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題名 資本結構、機構投資人持股比例與公司面臨經濟衰退時績效變動之關聯
Capital Structure, Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance During Economic Recession
作者 黃姿菱
Huang, Tzu-Ling
貢獻者 徐愛恩
Tsui, Stephanie
黃姿菱
Huang, Tzu-Ling
關鍵詞 資本結構
機構投資人持股
經濟衰退
公司績效
Capital structure
Institutional ownership
Recession
Firm performance
日期 2023
上傳時間 2-Aug-2023 13:26:03 (UTC+8)
摘要 　　資本結構與股權結構中，皆存有代理成本相關問題，進而影響公司績效表現。雖然過去文獻已廣泛討論資本結構與股權結構對公司績效之影響，但大多將研究期間設定於經濟環境較穩定之狀態，較少研究經濟動盪時刻資本結構及股權結構與公司績效之間關聯性，因此本研究欲探討發生經濟衰退前的財務槓桿比率及機構投資人持股比例，是否也能降低公司代理問題，從而影響經濟衰退後公司績效表現。
　　本研究以美國上市公司為樣本，並以2008年金融海嘯事件與2019年新冠肺炎疫情作為經濟衰退代表事件，研究經濟衰退前財務槓桿比率及機構投資人持股比例對經濟衰退後公司績效發展之間的關聯性。研究結果顯示，金融海嘯期間財務槓桿比率與公司績效呈顯著正相關，然而機構投資人持股比率與公司績效表現實證結果部分不顯著，而在新冠肺炎期間實證結果皆不顯著。
The problems of agency costs in capital structure and shareholding structure affect the firm performance. Although the effects of capital structure and shareholding structure on firm performance have been widely discussed in the past, most of the studies have been conducted in a stable economic period, rather than in the economic recession. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to discuss whether the financial leverage ratio and institutional ownership before the recession could reduce the agency problem of firms and affect the firm performance after the recession.
This study uses the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic as representative events to study the pre-recession effect of financial leverage ratio and institutional ownership on the post-recession, U.S. listed firm performance. The results show that financial leverage was significantly and positively correlated with firm performance, but that institutional ownership and firm performance were partially insignificant during the 2008 financial crisis. However, the results show that during the COVID-19 pandemic, those relationships were not significant.
參考文獻 中華民國中央銀行，2021，新冠肺炎危機vs.全球金融危機：起因、影響及因應對策與啟示，理監事會後記者會議題。
江偉弘與汪情萍，2020，探討持股比例對公司經營績效之影響，全球商業經營管理學報，第12期：41-48。
林建甫，2010，總體經濟計量模型的建立與應用，經濟論文叢刊，第三十八卷，第1期（3月）：1-64。
陳美菊，2009，全球金融危機之成因、影響及因應，經濟研究年刊，第9期（3月）：261-296。
趙文衡，2001，全球化與經濟危機，臺灣經濟研究月刊，第6期（6月）：35-38。
Bartov, E., and G. M. Bodnar. 1996. Alternative accounting methods, information asymmetry and liquidity: theory and evidence. The Accounting Review 71 (July): 397-418.
Baxter, N. D. 1967. Leverage, risk of ruin and the cost of capital. The Journal of Finance 22 (September): 395-403.
Berger, A. N., and E. Bonaccorsi di Patti. 2006. Capital structure and firm performance: A new approach to testing agency theory and an application to the banking industry. Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (April): 1065-1102.
Berle, A. A., and, G. C. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
Black, B. S. 1992. Agents watching agents: The promise of institutional investor voice. UCLA Law Review 39: 811-893.
Brander, J. A., and B. J. Spencer. 1989. Moral hazard and limited liability: implications for the theory of the firm. International Economic Review 30 (November): 833-849.
Brickley, J. A., R. C. Lease., and C. W. Smith Jr. 1988. Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 267-291.
Burns, A. F., and W. C. Mitchell. 1946. Measuring Business Cycles. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research
Bushee, B. J. 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. The Accounting Review 73 (July): 305-333.
Bushee, B. J. 2001. Do institutional investors prefer near-term earnings over long-run value? Contemporary Accounting Research 18 (summer): 207-246.
Chaganti, R., and F. Damanpour. 1991. Institutional ownership, capital structure, and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal 12 (October): 479-491.
Chauvin, K. W., and M. Hirschey. 1993. Advertising, R&D expenditures and the market value of the firm. Financial Management 22 (winter): 128-140.
Fiscal Affair Department of International Monetary Fund. 2020. Fiscal Monitor. International Monetary Fund.
Fischer, E. O., R. Heinkel, and J. Zechner. 1989. Dynamic capital structure choice: theory and tests. The Journal of Finance 44 (March): 19-40.
Gillan, S., and L. T. Starks. 2003. Corporate governance, corporate ownership, and the role of institutional investors: A global perspective. Journal of Applied Finance 13 (Fall): 4-22.
Harris, M., and A. Raviv. 1990. Capital structure and the informational role of debt. The Journal of Finance 45 (June): 321-349.
Harris, M., and A. Raviv. 1991. The theory of capital structure. The Journal of Finance 46 (March): 297-355.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76: 323-339.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (October): 305-360.
Kahn, C., and A. Winton. 1998. Ownership structure, speculation, and shareholder intervention. The Journal of Finance 53 (February): 99-129.
Karathanassis, G. A., and A. A. Drakos. 2004. A note on equity ownership and corporate value in Greece. Managerial and Decision Economics 25 (December): 537-547.
Keynes, J. M. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kim, E. H. 1978. A mean-variance theory of optimal capital structure and corporate debt capacity. Journal of Finance 33 (March): 45-64.
Kraus, A., and R. H. Litzenberger. 1973. A state-preference model of optimal financial leverage. The Journal of Finance 28 (September): 911-922.
Lev, B., and D. Pekelman. 1975. A multiperiod adjustment model for the firm`s capital structure. The Journal of Finance 30 (March): 75-91.
McConnell, J. J., and H. Servaes. 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics 27: 595-612.
McConnell, J. J., and H. Servaes. 1995. Equity ownership and the two faces of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 39 (September): 131-157.
Miller, M. H. 1962. Credit risk and credit rationing: further comment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 76 (August): 480-488.
Modigliani, F., and M. H. Miller. 1958. The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment. The American Economic Review 48 (June): 261-297.
Modigliani, F., and M. H. Miller. 1963. Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: a correction. The American Economic Review 53 (June): 433-443.
Morck. R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293-315.
Myers, S. C. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 5 (November): 147-175.
Myers, S. C., and N. S. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13 (June): 187-221.
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Business cycle dating. Available: https://www.nber.org/research/business-cycle-dating. Accessed: February 2, 2023.
Opler, T. C., and S. Titman. 1994. Financial distress and corporate performance. The Journal of Finance 49 (July): 1015-1040.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Corporate governance. Available: https://www.oecd.org/corporate/. Accessed: March 29, 2023.
Pound, J. 1988. Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 237-265.
Schumpeter, J. 1927. The explanation of the business cycle. Economica(December): 286-311.
Schumpeter, J. A. 1934. The Theory of Economic Development. Routledge.
Schumpeter, J. A. 1939. Business Cycles. Legare Street Press.
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94 (June): 461-488.
Stulz, R. M. 1990. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. Journal of Financial Economics 26 (July): 3-27.
Titman, S. 1984. The effect of capital structure on a firm`s liquidation decision. Journal of Financial Economics 13 (March): 137-151.
Titman, S., and R. Wessels. 1988. The determinants of capital structure choice. The Journal of Finance 43 (March): 1-19.
Wright, P., S. P. Ferris, A. Sarin, and V. Awasthi. 1996. Impact of corporate insider, blockholder, and institutional equity ownership on firm risk taking. The Academy of Management Journal 39 (April): 441-463.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
110353030
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110353030
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 徐愛恩zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Tsui, Stephanieen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 黃姿菱zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Huang, Tzu-Lingen_US
dc.creator (作者) 黃姿菱zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Huang, Tzu-Lingen_US
dc.date (日期) 2023en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2-Aug-2023 13:26:03 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 2-Aug-2023 13:26:03 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Aug-2023 13:26:03 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0110353030en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/146400-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 110353030zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 　　資本結構與股權結構中，皆存有代理成本相關問題，進而影響公司績效表現。雖然過去文獻已廣泛討論資本結構與股權結構對公司績效之影響，但大多將研究期間設定於經濟環境較穩定之狀態，較少研究經濟動盪時刻資本結構及股權結構與公司績效之間關聯性，因此本研究欲探討發生經濟衰退前的財務槓桿比率及機構投資人持股比例，是否也能降低公司代理問題，從而影響經濟衰退後公司績效表現。
　　本研究以美國上市公司為樣本，並以2008年金融海嘯事件與2019年新冠肺炎疫情作為經濟衰退代表事件，研究經濟衰退前財務槓桿比率及機構投資人持股比例對經濟衰退後公司績效發展之間的關聯性。研究結果顯示，金融海嘯期間財務槓桿比率與公司績效呈顯著正相關，然而機構投資人持股比率與公司績效表現實證結果部分不顯著，而在新冠肺炎期間實證結果皆不顯著。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The problems of agency costs in capital structure and shareholding structure affect the firm performance. Although the effects of capital structure and shareholding structure on firm performance have been widely discussed in the past, most of the studies have been conducted in a stable economic period, rather than in the economic recession. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to discuss whether the financial leverage ratio and institutional ownership before the recession could reduce the agency problem of firms and affect the firm performance after the recession.
This study uses the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic as representative events to study the pre-recession effect of financial leverage ratio and institutional ownership on the post-recession, U.S. listed firm performance. The results show that financial leverage was significantly and positively correlated with firm performance, but that institutional ownership and firm performance were partially insignificant during the 2008 financial crisis. However, the results show that during the COVID-19 pandemic, those relationships were not significant.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 壹、前言 1
一、研究背景與動機 1
二、研究議題與目的 3
三、研究流程 5
貳、文獻探討 6
一、景氣循環與經濟衰退相關文獻 6
二、資本結構相關文獻 7
三、公司治理與機構投資人相關文獻 11
四、假說發展 13
參、研究方法 17
一、研究期間與研究對象 17
二、資料來源 17
三、變數衡量 17
四、研究方法與模型 21
肆、實證結果 23
一、敘述性統計 23
二、共線性分析 27
三、迴歸分析 31
四、額外測試 38
伍、研究結論與限制 40
一、研究結論 40
二、研究限制 41
參考文獻 42
附錄 46		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1257983 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110353030en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資本結構zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 機構投資人持股zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經濟衰退zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司績效zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Capital structureen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Institutional ownershipen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Recessionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Firm performanceen_US
dc.title (題名) 資本結構、機構投資人持股比例與公司面臨經濟衰退時績效變動之關聯zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Capital Structure, Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance During Economic Recessionen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中華民國中央銀行，2021，新冠肺炎危機vs.全球金融危機：起因、影響及因應對策與啟示，理監事會後記者會議題。
江偉弘與汪情萍，2020，探討持股比例對公司經營績效之影響，全球商業經營管理學報，第12期：41-48。
林建甫，2010，總體經濟計量模型的建立與應用，經濟論文叢刊，第三十八卷，第1期（3月）：1-64。
陳美菊，2009，全球金融危機之成因、影響及因應，經濟研究年刊，第9期（3月）：261-296。
趙文衡，2001，全球化與經濟危機，臺灣經濟研究月刊，第6期（6月）：35-38。
Bartov, E., and G. M. Bodnar. 1996. Alternative accounting methods, information asymmetry and liquidity: theory and evidence. The Accounting Review 71 (July): 397-418.
Baxter, N. D. 1967. Leverage, risk of ruin and the cost of capital. The Journal of Finance 22 (September): 395-403.
Berger, A. N., and E. Bonaccorsi di Patti. 2006. Capital structure and firm performance: A new approach to testing agency theory and an application to the banking industry. Journal of Banking & Finance 30 (April): 1065-1102.
Berle, A. A., and, G. C. Means. 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
Black, B. S. 1992. Agents watching agents: The promise of institutional investor voice. UCLA Law Review 39: 811-893.
Brander, J. A., and B. J. Spencer. 1989. Moral hazard and limited liability: implications for the theory of the firm. International Economic Review 30 (November): 833-849.
Brickley, J. A., R. C. Lease., and C. W. Smith Jr. 1988. Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 267-291.
Burns, A. F., and W. C. Mitchell. 1946. Measuring Business Cycles. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research
Bushee, B. J. 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. The Accounting Review 73 (July): 305-333.
Bushee, B. J. 2001. Do institutional investors prefer near-term earnings over long-run value? Contemporary Accounting Research 18 (summer): 207-246.
Chaganti, R., and F. Damanpour. 1991. Institutional ownership, capital structure, and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal 12 (October): 479-491.
Chauvin, K. W., and M. Hirschey. 1993. Advertising, R&D expenditures and the market value of the firm. Financial Management 22 (winter): 128-140.
Fiscal Affair Department of International Monetary Fund. 2020. Fiscal Monitor. International Monetary Fund.
Fischer, E. O., R. Heinkel, and J. Zechner. 1989. Dynamic capital structure choice: theory and tests. The Journal of Finance 44 (March): 19-40.
Gillan, S., and L. T. Starks. 2003. Corporate governance, corporate ownership, and the role of institutional investors: A global perspective. Journal of Applied Finance 13 (Fall): 4-22.
Harris, M., and A. Raviv. 1990. Capital structure and the informational role of debt. The Journal of Finance 45 (June): 321-349.
Harris, M., and A. Raviv. 1991. The theory of capital structure. The Journal of Finance 46 (March): 297-355.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76: 323-339.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (October): 305-360.
Kahn, C., and A. Winton. 1998. Ownership structure, speculation, and shareholder intervention. The Journal of Finance 53 (February): 99-129.
Karathanassis, G. A., and A. A. Drakos. 2004. A note on equity ownership and corporate value in Greece. Managerial and Decision Economics 25 (December): 537-547.
Keynes, J. M. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kim, E. H. 1978. A mean-variance theory of optimal capital structure and corporate debt capacity. Journal of Finance 33 (March): 45-64.
Kraus, A., and R. H. Litzenberger. 1973. A state-preference model of optimal financial leverage. The Journal of Finance 28 (September): 911-922.
Lev, B., and D. Pekelman. 1975. A multiperiod adjustment model for the firm`s capital structure. The Journal of Finance 30 (March): 75-91.
McConnell, J. J., and H. Servaes. 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. Journal of Financial Economics 27: 595-612.
McConnell, J. J., and H. Servaes. 1995. Equity ownership and the two faces of debt. Journal of Financial Economics 39 (September): 131-157.
Miller, M. H. 1962. Credit risk and credit rationing: further comment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 76 (August): 480-488.
Modigliani, F., and M. H. Miller. 1958. The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment. The American Economic Review 48 (June): 261-297.
Modigliani, F., and M. H. Miller. 1963. Corporate income taxes and the cost of capital: a correction. The American Economic Review 53 (June): 433-443.
Morck. R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 293-315.
Myers, S. C. 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics 5 (November): 147-175.
Myers, S. C., and N. S. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13 (June): 187-221.
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Business cycle dating. Available: https://www.nber.org/research/business-cycle-dating. Accessed: February 2, 2023.
Opler, T. C., and S. Titman. 1994. Financial distress and corporate performance. The Journal of Finance 49 (July): 1015-1040.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Corporate governance. Available: https://www.oecd.org/corporate/. Accessed: March 29, 2023.
Pound, J. 1988. Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 237-265.
Schumpeter, J. 1927. The explanation of the business cycle. Economica(December): 286-311.
Schumpeter, J. A. 1934. The Theory of Economic Development. Routledge.
Schumpeter, J. A. 1939. Business Cycles. Legare Street Press.
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94 (June): 461-488.
Stulz, R. M. 1990. Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies. Journal of Financial Economics 26 (July): 3-27.
Titman, S. 1984. The effect of capital structure on a firm`s liquidation decision. Journal of Financial Economics 13 (March): 137-151.
Titman, S., and R. Wessels. 1988. The determinants of capital structure choice. The Journal of Finance 43 (March): 1-19.
Wright, P., S. P. Ferris, A. Sarin, and V. Awasthi. 1996. Impact of corporate insider, blockholder, and institutional equity ownership on firm risk taking. The Academy of Management Journal 39 (April): 441-463.		zh_TW