| dc.contributor.advisor | 連賢明 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Lien, Hsien-Ming | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 張逸芩 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Chang, Yi-Chin | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 張逸芩 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chang, Yi-Chin | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2023 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2-Aug-2023 13:57:01 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 2-Aug-2023 13:57:01 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 2-Aug-2023 13:57:01 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0110255004 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/146541 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政學系 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 110255004 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 我國勞工保險舊制與新制老年給付的「平均投保保薪資」分別採計退休前3年平均投保薪資與加保期間最高60個月的計算方式，對於被保險人有提高薪資的誘因存在。本研究使用2004年至2019年的勞工保險資料，篩選出請領老年給付的樣本，並追蹤這些樣本退休前每月的投保紀錄，再使用斷點迴歸進行估計，分析被保險人在「平均投保保薪資」計算基準月當月的薪資跳躍現象。研究結果顯示，請領舊制的產業與公司行號被保險人在退休前36個月有投保薪資跳躍的現象產生，當月顯著增加1.25%；與前12個月平均薪資相比，約為330元；請領新制的產業與公司行號被保險人在退休前60個月也有投保薪資跳躍的現象產生，當月顯著增加0.7%；再與前12個月平均薪資相比，約為190元。此外，不論是舊制或是新制，愈低薪資分位的組別在計算基準月的跳躍愈大，最低四分位與最高四分位的投保薪資跳躍幅度相差5.6至6.2倍，顯示投保薪資愈低的組別有較大的誘因在退休前提高投保薪資，以獲得較高的老年給付。綜上所述，人們對於制度會因應出不同的行為，未來政府在擬定或修正制度時，應納入考量並盡量降低制度的不當誘因，以免對社會保險制度造成不當的財務影響，維護制度上的公平性。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | In the case of the old and new systems of the Old-Age Benefits of Labor Insurance in Taiwan, the "average monthly insurance salary" is respectively calculated based on the average insured salary in the three years before retirement and the highest 60 months of coverage. These calculation methods provide incentives for people to increase their salaries. In this study, we used the administration data of labor insurance from 2004 to 2019, selected samples of recipients of old-age benefits, and used regression discontinuity analysis to estimate the salary jump phenomenon in the month when the "average monthly insurance salary" was calculated. The results of the study show that people in the old system experienced a salary jump in the 36 months before retirement, with a significant 1.25% increase compared to the average salary in the previous 12 months, which amounts to NT$330. People in the new system also experienced a salary jump in the 60 months before retirement, with a significant 0.7% increase compared to the average salary in the previous 12 months, which amounts to NT$190. Additionally, regardless of the old or new system, the lower salary groups had larger jumps in insurance salary in the calculation month. The jump in insurance salary for the lowest quartile group was 5.6 to 6.2 times larger than that of the highest quartile group, indicating that lower-income groups have a greater incentive to increase their insurance salary before retirement to receive higher old-age benefits. In conclusion, people respond differently to systems. In the future, when the government formulates or amends systems, it should take these factors into consideration and minimize inappropriate incentives to avoid undue financial impact on the social insurance system and maintain fairness in the system. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第壹章 緒論 1第貳章 背景介紹與文獻回顧 4第一節 勞工保險與老年給付制度介紹 4第二節 退休決策相關文獻 8第參章 研究方法 11第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 11第二節 實證模型 27第肆章 研究結果 29第一節 敘述統計 29第二節 估計結果 33第伍章 結論 47參考文獻 49附錄 51 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 3080081 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110255004 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 老年給付 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 平均投保薪資 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 制度誘因 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 斷點迴歸 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Old-Age Benefit | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Average monthly insurance salary | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Incentive mechanism | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Regression discontinuity design | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 勞工保險老年給付薪資調整誘因與2009年年金化之影響 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | The Incentives for Salary Adjustment and the Effects of the 2009 Pension Policy: Evidence from the Old-Age Benefits in Taiwan | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en_US |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | 勞動部勞工保險局（2023）。勞工保險簡介。吳慧瑛（2014）。勞工退休金制度變革對台灣勞動市場的影響。科技部專題研究計畫。林良齊（2020）。年金每改1次就引爆1次退休潮。中時新聞網。林萬億（2013）。我國的年金制度改革：危機與轉機。孫友聯（2013）。從年金改革看勞保年金制度的重構。社區發展季刊，201312(144)，111-120。陳昱涵、陳國樑、黃勢璋（2021）。公務人員退休金制度改革與其勞動市場之實證分析。經濟研究，57(1) ，123-171。張家麒（2023）。勞保加職業工會能「少繳多領」！達人曝光方法：用最低費用卻領天花板級距。聯合新聞網。楊子霆、駱明慶（2009）。誰付退休金?-勞退新制對私部門勞工薪資的影響。經濟論文，37(3)，339-368。楊子霆（2018）。簡介Regression Discontinuity Design：理論與應用。會計審計論叢，8(1)，29-48。羅紀琼（2013）。勞工保險老年給付之投保薪資誘因探討。臺灣經濟預測與政策，43(2)，1-22。Calonico, S., Cattaneo, M. D., & Titiunik, R. (2014). Robust nonparametric confidence intervals for regression‐discontinuity designs. Econometrica, 82(6), 2295-2326.Chan, S., & Stevens, A. H. (2008). What you don`t know can`t help you: Pension knowledge and retirement decision-making. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2), 253-266.Gruber, J., Kanninen, O., Nivalainen, S., Ravaska, T., & Uusitalo, R. (2019). The effect of relabeling and incentives on retirement: evidence from the Finnish pension reform in 2005. Labour Institute for Economic Research Working Paper, 328.Kim, D. (2020). Worker retirement responses to pension incentives: Do they respond to pension wealth?. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 173, 365-385.Krueger, A. B., & Pischke, J. S. (1992). The effect of social security on labor supply: A cohort analysis of the notch generation. Journal of labor economics, 10(4), 412-437.Lee, D. S., & Lemieux, T. (2010). Regression discontinuity designs in economics. Journal of economic literature, 48(2), 281-355. | zh_TW |
