碩案談起，公平交易季刊，第27卷第4期，2019年11月。英文部分（依字母順序）一、 英文專書1. ARMOUR JOHN, DAN AWREY, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, JEFFREY N. GORDON, COLIN MAYER, AND JENNIFER PAYNE, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION (2016).2. CORMEN THOMAS H., CHARLES E. LEISERSON, RONALD L. RIVEST., INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS (2009).二、 期刊論文1. Alford Duncan, Supervisory Colleges: The Global Financial Crisis and Improving International Supervisory Coordination, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 57 (2010).2. Arner Douglas, Ross Buckley, Kuzi Charamba, Artem Sergeev & Dirk Zetzsche, Governing FinTech 4.0: BigTech, Platform Finance, and Sustainable Development, 27 Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 1 (2022).3. Beneke Francisco & Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, Remedies for algorithmic tacit collusion, 9 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 152 (2021).4. Ezrachi Ariel & Maurice E. Stucke, Sustainable and Unchallenged Algorithmic Tacit Collusion, 17 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 217, 218 (2020).5. Hanley Daniel, How Self-Preferencing Can Violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Competition Policy International Antitrust Chronicle 2 (2021).6. Kim Pauline T., Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 189 (2017).7. Kroll Joshua A., Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 633 (2017).8. León Carlos, Clara Machado, Freddy Cepeda and Miguel Sarmiento, Too-connected-to-fail institutions and payment system`s stability: assessing challenges for financial authorities, Borradores de Economia 1 (2011).9. Malgieri Gianclaudio, Property and (Intellectual) Ownership of Consumers’ Information: A New Taxonomy for Personal Data, Privacy in Germany - PinG, n. 4 133 (2016).10. Petit Nicolas, Theories of Self-Preferencing Under Article 102 TFEU: A Reply to Bo Vesterdorf, Competition Law & Policy Debate 1 CLPD 1 (2015).11. Schwarcz Steven L., Systemic Risk, 97 Georgetown Law Journal 193 (2008).12. Stucke Maurice E. & Ariel Ezrachi, Two Artificial Neural Networks Meet in an Online Hub and Change the Future (Of Competition, Market Dynamics and Society), University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 323 (2017).13. Turow Joseph, Michael Hennessy & Nora A. Draper, The Trade-off Fallacy – How Marketers Are Misrepresenting American Consumers and Opening Them up to Exploitation, University of Pennsylvania-Annenberg School for Communication Working Paper (2015).14. Vesterdorf Bo, Theories of Self-Preferencing and Duty to Deal - Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 1 Competition Law & Policy Debate 4 (2015).15. Wachter Sandra & Brent Mittelstadt, A Right to Reasonable Inferences: Re-Thinking Data Protection Law in the Age of Big Data and AI, 2019 Columbia Business Law Review 494 (2019).16. Werbach Kevin & David T. Zaring, Systemically Important Technology, TEXAS Law Review (forthcoming 2022).三、 國際機構與非政府組織報告1. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), Implications of fintech developments for banks and bank supervisors (February 19, 2018), available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d431.htm.2. Bank of International Settlement (BIS), Big techs in finance: on the new nexus between data privacy and competition (October, 2021), available at https://www.bis.org/publ/work970.pdf.3. Bank of International Settlement (BIS), Whom do consumers trust with their data? US survey evidence (May 27, 2021), available at https://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull42.pdf.4. Crisanto Juan Carlos, Johannes Ehrentraud & Marcos Fabian, Big techs in finance: regulatory approaches and policy options, FSI Briefs No.12 (2021), available at https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsibriefs12.pdf.5. Crisanto Juan Carlos, Johannes Ehrentraud, Aidan Lawson & Fernando Restoy, Big tech regulation: what is going on?, FSI Insights on policy implementation No. 36 (2021), available at https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights36.pdf.6. Ehrentraud Johannes, Jamie Lloyd Evans, Amelie Monteil & Fernando Restoy, Big tech regulation: in search of a new framework, Financial Stability Institute Occasional Paper No 20 (2022), available at https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsipapers20.pdf.7. Financial Stability Board (FSB), BigTech in Finance Market Developments and Potential Financial Stability Implications (December, 2019), available at https://www.fsb.org/2019/12/bigtech-in-finance-market-developments-and-potential-financial-stability-implications/.8. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Personalised Pricing in the Digital Era, Background Note presented at the joint meeting between the Competition Committee and the Committee on Consumer Policy on the Personalised Pricing in the Digital Era, Pairs, available at https://www.oecd.org/competition/personalised-pricing-in-the-digital-era.htm.9. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Algorithms and Collusion: Competition Policy in the Digital Age (2017), available at www.oecd.org/competition/algorithms-collusion-competition-policy-in-the-digital-age.htm.10. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Algorithms and Collusion-Note from the European Union (2017), available at https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WD(2017)12/en/pdf.11. Zamil Raihan & Aidan Lawson, Gatekeeping the gatekeepers: when big techs and fintechs own banks-benefits, risks and policy options, FSI Insights on policy implementation No. 39 (January 20, 2022), available at https://www.bis.org/fsi/publ/insights39.pdf. zh_TW
