| dc.contributor.advisor | 王智賢 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Wang, Jue-Shyan | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 温姵瑩 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Wen, Pei-Ying | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 温姵瑩 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Wen, Pei-Ying | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2023 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 6-Jul-2023 16:38:57 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 6-Jul-2023 16:38:57 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 6-Jul-2023 16:38:57 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0110255006 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/145826 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政學系 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 110255006 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 綜觀臺灣之近年選舉過程中，新興政黨與長久主導政壇的兩政黨間，常透過提名或不提名候選人的方式，表達政黨或候選人選擇模糊化政治光譜與否的情形，以及政黨間目標攻擊對象的選擇，也會帶給其他政黨競選利弊等效果。本文建立三政黨競選賽局模型，探討單一選區選舉中，新崛起政黨提名決策的競選效益條件為何，以及分析政黨攻擊策略選擇的合理性。依據均衡結果得出，政黨攻擊對象選擇與提名決定皆取決於政黨的各自淨好處大小比較，與環境無關。另外在衍生模型中，政黨1與2的攻擊對象搭配組合將影響政黨3的提名決定，以及當政黨3不提名的原始淨好處愈大時，若政黨1與2選擇攻擊政黨3時，則政黨3愈不容易提名。此外，若政黨3不提名原始淨好處較小(大)時，則其將提名(不提名)。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Overviewing Taiwan’s electoral process in recent years, there has been a tendency for emerging political parties and the two long-standing dominant parties to express their stance on political spectrum ambiguity through the nomination or non-nomination of candidates. Meanwhile, choosing the target of the attack among the parties also brings the effect of the advantages and disadvantages to other parties’ campaigns. In this paper, a three-party game theoretical model is developed not only to analyze the conditions for the campaign benefit of the nomination decisions made by the emerging parties in single-member district elections, but also to discuss the rationality of parties’ attack strategy choices. According to the equilibrium results, we conclude that parties’ attack target selection and nomination decisions depended on the comparison of the respective net benefits of the parties instead of the environment. Furthermore, in the derivative model, the combination of attack targets of party 1 and 2 affects the nomination decision of party 3, and while party 3’s original net benefit of not nominating is getting larger, party 3 is less likely to nominate if party 1 and 2 choose to attack party 3. In addition, if party 3 has a smaller original net benefit in non-nominating, it will nominate. Conversely, if party 3 has a larger original net benefit in non-nominating, it won’t nominate. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 前言 1第二章 兩黨同時決策下之三政黨競選賽局 8第三章 考量攻擊效益分散下，兩黨同時決策下之三政黨競選賽局 17第四章 結論 36參考文獻 38 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 2482319 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110255006 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 單一選區 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 政黨攻擊 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 政黨提名 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 子賽局完全均衡 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Single-member district | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Party attack | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Party nomination | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Subgame perfect equilibrium | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 單一選區下三政黨的攻擊與提名策略之賽局分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Three-Party Game of Attack`s and Nomination`s Strategy in Single Member District Election | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en_US |
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