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題名 CEO長期激勵薪酬、研究發展費用與ESG評比之關聯
The Relationship among Long-Term Incentive Compensation, R&D and ESG Rating
作者 林思妤
Lin, Szu-Yu
貢獻者 徐愛恩
Tsui, Stephanie
林思妤
Lin, Szu-Yu
關鍵詞 長期激勵薪酬
ESG評比
研究發展費用
R&D
Long-term Incentive Compensation
ESG Rating
日期 2023
上傳時間 2-Aug-2023 13:25:35 (UTC+8)
摘要 企業ESG表現越來越受到社會重視，諸如政府法規規定企業需要接露企業社會責任，抑或是更多的機構提供社會大眾ESG評比分數使更多人能了解市場趨勢等等，都顯示了企業社會責任近年來受到的重視。而過往許多研究企業社會責任的文獻指出，企業社會責任對公司有許多正面影響，例如公司的聲譽、與利害關係人之間的關係或是財務績效表現等等。因此，本研究欲探討是否能透過薪酬激勵來促進公司對企業社會責任之實行與推動。
     由於企業社會責任衡量不易，抑有產業差異性等問題，使得過往研究高階主管薪酬及企業社會責任表現的關聯並沒有一致性的結果，因此，本研究欲透過標準普爾全球公司(S&P Global Inc.)提供之ESG指數當作公司ESG表現之代理變數來衡量CEO長期激勵薪酬對企業ESG表現之關聯。
     實證結果顯示出，高階主管長期激勵薪酬對企業ESG表現有正向之影響，而當高階主管長期薪酬佔比較高時亦對企業ESG表現有正向影響，符合代理理論之假設。此外，本研究結果也得出研究發展費用對企業ESG表現有顯著正相關，顯示企業投入研究發展費用對企業社會責任有正面之影響。另外，考量到產業特性之差異，本研究對製造業及非製造業進行進一步分析，結果顯示出製造業之長期薪酬激勵或是研究發展費用對企業ESG表現都有更顯著之影響。
The increase in the attention of ESG performance of companies spreads over the society. In recent years, such as government regulations that require companies to disclose their corporate social responsibility or various institutions providing ESG performance information to the public all demonstrate the greater importance of corporate social responsibility. Previous research indicated that corporate social responsibility has several positive impacts on companies, such as reputation, relationships with stakeholders, and financial performance. Therefore, this study aims to explore whether promotion, implementation and advancement of corporate social responsibility can be achieved through incentive compensation.
     According to agency theory, when the interests of agents align with those of shareholders, agents will be more motivated to make decisions that positively benefit the long-term interests of the company. However, because of the difficulty in measurement of corporate social responsibility and the differences among industries, resulting in inconsistent findings in previous studies regarding the relationship between executive compensation and corporate social responsibility performance. Therefore, this study uses the ESG index provided by S&P Global Inc. as a proxy variable for corporate ESG performance to measure the association between long-term incentive compensation for CEO and corporate ESG performance.
     The empirical results show a positive impact of long-term incentive compensation for top executives on corporate ESG performance. Additionally, the higher the proportion of long-term executive compensation the greater level of corporate ESG performance would present, supporting the assumptions of agency theory. Furthermore, this study finds a significant positive correlation between research and development expenses and corporate ESG performance, indicating that investment in research and development has a positive impact on corporate social responsibility. Considering the differences in industry characteristics, this study further analyzes the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, revealing that long-term incentive compensation as well as research and development expenses have a more significant impact on corporate ESG performance in the manufacturing sector than in the non-manufacturing sector.
參考文獻 梁彤纓、金鎮城、蘇德貴，2016，所有制性質，研發投入與企業社會責任，科技管理研究，第36卷第7期: 256-262。
     Adams, H. D. 1986. Factors affecting the use of performance variables in executive compensation contracts. Washington, W.A.: University of Washington.
     Alchian, A.A., and II. Dcmsctz. 1972. Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review. 62(5): 777-795.
     Alexander, G. J., and R. A. Buchholz. 1978. Corporate Social Responsibility and Stock Market Performance. The Academy of Management Journal. 21(3): 479–486.
     and financial performance: Correlation or misspecification?.
     Berrone, P., and L.R. Gomez-Mejia. 2009. “Environmental performance and executive compensation: an integrated agency-institutional perspective”. Academy of Management Journal. 52(1): 103-126.
     Birger, W. 1984. A resource-based view of the firm. Strategy management journal 5(2): 171-180
     Brammer, S., and A. Millington. 2005. Corporate reputation and philanthropy: An empirical analysis. Journal of Business Ethics. 61: 29–44.
     Branco, M.C., L.L. Rodrigues. 2006. Corporate Social Responsibility and Resource-Based Perspectives. Journal of Business Ethics. 69: 111–132.
     Bryan, S., L. Hwang, and S. Lilien. 2000. CEO stock‐based compensation: An empirical analysis of incentive‐intensity, relative mix, and economic determinants. The Journal of Business. 73(4): 661-693.
     Cochran, P. L., and R. A. Wood. 1984. Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance. The Academy of Management Journal. 27(1): 42–56.
     Coombs, J. E., and K. M. Gilley. 2005. Stakeholder management as a predictor of CEO compensation: Main effects and interactions with financial performance. Strategic Management Journal. 26(9): 827-840.
     Fahlenbrach, R. 2004. Founder-CEOs and stock market performance. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania.
     Fogler, H. R., and F. Nutt. 1975. A note on social responsibility and stock valuation. Academy of Management Journal. 18(1): 155-160.
     Friedman, M. 1970. “The Social Responsibility pf Business is to Increase its Profit,” New York Times Magazine. (September): 122-126.
     Godfrey, P. C. 2005. The relationship between corporate philanthropy and shareholder wealth: A risk management perspective. Academy of Management Review. 30: 777–798.
     Graves, S. B., and S. A. Waddock. 1994. Institutional owners and corporate social performance. Academy of Management journal. 37(4): 1034-1046.
     Griffin, J. J., and J. F. Mahon. 1997. The corporate social performance and corporate financial performance debate: Twenty-five years of incomparable research. Business & society. 36(1): 5-31.
     Hambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason. 1984. Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers. The Academy of Management Review. 9(2): 193–206.
     Harris, M., and A. Raviv. 1979. Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information. Journal of economic theory. 20(2): 231-259.
     Harrison, J. S., and R. E. Freeman 1999. Stakeholders, social responsibility, and performance: Empirical evidence and theoretical perspectives. Academy of Management Journal. 42(5): 479–485.
     Hill, C. W., and P. Phan. 1991. CEO tenure as a determinant of CEO pay. Academy of Management journal. 34(3): 707-717.
     Hirshleifer, D. 1993. Managerial reputation and corporate investment decisions. Financial management. 145-160.
     Howard R. B. 1953. Social Responsibilities of the Businessman. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.
     Jensen, M. 1986. "Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence," Midland Corporate Finance Journal. 4: 6-32.
     Jensen, M. C., and K. J. Murphy. 1990. Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of political economy. 98(2): 225-264.
     Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics. 3: 305-360.
     Jo, H., and H. Na. 2012. Does CSR reduce firm risk? Evidence from controversial industry sectors. Journal of business ethics. 110: 441-456.
     John, T. A., and John, K. (1993). Top‐management compensation and capital structure. The Journal of Finance. 48(3), 949-974.
     Johnson, R. A., and D. W. Greening. 1999. The effects of corporate governance and institutional ownership types on corporate social performance. Academy of management journal. 42(5): 564-576.
     Lambert, R. A., and D. F. Larcker. 1987. “An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts”. Journal of Accounting Research. 25: 85-125.
     Loderer, C. F., and U. Waelchli. 2010. Firm age and performance. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1342248. Accessed: March 5, 2023.
     Mahoney, L., and L. Thorne. 2005. “Corporate social responsibility and long-term compensation: Evidence from Canada”. Journal of Business Ethics. 57(3): 241-253.
     Mahoney, L. and L. Thorne. 2006. “An examination of the structure of executive compensation and corporate social responsibility: a Canadian investigation”. Journal of Business Ethics. 69(2): 149-162.
     Malik, M., and E. D. Shim 2022. Empirical examination of the direct and moderating role of corporate social responsibility in top executive compensation. Pacific Accounting Review. 34(5): 708-727.
     Margolis, J. D., and H. A. Elfenbein and J. P. Walsh. 2009. Does it pay to be good? A meta-analysis and redirection of research on the relationship between corporate social and financial performance. Working Paper.
     Matolcsy, Z., and A. Wright. 2011. CEO compensation structure and firm performance. Accounting & Finance. 51(3): 745-763.
     McGuire, J., S. Dow and K. Argheyd. 2003. CEO Incentives and Corporate Social Performance. Journal of Business Ethics 45: 341-359
     McWilliams, A., and Siegel, D. 2000. Corporate social responsibility and financial performance: correlation or misspecification?. Strategic management journal. 21(5), 603-609.
     McWilliams, A., D. S. Siegel, and P. M. Wright. 2006. Corporate Social Responsibility: International Perspectives. Working papers, Department of Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
     Mishra, S., and D. Suar. 2010. Does corporate social responsibility influence firm performance of Indian companies?. Journal of business ethics. 95: 571-601.
     Moura‐Leite, R. C., R. C. Padgett, and J. I. Galan. 2012. Is social responsibility driven by industry or firm‐specific factors?. Management decision. 50(7): 1200-1221.
     Murphy, K. 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: an empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 7(1-3): 11-42.
     Nehrt, C. 1996. Timing and intensity effects of environmental investments. Strategic management journal. 17(7): 535-547.
     Oliver Sheldon. 1924. The Philosophy of Management. London: Sir I. Pitman and Sons.
     Orlitzky, M., F. L. Schmidt and S. L. Rynes. 2003. Corporate social and financial performance: A meta-analysis. Organization Studies. 24: 403–441.
     Pava, M. L., and J. Krausz.1996. The Association between Corporate Social-Responsibility and Financial Performance: The Paradox of Social Cost. Journal of Business Ethics. 15(3): 321–357.
     Peter W. Roberts, Grahame R. Dowling. 2002. Corporate reputation and sustained superior financial performance. Strategy management journal. 23(12): 1077-1093.
     Porter, M. E., and C. V. D. Linde. 1995. Toward a new conception of the environment-competitiveness relationship. Journal of economic perspectives. 9(4): 97-118.
     Porter, M. E., and M. R. Kramer. 2002. The competitive advantage of corporate philanthropy. Harvard Business Review. 80: 5–16.
     R.E. Freeman. 1984. Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Marshfield, MA: Pittman Publishing.
     Roberts, P. W., and G. R. Dowling. 2002. Corporate reputation and sustained superior financial performance. Strategic Management Journal. 23(12): 1077-1093.
     Russo, M. V., and P. A. Fouts. 1997. A resource-based perspective on corporate environmental performance and profitability. Academy of management Journal. 40(3): 534-559.
     Ryan Jr, H. E., and R. A. Wiggins III. 2002. The interactions between R&D investment decisions and compensation policy. Financial Management: 5-29. Strategic Management Journal. 21: 603–609.
     Saiia, D. H., A. B. Carroll and A. K. Buchholtz. 2003. Philanthropy as strategy: When corporate charity ‘‘begins at home’’. Business and Society. 42: 169–201.
     Samuel B. G. and S. A. Waddock. 1994. Institutional Owners and Corporate Social Performance. The Academy of Management Journal. 37(4): 1034-1046
     Waddock, S. A., and S. B. Graves. 1997. The corporate social performance–financial performance link. Strategic management journal. 18(4): 303-319.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
110353024
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110353024
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 徐愛恩zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Tsui, Stephanieen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 林思妤zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lin, Szu-Yuen_US
dc.creator (作者) 林思妤zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Lin, Szu-Yuen_US
dc.date (日期) 2023en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2-Aug-2023 13:25:35 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 2-Aug-2023 13:25:35 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Aug-2023 13:25:35 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0110353024en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/146397-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 110353024zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 企業ESG表現越來越受到社會重視，諸如政府法規規定企業需要接露企業社會責任，抑或是更多的機構提供社會大眾ESG評比分數使更多人能了解市場趨勢等等，都顯示了企業社會責任近年來受到的重視。而過往許多研究企業社會責任的文獻指出，企業社會責任對公司有許多正面影響，例如公司的聲譽、與利害關係人之間的關係或是財務績效表現等等。因此，本研究欲探討是否能透過薪酬激勵來促進公司對企業社會責任之實行與推動。
     由於企業社會責任衡量不易，抑有產業差異性等問題，使得過往研究高階主管薪酬及企業社會責任表現的關聯並沒有一致性的結果，因此，本研究欲透過標準普爾全球公司(S&P Global Inc.)提供之ESG指數當作公司ESG表現之代理變數來衡量CEO長期激勵薪酬對企業ESG表現之關聯。
     實證結果顯示出，高階主管長期激勵薪酬對企業ESG表現有正向之影響，而當高階主管長期薪酬佔比較高時亦對企業ESG表現有正向影響，符合代理理論之假設。此外，本研究結果也得出研究發展費用對企業ESG表現有顯著正相關，顯示企業投入研究發展費用對企業社會責任有正面之影響。另外，考量到產業特性之差異，本研究對製造業及非製造業進行進一步分析，結果顯示出製造業之長期薪酬激勵或是研究發展費用對企業ESG表現都有更顯著之影響。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The increase in the attention of ESG performance of companies spreads over the society. In recent years, such as government regulations that require companies to disclose their corporate social responsibility or various institutions providing ESG performance information to the public all demonstrate the greater importance of corporate social responsibility. Previous research indicated that corporate social responsibility has several positive impacts on companies, such as reputation, relationships with stakeholders, and financial performance. Therefore, this study aims to explore whether promotion, implementation and advancement of corporate social responsibility can be achieved through incentive compensation.
     According to agency theory, when the interests of agents align with those of shareholders, agents will be more motivated to make decisions that positively benefit the long-term interests of the company. However, because of the difficulty in measurement of corporate social responsibility and the differences among industries, resulting in inconsistent findings in previous studies regarding the relationship between executive compensation and corporate social responsibility performance. Therefore, this study uses the ESG index provided by S&P Global Inc. as a proxy variable for corporate ESG performance to measure the association between long-term incentive compensation for CEO and corporate ESG performance.
     The empirical results show a positive impact of long-term incentive compensation for top executives on corporate ESG performance. Additionally, the higher the proportion of long-term executive compensation the greater level of corporate ESG performance would present, supporting the assumptions of agency theory. Furthermore, this study finds a significant positive correlation between research and development expenses and corporate ESG performance, indicating that investment in research and development has a positive impact on corporate social responsibility. Considering the differences in industry characteristics, this study further analyzes the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, revealing that long-term incentive compensation as well as research and development expenses have a more significant impact on corporate ESG performance in the manufacturing sector than in the non-manufacturing sector.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章、 前言 1
     第一節、研究背景與動機 1
     第二節、研究議題與目的 3
     第三節、研究架構 6
     第貳章、文獻回顧 7
     第一節、ESG相關文獻 7
     第二節、 CEO薪酬激勵相關文獻 9
     第三節、企業ESG表現與CEO薪酬關聯之相關文獻 10
     第四節、 研究發展費用及資本支出相關文獻 10
     第參章、研究方法 12
     第一節、研究假說 12
     第二節、樣本選取與研究模型 14
     第三節、變數定義 17
     第肆章、實證結果 23
     第一節、敘述性統計 23
     第二節、相關係數分析 24
     第三節、迴歸分析 27
     第四節、額外測試 33
     第伍章、研究結論 35
     參考文獻 36
     附錄 41		zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110353024en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 長期激勵薪酬zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) ESG評比zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 研究發展費用zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) R&Den_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Long-term Incentive Compensationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) ESG Ratingen_US
dc.title (題名) CEO長期激勵薪酬、研究發展費用與ESG評比之關聯zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The Relationship among Long-Term Incentive Compensation, R&D and ESG Ratingen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 梁彤纓、金鎮城、蘇德貴，2016，所有制性質，研發投入與企業社會責任，科技管理研究，第36卷第7期: 256-262。
     Adams, H. D. 1986. Factors affecting the use of performance variables in executive compensation contracts. Washington, W.A.: University of Washington.
     Alchian, A.A., and II. Dcmsctz. 1972. Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review. 62(5): 777-795.
     Alexander, G. J., and R. A. Buchholz. 1978. Corporate Social Responsibility and Stock Market Performance. The Academy of Management Journal. 21(3): 479–486.
     and financial performance: Correlation or misspecification?.
     Berrone, P., and L.R. Gomez-Mejia. 2009. “Environmental performance and executive compensation: an integrated agency-institutional perspective”. Academy of Management Journal. 52(1): 103-126.
     Birger, W. 1984. A resource-based view of the firm. Strategy management journal 5(2): 171-180
     Brammer, S., and A. Millington. 2005. Corporate reputation and philanthropy: An empirical analysis. Journal of Business Ethics. 61: 29–44.
     Branco, M.C., L.L. Rodrigues. 2006. Corporate Social Responsibility and Resource-Based Perspectives. Journal of Business Ethics. 69: 111–132.
     Bryan, S., L. Hwang, and S. Lilien. 2000. CEO stock‐based compensation: An empirical analysis of incentive‐intensity, relative mix, and economic determinants. The Journal of Business. 73(4): 661-693.
     Cochran, P. L., and R. A. Wood. 1984. Corporate Social Responsibility and Financial Performance. The Academy of Management Journal. 27(1): 42–56.
     Coombs, J. E., and K. M. Gilley. 2005. Stakeholder management as a predictor of CEO compensation: Main effects and interactions with financial performance. Strategic Management Journal. 26(9): 827-840.
     Fahlenbrach, R. 2004. Founder-CEOs and stock market performance. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania.
     Fogler, H. R., and F. Nutt. 1975. A note on social responsibility and stock valuation. Academy of Management Journal. 18(1): 155-160.
     Friedman, M. 1970. “The Social Responsibility pf Business is to Increase its Profit,” New York Times Magazine. (September): 122-126.
     Godfrey, P. C. 2005. The relationship between corporate philanthropy and shareholder wealth: A risk management perspective. Academy of Management Review. 30: 777–798.
     Graves, S. B., and S. A. Waddock. 1994. Institutional owners and corporate social performance. Academy of Management journal. 37(4): 1034-1046.
     Griffin, J. J., and J. F. Mahon. 1997. The corporate social performance and corporate financial performance debate: Twenty-five years of incomparable research. Business & society. 36(1): 5-31.
     Hambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason. 1984. Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers. The Academy of Management Review. 9(2): 193–206.
     Harris, M., and A. Raviv. 1979. Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information. Journal of economic theory. 20(2): 231-259.
     Harrison, J. S., and R. E. Freeman 1999. Stakeholders, social responsibility, and performance: Empirical evidence and theoretical perspectives. Academy of Management Journal. 42(5): 479–485.
     Hill, C. W., and P. Phan. 1991. CEO tenure as a determinant of CEO pay. Academy of Management journal. 34(3): 707-717.
     Hirshleifer, D. 1993. Managerial reputation and corporate investment decisions. Financial management. 145-160.
     Howard R. B. 1953. Social Responsibilities of the Businessman. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.
     Jensen, M. 1986. "Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence," Midland Corporate Finance Journal. 4: 6-32.
     Jensen, M. C., and K. J. Murphy. 1990. Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of political economy. 98(2): 225-264.
     Jensen, M.C. and W.H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics. 3: 305-360.
     Jo, H., and H. Na. 2012. Does CSR reduce firm risk? Evidence from controversial industry sectors. Journal of business ethics. 110: 441-456.
     John, T. A., and John, K. (1993). Top‐management compensation and capital structure. The Journal of Finance. 48(3), 949-974.
     Johnson, R. A., and D. W. Greening. 1999. The effects of corporate governance and institutional ownership types on corporate social performance. Academy of management journal. 42(5): 564-576.
     Lambert, R. A., and D. F. Larcker. 1987. “An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts”. Journal of Accounting Research. 25: 85-125.
     Loderer, C. F., and U. Waelchli. 2010. Firm age and performance. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1342248. Accessed: March 5, 2023.
     Mahoney, L., and L. Thorne. 2005. “Corporate social responsibility and long-term compensation: Evidence from Canada”. Journal of Business Ethics. 57(3): 241-253.
     Mahoney, L. and L. Thorne. 2006. “An examination of the structure of executive compensation and corporate social responsibility: a Canadian investigation”. Journal of Business Ethics. 69(2): 149-162.
     Malik, M., and E. D. Shim 2022. Empirical examination of the direct and moderating role of corporate social responsibility in top executive compensation. Pacific Accounting Review. 34(5): 708-727.
     Margolis, J. D., and H. A. Elfenbein and J. P. Walsh. 2009. Does it pay to be good? A meta-analysis and redirection of research on the relationship between corporate social and financial performance. Working Paper.
     Matolcsy, Z., and A. Wright. 2011. CEO compensation structure and firm performance. Accounting & Finance. 51(3): 745-763.
     McGuire, J., S. Dow and K. Argheyd. 2003. CEO Incentives and Corporate Social Performance. Journal of Business Ethics 45: 341-359
     McWilliams, A., and Siegel, D. 2000. Corporate social responsibility and financial performance: correlation or misspecification?. Strategic management journal. 21(5), 603-609.
     McWilliams, A., D. S. Siegel, and P. M. Wright. 2006. Corporate Social Responsibility: International Perspectives. Working papers, Department of Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
     Mishra, S., and D. Suar. 2010. Does corporate social responsibility influence firm performance of Indian companies?. Journal of business ethics. 95: 571-601.
     Moura‐Leite, R. C., R. C. Padgett, and J. I. Galan. 2012. Is social responsibility driven by industry or firm‐specific factors?. Management decision. 50(7): 1200-1221.
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