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題名 機構投資人持股對企業使用主觀及客觀指標發放獎酬之影響
The impact of institutional investors` shareholding on companies` use of subjective and objective indicators to pay compensation
作者 江孟衡
Jiang, Meng-Heng
貢獻者 徐愛恩
Tsui, Stephanie
江孟衡
Jiang, Meng-Heng
關鍵詞 薪酬合約
主觀績效指標
相對績效指標
機構投資人
Institutional investors
Compensation contracts
Subjective performance measures
Relative performance measures
日期 2023
上傳時間 2-Aug-2023 13:28:00 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究探討機構投資人監督效果對企業使用主觀及客觀指標發放獎酬的影響。客觀績效指標由於它事前訂定的特性，使高階經理人有機會操弄績效。因此透過融入能事後進行調整的主觀績效指標及能夠過濾市場衝擊之相對績效指標（RPE）於薪酬合約中，可以有效降低高階經理人操縱績效的動機和機會。但主觀績效指標將延伸出資訊不透明等代理問題。據此，本研究欲探討機構投資人對於主觀績效指標的態度為傾向透過主觀績效指標達到最適薪酬合約，抑或是傾向降低主觀績效指標延伸出的代理成本，並進一步研究機構投資人為使公司達最適薪酬合約是否將使公司融入RPE於薪酬合約中。
實證結果顯示機構投資人對薪酬委員會制定薪酬契約有顯著的影響，並發現在 Dedicated 類型、Value 類型 以及同時為 Dedicated 和 Growth 類型之機構投資人影響尤為顯著，但未發現Growth類型機構投資人對公司融入RPE有顯著影響。
This study aims to analyze how the monitoring practices of institutional investors affect the selection of performance measures for executive compensation. The use of objective performance measures can be manipulated by senior executives, while incorporating adjustable subjective measures and relative performance evaluation (RPE) measures can reduce incentives for manipulation. However, subjective measures create agency problems due to information opacity. This study explores whether institutional investors prefer subjective measures to achieve optimal compensation contracts or to mitigate agency costs. This study also investigates whether they advocate the inclusion of RPE in compensation contracts.
The empirical results demonstrate a significant influence of institutional investors on the compensation contracts formulated by the compensation committee. Specifically, institutional investors of the Dedicated and Value types, as well as those who are both Dedicated and Growth types, have a particularly notable impact. However, no significant influence of Growth type institutional investors on the inclusion of RPE in compensation contracts is found.
參考文獻 李靜妮，2011，公司治理與裁量性紅利關聯性之研究，國立政治大學會計學系碩士論文。
郭家瑀，2019，不同類型機構投資人持股對公司債殖利率利差影響，國立台灣大學管理學院財務金融研究所碩士論文。
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Agrawal, A., & Mandelker, G. N. (1990). Large shareholders and the monitoring of managers: The case of antitakeover charter amendments. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25(2), 143-161.
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描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
110353047
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110353047
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 徐愛恩zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Tsui, Stephanieen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 江孟衡zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Jiang, Meng-Hengen_US
dc.creator (作者) 江孟衡zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Jiang, Meng-Hengen_US
dc.date (日期) 2023en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2-Aug-2023 13:28:00 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 2-Aug-2023 13:28:00 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Aug-2023 13:28:00 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0110353047en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/146409-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 110353047zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究探討機構投資人監督效果對企業使用主觀及客觀指標發放獎酬的影響。客觀績效指標由於它事前訂定的特性，使高階經理人有機會操弄績效。因此透過融入能事後進行調整的主觀績效指標及能夠過濾市場衝擊之相對績效指標（RPE）於薪酬合約中，可以有效降低高階經理人操縱績效的動機和機會。但主觀績效指標將延伸出資訊不透明等代理問題。據此，本研究欲探討機構投資人對於主觀績效指標的態度為傾向透過主觀績效指標達到最適薪酬合約，抑或是傾向降低主觀績效指標延伸出的代理成本，並進一步研究機構投資人為使公司達最適薪酬合約是否將使公司融入RPE於薪酬合約中。
實證結果顯示機構投資人對薪酬委員會制定薪酬契約有顯著的影響，並發現在 Dedicated 類型、Value 類型 以及同時為 Dedicated 和 Growth 類型之機構投資人影響尤為顯著，但未發現Growth類型機構投資人對公司融入RPE有顯著影響。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study aims to analyze how the monitoring practices of institutional investors affect the selection of performance measures for executive compensation. The use of objective performance measures can be manipulated by senior executives, while incorporating adjustable subjective measures and relative performance evaluation (RPE) measures can reduce incentives for manipulation. However, subjective measures create agency problems due to information opacity. This study explores whether institutional investors prefer subjective measures to achieve optimal compensation contracts or to mitigate agency costs. This study also investigates whether they advocate the inclusion of RPE in compensation contracts.
The empirical results demonstrate a significant influence of institutional investors on the compensation contracts formulated by the compensation committee. Specifically, institutional investors of the Dedicated and Value types, as well as those who are both Dedicated and Growth types, have a particularly notable impact. However, no significant influence of Growth type institutional investors on the inclusion of RPE in compensation contracts is found.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 誌謝 i
摘要 ii
Abstract iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 vi
壹、 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的及研究問題 4
貳、 文獻探討 6
第一節 代理問題與薪酬 6
第二節 客觀績效指標(公式型指標)之探討 7
一、 客觀績效指標自身存在之問題 7
二、 客觀績效指標之設計存在偏誤時產生的影響 8
第三節 探討主觀績效指標優、缺點以及使用時機之相關文獻 9
一、 主觀績效指標幫助公司達到最適薪酬合約 9
二、 主觀績效指標造成公司增加額外的增額成本 11
三、 探討主觀績效指標會在何種情況使用之文獻 13
第四節 探討機構投資人監督效果之相關文獻 13
第五節 探討各類別機構投資人之監督效果 15
第六節 探討機構投資人對薪酬監督效果之相關文獻 16
第七節 相對績效指標（RPE）之相關文獻 17
參、 研究假說 19
第一節 裁量性紅利與機構投資人 19
第二節 RPE與機構投資人 21
肆、 研究方法 22
第一節 研究模型 22
第二節 樣本及資料來源蒐集 32
伍、 實證結果與分析 35
第一節 敘述性統計 35
第二節 相關係數分析 41
第三節 實證迴歸結果 46
一、 機構投資人持股對公司發放裁量性紅利之影響 46
二、 各類型機構投資人持股對公司發放裁量性紅利之影響 49
三、 公司被Dedicated類型及Growth類型之機構投資人持股對公司發放裁量性紅利之影響是否較公司被Transient類型及Value類型之機構投資人持有顯著 52
四、 Growth類型機構投資人持股對融入RPE於薪酬契約之影響 56
陸、 結論及建議 60
第一節 研究結論 60
第二節 研究建議 61
柒、 參考文獻 62
附錄一 69
附錄二 70		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 2531160 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110353047en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 薪酬合約zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 主觀績效指標zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 相對績效指標zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 機構投資人zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Institutional investorsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Compensation contractsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Subjective performance measuresen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Relative performance measuresen_US
dc.title (題名) 機構投資人持股對企業使用主觀及客觀指標發放獎酬之影響zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The impact of institutional investors` shareholding on companies` use of subjective and objective indicators to pay compensationen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 李靜妮，2011，公司治理與裁量性紅利關聯性之研究，國立政治大學會計學系碩士論文。
郭家瑀，2019，不同類型機構投資人持股對公司債殖利率利差影響，國立台灣大學管理學院財務金融研究所碩士論文。
Abarbanell, J. S., Bushee, B. J., & Smith Raedy, J. (2003). Institutional investor preferences and price pressure: The case of corporate spin‐offs. The Journal of Business, 76(2), 233-261.
Agrawal, A., & Mandelker, G. N. (1990). Large shareholders and the monitoring of managers: The case of antitakeover charter amendments. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25(2), 143-161.
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