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題名 在資訊不對稱下的融資結構、逃漏稅與經濟成長
Financial Structure, Tax Evasion, and Economic Growth under Information Asymmetry作者 胡雋
Hu, Chuan貢獻者 洪福聲
Hung, Fu-Sheng
胡雋
Hu, Chuan關鍵詞 融資結構
逃漏稅
資訊不對稱
地下經濟
經濟成長
Financial structure
Tax evasion
Information asymmetry
Underground economy
Economic growth日期 2023 上傳時間 6-Jul-2023 16:40:07 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文結合了內生經濟成長模型、資訊不對稱、廠商逃漏稅以及廠商對融資結構的選擇，試圖建立並解釋廠商逃漏稅與金融發展程度之間負向的關係。本文先建立廠商逃稅的策略，接著分析當廠商選擇不同融資結構時的預期報酬，並討論政府在廠商選擇不同的融資結構時所能極大化社會福利的最適逃漏稅稽查機率。在政府目標為極大化社會福利的假設下，透過本研究的數值模擬發現：逃漏稅稽查機率越高會使廠商逃漏稅的程度降低；當廠商選擇股權融資時，最適逃漏稅稽查機率會大於當廠商選擇債權融資時的最適逃漏稅稽查機率。在過去文獻所定義股權融資的出現以及廠商對股權融資的依賴上升為金融發展下，本文發現金融發展程度較高對應到較低的廠商逃漏稅情形，與實證結果一致。
This study seeks to establish and elucidate a negative relationship between financial development and the level of firms’ tax evasion, by integrating the endogenous growth model, information asymmetry, firms’ decision on tax evasion, and firms’ decision on financial structures. In this study, firms’ decision on tax evasion is first determined, followed by the calculation of firms’ expected consumption under various financial structures. Finally, the government’s optimal probabilities of tax auditing that maximized social welfare under different financial structures are determined. Assuming the government`s objective is to maximize social welfare, a numerical simulation of this model reveals that a higher probability of tax auditing corresponds to a lower level of corporate tax evasion. When firms opt for equity financing, the optimal probability of tax auditing is larger, compared to situations when firms decide on debt financing. Under the definition of the emergence of stock markets and firms’ increasing reliance on equity financing as financial development, it is found that higher levels of financial development correspond to milder firms’ tax evasion. These results align with recent empirical studies.參考文獻 Akerlof, G. A. (1978). The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Uncertainty in Economics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500.Atje, R., & Jovanovic, B. (1993). Stock Markets and Development. European Economic Review, 37(2-3), 632-640.Beck, T., A.L. Chen, & A.U. Yue (2014) Why Do Firms Evade Taxes? The Role of Information Sharing and Financial Sector Outreach. Journal of Finance, 69(2), 763-817.Bencivenga, V. R., & Smith, B. D. (1993). Some Consequences of Credit Rationing in an Endogenous Growth Model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 17(1-2), 97-122.Blackburn, K., N. Bose, & S. Capassom (2012), Tax Evasion, the Underground Economy, and Financial Development. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 83(2), 243-253.Bolton, P., & X. Freixas (2000) Equity, Bonds and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and Financial Market Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2), 324-351.Bose, N., & Cothren, R. (1996). Equilibrium Loan Contracts and Endogenous Growth in the Presence of Asymmetric Information. Journal of Monetary Economics, 38(2), 363-376.Bose, N. (2005). Endogenous Growth and the Emergence of Equity Finance. Journal of Development Economics, 77(1), 173-188.Chen, B. L. (2003). Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth. Review of Economic Dynamics, 6(2), 381-403.Dabla-Norris, E., M. Gradstein, & G. Inchauste (2008). What Causes Firms to Hide Output? The Determinants of Informality. Journal of Development Economics, 85(1-2), 1-27.Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (1996). Stock Market Development and Financial Intermediaries: Stylized Facts. The World Bank Economic Review, 10(2), 291-321.Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (1996). Stock Markets, Corporate Finance, and Economic Growth: An Overview. The World Bank Economic Review, 10(2), 223-239.Feige, E. L. (1990). Defining and Estimating Underground and Informal Economies: The New Institutional Economics Approach. World Development, 18(7), 989-1002.Freixas, X., & Bolton, P. (1998). A Dilution Cost Approach to Financial Intermediation and Securities Markets. Financial Markets Group.Gordon, R.H., & W. Li (2009). Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation. Journal of Public Economics, 93(7-8), 855-866.Goldsmith, R. W. (1969). Financial Structure and Development. Yale University Press.Guo, J. T., & Hung, F. S. (2020). Tax Evasion and Financial Development under Asymmetric Information in Credit Markets. Journal of Development Economics, 145, 102463.Hung, F. S. (2022). Financial Structure, Tax Evasion, and Government Revenue. Unpublished NSC Project Report (MOST 109-2410-H-004-124).Gurley, J. G., & E. S. Shaw (1955). Financial Aspects of Economic Development. American Economic Review, 45(4), 515-538.Gurley, J. G., & E. S. Shaw (1960). Money in a Theory of Finance. Brookings Institution.Levine, R., & Zervos, S. (1996). Stock Market Development and Long-Run Growth. The World Bank Economic Review, 10(2), 323-339.Levine, R., & Zervos, S. (1998). Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth. The American Economic Review, 88(3), 537-558.Quintin, E. (2008). Contract Enforcement and the Size of the Informal Economy. Economic Theory, 37(3), 395-416.Schneider, F., & Enste, D. H. (2013). The Shadow Economy: An International Survey. Cambridge University Press. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
108258007資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108258007 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 洪福聲 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Hung, Fu-Sheng en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 胡雋 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Hu, Chuan en_US dc.creator (作者) 胡雋 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Hu, Chuan en_US dc.date (日期) 2023 en_US dc.date.accessioned 6-Jul-2023 16:40:07 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 6-Jul-2023 16:40:07 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 6-Jul-2023 16:40:07 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0108258007 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/145831 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 經濟學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 108258007 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文結合了內生經濟成長模型、資訊不對稱、廠商逃漏稅以及廠商對融資結構的選擇，試圖建立並解釋廠商逃漏稅與金融發展程度之間負向的關係。本文先建立廠商逃稅的策略，接著分析當廠商選擇不同融資結構時的預期報酬，並討論政府在廠商選擇不同的融資結構時所能極大化社會福利的最適逃漏稅稽查機率。在政府目標為極大化社會福利的假設下，透過本研究的數值模擬發現：逃漏稅稽查機率越高會使廠商逃漏稅的程度降低；當廠商選擇股權融資時，最適逃漏稅稽查機率會大於當廠商選擇債權融資時的最適逃漏稅稽查機率。在過去文獻所定義股權融資的出現以及廠商對股權融資的依賴上升為金融發展下，本文發現金融發展程度較高對應到較低的廠商逃漏稅情形，與實證結果一致。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study seeks to establish and elucidate a negative relationship between financial development and the level of firms’ tax evasion, by integrating the endogenous growth model, information asymmetry, firms’ decision on tax evasion, and firms’ decision on financial structures. In this study, firms’ decision on tax evasion is first determined, followed by the calculation of firms’ expected consumption under various financial structures. Finally, the government’s optimal probabilities of tax auditing that maximized social welfare under different financial structures are determined. Assuming the government`s objective is to maximize social welfare, a numerical simulation of this model reveals that a higher probability of tax auditing corresponds to a lower level of corporate tax evasion. When firms opt for equity financing, the optimal probability of tax auditing is larger, compared to situations when firms decide on debt financing. Under the definition of the emergence of stock markets and firms’ increasing reliance on equity financing as financial development, it is found that higher levels of financial development correspond to milder firms’ tax evasion. These results align with recent empirical studies. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 1. Introduction 12. The Economy 53. The Credit Market and The Tax Evasion 104. The Equilibrium Contracts 175. Optimal Tax Enforcement 206. Optimal Loan Contracts 227. Conclusions 35Reference 36Appendix 1 39Appendix 2 40Appendix 3 41 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1170812 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108258007 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 融資結構 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 逃漏稅 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資訊不對稱 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 地下經濟 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經濟成長 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Financial structure en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Tax evasion en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Information asymmetry en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Underground economy en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Economic growth en_US dc.title (題名) 在資訊不對稱下的融資結構、逃漏稅與經濟成長 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Financial Structure, Tax Evasion, and Economic Growth under Information Asymmetry en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Akerlof, G. A. (1978). The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Uncertainty in Economics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500.Atje, R., & Jovanovic, B. (1993). Stock Markets and Development. European Economic Review, 37(2-3), 632-640.Beck, T., A.L. Chen, & A.U. Yue (2014) Why Do Firms Evade Taxes? The Role of Information Sharing and Financial Sector Outreach. Journal of Finance, 69(2), 763-817.Bencivenga, V. R., & Smith, B. D. (1993). Some Consequences of Credit Rationing in an Endogenous Growth Model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 17(1-2), 97-122.Blackburn, K., N. Bose, & S. Capassom (2012), Tax Evasion, the Underground Economy, and Financial Development. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 83(2), 243-253.Bolton, P., & X. Freixas (2000) Equity, Bonds and Bank Debt: Capital Structure and Financial Market Equilibrium under Asymmetric Information. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2), 324-351.Bose, N., & Cothren, R. (1996). Equilibrium Loan Contracts and Endogenous Growth in the Presence of Asymmetric Information. Journal of Monetary Economics, 38(2), 363-376.Bose, N. (2005). Endogenous Growth and the Emergence of Equity Finance. Journal of Development Economics, 77(1), 173-188.Chen, B. L. (2003). Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth. Review of Economic Dynamics, 6(2), 381-403.Dabla-Norris, E., M. Gradstein, & G. Inchauste (2008). What Causes Firms to Hide Output? The Determinants of Informality. Journal of Development Economics, 85(1-2), 1-27.Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (1996). Stock Market Development and Financial Intermediaries: Stylized Facts. The World Bank Economic Review, 10(2), 291-321.Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & Levine, R. (1996). Stock Markets, Corporate Finance, and Economic Growth: An Overview. The World Bank Economic Review, 10(2), 223-239.Feige, E. L. (1990). Defining and Estimating Underground and Informal Economies: The New Institutional Economics Approach. World Development, 18(7), 989-1002.Freixas, X., & Bolton, P. (1998). A Dilution Cost Approach to Financial Intermediation and Securities Markets. Financial Markets Group.Gordon, R.H., & W. Li (2009). Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation. Journal of Public Economics, 93(7-8), 855-866.Goldsmith, R. W. (1969). Financial Structure and Development. Yale University Press.Guo, J. T., & Hung, F. S. (2020). Tax Evasion and Financial Development under Asymmetric Information in Credit Markets. Journal of Development Economics, 145, 102463.Hung, F. S. (2022). Financial Structure, Tax Evasion, and Government Revenue. Unpublished NSC Project Report (MOST 109-2410-H-004-124).Gurley, J. G., & E. S. Shaw (1955). Financial Aspects of Economic Development. American Economic Review, 45(4), 515-538.Gurley, J. G., & E. S. Shaw (1960). Money in a Theory of Finance. Brookings Institution.Levine, R., & Zervos, S. (1996). Stock Market Development and Long-Run Growth. The World Bank Economic Review, 10(2), 323-339.Levine, R., & Zervos, S. (1998). Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth. The American Economic Review, 88(3), 537-558.Quintin, E. (2008). Contract Enforcement and the Size of the Informal Economy. Economic Theory, 37(3), 395-416.Schneider, F., & Enste, D. H. (2013). The Shadow Economy: An International Survey. Cambridge University Press. zh_TW
