| dc.contributor.advisor | 王智賢 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 陳宣竹 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Chen, Shiuan-Ju | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 陳宣竹 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chen, Shiuan-Ju | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2023 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 6-Jul-2023 16:39:41 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 6-Jul-2023 16:39:41 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 6-Jul-2023 16:39:41 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0110255032 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/145829 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政學系 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 110255032 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 候選人的提名策略是影響選舉結果最關鍵的因素之一。政黨可藉由提名寄望的候選人來爭取選民的支持，以獲得發聲機會。本文期望透過賽局理論的分析來探討政黨與候選人間對上述選舉要素的決策過程，文中聚焦於勸進的策略。由政黨決策者（參賽者1）勸進目標候選人（參賽者2）參選，接著觀察被勸進者採取的對策。在基本模型中，參賽者1將評估勸進與不勸進兩種策略之下的預期效用，並採取其中預期效用較高的決策，若選擇勸進，再由參賽者2衡量其預期效用，決定是否接受勸進而參選；若存在資訊不對稱情形，只有參賽者1知曉參賽者2的政治實力相較其他參選人孰強孰弱，參賽者1則有s型（其他參選人更強）與w型（其他參選人較弱）兩種型態，此時存在一組分離均衡，當參賽者1勸進的效用介於s型及w型參賽者1不勸進的效用之間時，只有w型參賽者1選擇勸進。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | One of the most critical factors influencing the elections would be candidate nominations. Parties nominate the hope-placed candidates to strive for the support of voters and obtain the chance of vocalizion. This paper analyzes the decision making strategies between parties and candidates with game theoretical models. It focuses on the persuading strategies: a party’s decision maker (player 1) persuades a selected candidate (player 2) into running for election, then observing player 2’s responses. In basic model, player 1 will evaluate the expected utilities of whether persuading or not, and take the higher one. If player 1 choose persuading in the first stage, player 2 will determine whether accepting the persuasion with measuring the expected utilities in second stage. In the case of information asymmetry, only player 1 knows the fact that whether player 2 is stronger or weaker than the other candidates. Player 1 has two types, s type (the other candidates are stronger) and w type (the other candidates are weaker). A separating equilibrium holds in this case when expected utilities of persuading falls in the interval between s type not-persuading and w type not-persuading, w type persuades, while s type doesn’t. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 前言 1第二章 基本模型下的勸進參選賽局 7第三章 資訊不對稱模型下的勸進參選賽局 10第四章 結論 18參考文獻 20 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 1319695 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110255032 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 黨內初選 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 勸進參選 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 序列均衡 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Party primaries | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Candidate persuasion | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Sequential equilibrium | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 勸進參選的賽局分析 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Game-Theoretic Analysis of Persuading Candidates into Running for Elections | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en_US |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | I. 中文部分王智賢，2007，〈勸退參選的分析〉，《經濟研究》，43(2): 149-180。(Wang, Jue-shyan. 2007. “Quan tui can xuan de sai ju fen xi” [Game-Theoretic Analysis of Dissuading Candidates from Running for Elections]. Taipei Economic Inquiry 43(2): 149-180.)王智賢、陳虹羽，2022，〈單一選區下三政黨的合作與競爭之賽局分析〉，《選舉研究》，29(1): 1-30。(Wang, Jue-shyan, and Hong-yu Chen. 2022. “Dan yi xuan qu xia san zheng dang de he zuo yu jing zheng zhi sai ju fen xi” [Three-Party Game of Cooperation and Competition in Single Member District Election] Journal of Electoral Studies 29(1): 1-30.)王智賢、嚴馥妤、林玫吟，2019，〈禮讓參選的賽局分析〉，《選舉研究》，26(2): 1-22。(Wang, Jue-shyan, Fu-yu Yan, and Mei-yin Lin. 2019. “Li rang can xuan de sai ju fen xi” [Game-Theoretic Analysis of Making a Concession Decision in an Election] Journal of Electoral Studies 26(2): 1-22.)田弘華、劉義周，2005，〈政黨合作與杜瓦傑法則：連宋配、國親合的賽局分析〉，《台灣政治學刊》，9(1): 3-37。(Tien, Hung-hua, and I-chou Liu. 2005. “Zheng dang he zuo yu du wa jie fa ze: Lian Song pei, guo qin he de sai ju fen xi” [Party Cooperation and Duverger`s Law: A Game-theoretical Analysis of Pan-Blue Alliance]. Taiwanese Political Science Review 9(1): 3-37.)林繼文，2008，〈以輸為贏：小黨在日本單一選區兩票制下的參選策略〉，《選舉研究》，15(2): 37-66。(Lin, Jih-wen. 2008. “Yi shu wei ying:xiao dang zai ri ben dan yi xuan qu liang piao zhi xia de can xuan ce lue” [To Lose Is to Win: The Candidate-Placement Strategy of Minor Parties under Japan`s Mixed-Member Majoritarian System]. Journal of Electoral Studies 15(2): 37-66.)崔曉倩、吳重禮，2007，〈政黨與未獲提名候選人之參選決策分析〉，《選舉研究》，14(1): 119-143。(Tsui, Hsiao-chien, and Wu Chung-li. 2007. “Zheng dang yu wei huo ti ming hou xuan ren zhi can xuan jue ce fen xi” [Electoral Decisions for Political Party and Its Un-nominated Aspirants]. Journal of Electoral Studies 14(1): 119-143.)II. 英文部分Adams, James, and Samuel Merrill III. 2008. “Candidate and Party Strategies in Two-Stage Elections Beginning with a Primary.” American Journal of Political Science 52(2): 344-359.Adekeye, Muinat Adetayo. 2017. “Party Primaries, Candidate Selection and Intra-Party Conflict in Nigeria: PDP in Perspective.” Covenant University Journal of Politics & Internationall Affairs 5(1): 22-39.Aragón, Fernando M.. 2014. “Why do parties use primaries?: Political selection versus candidate incentives.” Public Choice 160(1-2): 205-225.Borodin, Allan, Omer Lev, Nisarg Shah, and Tyrone Strangway. 2019. “Primarily about Primaries.” Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33(01), 1804-1811.Gherghina, Sergiu. 2013. “One-Shot Party Primaries: The Case of the Romanian Social Democrats.” Politics 33(3): 185-195.Hirano, Shigeo, James M. Snyder Jr, and Michael M. Ting. 2009. “Distributive Politics with Primaries.” The Journal of Politics 71(4): 1467-1480.Hortala-Vallve, Rafael, and Hannes Mueller. 2015. “Primaries: The Unifying Force.” Public Choice 163(3-4): 289-305.Ichino, Nahomi, and Noah L. Nathan. 2012. “Primaries on Demand? Intra-Party Politics and Nominations in Ghana.” British Journal of Political Science 42(4): 769-791.Kreps, David M., and Robert Wilson. 1982. “Sequential Equilibria.” Econometrica 50(4): 863-894.Serra, Gilles. 2011. “Why primaries? The party’s tradeoff between policy and valence.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 23(1): 21-51.Snyder Jr, James M., and Michael M. Ting. 2011. “Electrol Selection with Parties and Primaries.” American Journal of Political Science 55(4): 782-796. | zh_TW |
