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題名 獨立董事財務背景與盈餘管理之關聯
The association between financial background of independent directors and earnings management
作者 吳冠萱
Wu, Kuan-Hsuan
貢獻者 潘健民
Pan, Chien- Min
吳冠萱
Wu, Kuan-Hsuan
關鍵詞 公司治理
應計項目盈餘管理
實質盈餘管理
獨立董事
財務背景
Corporate governance
Accrual-based earnings management
Real activities manipulation
Independent director
Financial background
日期 2023
上傳時間 6-Jul-2023 16:49:28 (UTC+8)
摘要 獨立董事係維護公司治理之重要機制，而財務報導品質為衡量企業公司治理好壞之關鍵因素。然而公司經理人往往出於自利動機、政策誘因等不同原因而有從事盈餘管理之行為。盈餘管理不同於常見之財務報表舞弊，多運用會計準則所賦予的彈性或企業決策之自主裁量權進行，對企業揭露品質和長期經營有重大影響，因此獨立董事往往被期許能對企業盈餘管理行為產生有力的監督效果。由於日本並未強制規範所有公司皆須設置獨立董事，因此本文得以探討獨立董事的設置與企業盈餘管理行為的關聯性。本研究以日本東京證券交易所上市公司為研究樣本，探討聘用獨立董事與否和聘用之獨立董事比率，對於盈餘管理之影響。實證結果顯示，僅設立獨立董事一職無法對盈餘操縱行為產生顯著抑制作用，惟當獨立董事比率愈高時，企業確實會減少應計項目和實質盈餘管理行為。同時，本研究亦探討獨立董事之財務專業背景是否能對盈餘管理產生較佳之監督效果，結果顯示董事會中具財務背景的獨立董事比例愈高，企業反而會傾向於增加應計項目盈餘管理行為，此一結果與先前研究假說相悖，推測原因為具財務背景之獨立董事往往與企業有密切往來，因此未能發揮獨立董事應有之監督效果。再者，本研究也以企業是否聘僱具財務背景獨立董事此一虛擬變數替換主要變數，以論證具財務背景獨立董事是否同樣需佔董事會一定比例才會導致盈餘管理程度的改變。惟研究顯示相比於獨立董事皆不具財務背景之企業，聘有具財務背景獨立董事之企業其應計項目盈餘管理程度會增加。由此可推知財務背景獨立董事不僅無法發揮其監督效果，且當其存在於董事會中，僅有聘任的事實就能對盈餘管理程度造成影響。
Managers have incentives to manage earnings and independent director plays an important role in corporate governance to safeguard financial reporting quality. Earnings management stems from managers exploit the flexibility and discretion given by accounting policies to achieve an earnings target. On the other hand, independent directors are expected to monitor the managers and safeguard the financial reporting quality of the firm. Taking the advantage that independent directors are not mandated in Japan, we examine the association between independent directors and earnings management behaviors using the data from firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Consistent with the prior studies, the empirical results show that the existence of independent directors in the board of director have no association with earnings management, but as the ratio of independent director in the board gets higher, the level of earnings management gets lower.
To our surprise, the analyses show that independent directors with financial background increase the level of accrual-based earnings management. Further analyses also show that the existence of independent director in the board can increase the level of accrual-based earnings management.
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Ahmed, A. S., and S. Duellman. 2007. Accounting conservatism and board of director characteristics: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 43 (2-3): 411-437.
Barton, J., and P. J. Simko. 2002. The balance sheet as an earnings management constraint. Accounting Review 77 (1): 1-27.
Bartov, E., F. A. Gul, and J. S. L. Tsui. 2000. Discretionary-accruals models and audit qualifications. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30 (3): 421-452.
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review 71 (4): 443-465.
Berle, A., and G. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York, NY: Macmillan.
Bernard, V. L., and J. K. Thomas. 1990. Evidence that stock prices do not fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 13 (4): 305-340.
Brennan, M. J., and H. H. Cao. 1997. International portfolio investment flows. Journal of Finance 52 (5): 1851-1880.
Bushee, B. J. 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. Accounting Review 73 (3): 305-333.
Cadbury, A. 1992. Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. London: GEE.
Chava, S., and M. R. Roberts. 2008. How does financing impact investment? The role of debt covenants. Journal of Finance 63 (5): 2085-2121.
Chen, J. F., R. R. Duh, A. W. H. Hsu, and C. M. Pan. 2015. Can Anglo-Saxon audit committee scheme improve earnings quality in non-Anglo-Saxon environments? Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics 11 (1): 61-74.
Cheng, S. 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics 87 (1): 157-176.
Chi, W., L. L. Lisic, and M. Pevzner. 2011. Is enhanced audit quality associated with greater real earnings management? Accounting Horizons 25 (2): 315-335.
Chung, R., M. Firth, and J. B. Kim. 2002. Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management. Journal of Corporate Finance 8 (1): 29-48.
Cohen, D. A., A. Dey, and T. Z. Lys. 2008. Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre- and post- Sarbanes Oxley periods. Journal of Corporate Finance 83 (3): 757-787.
Cohen, D. A., and P. Zarowin. 2010. Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50 (1): 2-19.
Cohen, J. R., U. Hoitash, G. Krishnamoorthy, and A. M. Wright. 2014. The effect of audit committee industry expertise on monitoring the financial reporting process. Accounting Review 89 (1): 243-273.
Dass, N., O. Kini, V. Nanda, B. Onal, and J. Wang. 2014. Board expertise: Do directors from related industries help bridge the information gap? Review of Financial Studies 27 (5): 1533-1592.
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and D. J. Skinner. 1994. Accounting choice in troubled companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (1-2): 113-143.
Dechow, P. M. 1994. Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance: The role of accounting accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 18 (1): 3-42.
Dechow, P. M., and D. J. Skinner. 2000. Earnings management: Reconciling the views of accounting academics, practitioners and regulators. Accounting Horizons 14 (2): 235-250.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings management. Accounting Review 70 (2): 193-225.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1996. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13 (1): 1-36.
Degeorge, F., J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser. 1999. Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of Business 72 (1): 1-33.
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Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law & Economics 26 (2): 301-325.
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Gunny, K. A. 2010. The relationship between earnings management using real activities manipulation and future performance: Evidence from meeting earnings benchmarks. Contemporary Accounting Research 27 (3): 855-888.
Gupta, M., M. Pevzner, and C. Seethamraju. 2010. The implications of absorption cost accounting and production decisions for future firm performance and valuation. Contemporary Accounting Research 27 (3): 889-922.
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描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
110353017
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110353017
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 潘健民zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Pan, Chien- Minen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 吳冠萱zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Wu, Kuan-Hsuanen_US
dc.creator (作者) 吳冠萱zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Wu, Kuan-Hsuanen_US
dc.date (日期) 2023en_US
dc.date.accessioned 6-Jul-2023 16:49:28 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 6-Jul-2023 16:49:28 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 6-Jul-2023 16:49:28 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0110353017en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/145873-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 110353017zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 獨立董事係維護公司治理之重要機制，而財務報導品質為衡量企業公司治理好壞之關鍵因素。然而公司經理人往往出於自利動機、政策誘因等不同原因而有從事盈餘管理之行為。盈餘管理不同於常見之財務報表舞弊，多運用會計準則所賦予的彈性或企業決策之自主裁量權進行，對企業揭露品質和長期經營有重大影響，因此獨立董事往往被期許能對企業盈餘管理行為產生有力的監督效果。由於日本並未強制規範所有公司皆須設置獨立董事，因此本文得以探討獨立董事的設置與企業盈餘管理行為的關聯性。本研究以日本東京證券交易所上市公司為研究樣本，探討聘用獨立董事與否和聘用之獨立董事比率，對於盈餘管理之影響。實證結果顯示，僅設立獨立董事一職無法對盈餘操縱行為產生顯著抑制作用，惟當獨立董事比率愈高時，企業確實會減少應計項目和實質盈餘管理行為。同時，本研究亦探討獨立董事之財務專業背景是否能對盈餘管理產生較佳之監督效果，結果顯示董事會中具財務背景的獨立董事比例愈高，企業反而會傾向於增加應計項目盈餘管理行為，此一結果與先前研究假說相悖，推測原因為具財務背景之獨立董事往往與企業有密切往來，因此未能發揮獨立董事應有之監督效果。再者，本研究也以企業是否聘僱具財務背景獨立董事此一虛擬變數替換主要變數，以論證具財務背景獨立董事是否同樣需佔董事會一定比例才會導致盈餘管理程度的改變。惟研究顯示相比於獨立董事皆不具財務背景之企業，聘有具財務背景獨立董事之企業其應計項目盈餘管理程度會增加。由此可推知財務背景獨立董事不僅無法發揮其監督效果，且當其存在於董事會中，僅有聘任的事實就能對盈餘管理程度造成影響。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Managers have incentives to manage earnings and independent director plays an important role in corporate governance to safeguard financial reporting quality. Earnings management stems from managers exploit the flexibility and discretion given by accounting policies to achieve an earnings target. On the other hand, independent directors are expected to monitor the managers and safeguard the financial reporting quality of the firm. Taking the advantage that independent directors are not mandated in Japan, we examine the association between independent directors and earnings management behaviors using the data from firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Consistent with the prior studies, the empirical results show that the existence of independent directors in the board of director have no association with earnings management, but as the ratio of independent director in the board gets higher, the level of earnings management gets lower.
To our surprise, the analyses show that independent directors with financial background increase the level of accrual-based earnings management. Further analyses also show that the existence of independent director in the board can increase the level of accrual-based earnings management.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 壹、緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究架構 5
貳、文獻探討與假說 6
第一節 獨立董事 6
第二節 盈餘管理 9
第三節 研究假說 14
參、研究方法 16
第一節 實證模型與變數定義 16
第二節 資料來源與樣本選取 28
肆、實證結果與分析 32
第一節 敘述性統計 32
第二節 相關係數檢定 35
第三節 迴歸結果分析 41
伍、追加測試 55
第一節 新冠疫情之影響 55
陸、結論與建議 61
參考文獻 64		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 2551558 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110353017en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 應計項目盈餘管理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 實質盈餘管理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 獨立董事zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 財務背景zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporate governanceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Accrual-based earnings managementen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Real activities manipulationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Independent directoren_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Financial backgrounden_US
dc.title (題名) 獨立董事財務背景與盈餘管理之關聯zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The association between financial background of independent directors and earnings managementen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Aggarwal, R., I. Erel, M. Ferreira, and P. Matos. 2011. Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics 100 (1): 154-181.
Ahmed, A. S., and S. Duellman. 2007. Accounting conservatism and board of director characteristics: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics 43 (2-3): 411-437.
Barton, J., and P. J. Simko. 2002. The balance sheet as an earnings management constraint. Accounting Review 77 (1): 1-27.
Bartov, E., F. A. Gul, and J. S. L. Tsui. 2000. Discretionary-accruals models and audit qualifications. Journal of Accounting and Economics 30 (3): 421-452.
Beasley, M. S. 1996. An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting Review 71 (4): 443-465.
Berle, A., and G. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York, NY: Macmillan.
Bernard, V. L., and J. K. Thomas. 1990. Evidence that stock prices do not fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 13 (4): 305-340.
Brennan, M. J., and H. H. Cao. 1997. International portfolio investment flows. Journal of Finance 52 (5): 1851-1880.
Bushee, B. J. 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. Accounting Review 73 (3): 305-333.
Cadbury, A. 1992. Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance. London: GEE.
Chava, S., and M. R. Roberts. 2008. How does financing impact investment? The role of debt covenants. Journal of Finance 63 (5): 2085-2121.
Chen, J. F., R. R. Duh, A. W. H. Hsu, and C. M. Pan. 2015. Can Anglo-Saxon audit committee scheme improve earnings quality in non-Anglo-Saxon environments? Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics 11 (1): 61-74.
Cheng, S. 2008. Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics 87 (1): 157-176.
Chi, W., L. L. Lisic, and M. Pevzner. 2011. Is enhanced audit quality associated with greater real earnings management? Accounting Horizons 25 (2): 315-335.
Chung, R., M. Firth, and J. B. Kim. 2002. Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management. Journal of Corporate Finance 8 (1): 29-48.
Cohen, D. A., A. Dey, and T. Z. Lys. 2008. Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre- and post- Sarbanes Oxley periods. Journal of Corporate Finance 83 (3): 757-787.
Cohen, D. A., and P. Zarowin. 2010. Accrual-based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 50 (1): 2-19.
Cohen, J. R., U. Hoitash, G. Krishnamoorthy, and A. M. Wright. 2014. The effect of audit committee industry expertise on monitoring the financial reporting process. Accounting Review 89 (1): 243-273.
Dass, N., O. Kini, V. Nanda, B. Onal, and J. Wang. 2014. Board expertise: Do directors from related industries help bridge the information gap? Review of Financial Studies 27 (5): 1533-1592.
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and D. J. Skinner. 1994. Accounting choice in troubled companies. Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (1-2): 113-143.
Dechow, P. M. 1994. Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance: The role of accounting accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 18 (1): 3-42.
Dechow, P. M., and D. J. Skinner. 2000. Earnings management: Reconciling the views of accounting academics, practitioners and regulators. Accounting Horizons 14 (2): 235-250.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings management. Accounting Review 70 (2): 193-225.
Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1996. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13 (1): 1-36.
Degeorge, F., J. Patel, and R. Zeckhauser. 1999. Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of Business 72 (1): 1-33.
Fama, E. F. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88 (2): 288-307.
Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law & Economics 26 (2): 301-325.
Graham, J. R., C. R. Harvey, and S. Rajgopal. 2005. The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40 (1-3): 3-73.
Gunny, K. A. 2010. The relationship between earnings management using real activities manipulation and future performance: Evidence from meeting earnings benchmarks. Contemporary Accounting Research 27 (3): 855-888.
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