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題名 排碳外部性與最適碳稅
The Externality of Carbon Emissions and the Optimal Carbon Tax作者 簡靖峰 貢獻者 陳國樑<br>羅時萬
簡靖峰關鍵詞 碳稅
外部性
次佳理論
淨零排放
最適租稅
Carbon tax
Externalities
Second-best theory
Net zero
The optimal taxation日期 2023 上傳時間 2-Aug-2023 13:59:49 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文依循Sandmo (1975) 的模型設定，透過極大化社會的淨效用，分析最適碳稅架構。結果發現，在伯瑞圖最適與個人消費選擇之下，若是不存在排碳外部性，則其最適資源配置條件同傳統觀點：財貨間的消費者評價與廠商邊際成本相等；若是存在排碳外部性，則消費者的邊際替代率 (marginal rate of substitution, MRS) 不會直接等於廠商的邊際轉換率 (marginal rate of transformation, MRT)，但可透過皮古稅提高財貨價格使消費者承擔外部成本，最終讓市場均衡量下降，達到伯瑞圖最適；且若是一個財貨的排碳程度較高，則應負擔較高的皮古稅。若消費者認為自身消費對於總產量的影響不為零，則透過本文模型得出，最適皮古稅將相較於消費者認為其對於總產量的影響為零的情況要低，甚至為零。而在次佳理論 (second-best theory) 當中，財貨課稅的最適稅額會受到個人所得邊際效用與政府稅收對社會邊際效用大小影響，並且在考量排碳總量限制之下，得出若是排碳超出限制，應提高最適稅額降低產量與排碳；若排碳在限制範圍內，則無需變動稅額。最後，結合淨零排放政策達成碳中和，得出淨零碳費應與單位減碳成本和單位排碳量的乘積有關，且若各財貨的單位減碳成本不同，則有較高減碳成本的財貨應負擔較高的淨零碳費。
This paper follows the model set by Sandmo (1975) to analyze the optimal carbon tax framework by maximizing social net utility. The results reveal that under the Pareto optimality and individual consumption choice, in the absence of carbon externalities, the optimal resource allocation conditions are consistent with the traditional perspective: consumer valuation of goods equals firm marginal costs. However, in the presence of carbon externalities, the consumer`s Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) does not directly equal the firm`s Marginal Rate of Transformation (MRT). Nevertheless, the use of Pigouvian taxes to increase the prices of goods enables consumers to bear the external costs, leading to a decrease in market equilibrium quantity and achieving Pareto optimality. Additionally, if a good has a higher carbon intensity, it should bear a higher Pigouvian tax. If consumers perceive that their own consumption affects total output, the model shows that the optimal Pigouvian tax is lower compared to the scenario where consumers perceive their impact on total output to be zero, and it may even be zero.Under the second-best scenario, the optimal tax rate on goods is influenced by individual marginal utility of income and the social marginal utility of government`s tax revenue. Considering the carbon emission constraint, it is concluded that if carbon emissions exceed the limit, the optimal tax rate should be increased to reduce output and carbon emissions. If carbon emissions are within the limit, there is no need to change the tax rate.Lastly, integrating the net-zero emission policy to achieve carbon neutrality, it is found that the optimal carbon fee should be related to the product of the unit cost of carbon reduction and the unit amount of carbon emissions. If the unit costs of carbon reduction vary across goods, goods with higher reduction costs should bear higher carbon fees.參考文獻 專書論文吳佩凌 (2005)，《不對稱資訊下最適所得稅與租稅逃漏及查核策略之研究》，博士論文，國立政治大學財政學研究所。蕭代基、黃琝琇、林師模與傅俞瑄 (2022)，「國際碳邊境調整機制對臺灣減碳與經濟的影響」，《臺灣能源期刊》，9，1−24。Atkinson, A. (1973), “How Progressive Should Income Tax Be ?” in M. Parkin and A. R. Nobay (eds), Essays in modern economics, 90-109, London: Longman.Boadway, R. and M. Keen (1993), “Public Goods, Self-selection and Optimal Income Taxation,” International Economic Review, 34, 463-478.Bovenberg, A. and F. van der Ploeg (1994), “Environmental Policy, Public Finance and the Labour Market in a Second-best World,” Journal of Public Economics, 55, 349−390.Chander, P. and L. Wilde (1998), “A Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement,” Review of Economic Studies, 65, 165-183.Coase, R. (1960), “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1−44.Corlett, W. and D. Hague (1953), “Complementarity and the Excess Burden of Taxation,” The Review of Economic Studies, 21, 21−30.Cremer, H. and F. Gahvari (1995), “Tax Evasion and the Optimal General Income Tax,” Journal of Public Economics, 60, 235-249.Cremer, H., F. Gahvari, N. Ladoux (1998), “Externalities and Optimal Taxation,” Journal of Public Economics, 70, 343−364.Dalton, T. and E. Sadka (1979), “A Many-Good Corlett-Hague Tax Rule,” Economics Letters, 4, 169−172.Dixit, A. (1985), “Tax Policy in Open Economies,” in A. Auerbach, and M. Feldstein (eds), Handbook of Public Economics, 313−374, North-Holland, Amsterdam.Dong, B., W. Wei, X. Ma, P. Li (2017), “On the Impacts of Carbon Tax and Technological Progress on China,” Applied Economics, 50, 389−406.Edgeworth, F. (1897), “The Pure Theory of Taxation,” The Economic Journal, 7, 550−571.Fuest, C. and B. Huber (1997), “Wage Bargaining, Labor-tax Progression, and Welfare,” Journal of Economics, 66, 127−150.Goulder, L. (1995), “Effects of Carbon Taxes in an Economy with Prior Tax Distortions: An Intertemporal General Equilibrium Analysis,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 29, 271−297.Hoel, M. (1996), “Should a Carbon Tax Be Differentiated across Sectors?” Journal of Public Economics, 59, 17−32.Hungerbuelher, M., E. Lehmann, A. Parmentier, B. van der Linden (2006), “Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model,” The Review of Economic Studies, 73, 743−767.Jaqua, D. and D. Schaffa (2016), “Pigouvian Taxation with Costly Administration and Multiple Externalities,” National Tax Association, 109, 1−27.Ley, E. (1992), “A Note on Ramsey and Corlett-Hague Rules,” working paper.Lin, B. and X. Li (2011), “The Effect of Carbon Tax on Per Capital CO2 Emissions,” Energy Policy, 39, 5137−5146.Metcalf, G. and D. Weisbach (2009), “The Design of a Carbon Tax,” The Harvard Environmental Law Review, 33, 499−556.Metcalf, G. and J. Stock (2020), “The Macroeconomic Impact of Europe’s Carbon Taxes,” working paper.Mirrlees, J. (1971), “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,” The Review of Economic Studies, 38, 175−208.Nordhaus, W. (2011), “Designing a Friendly Space for Technological Change to Slow Global Warming,” Energy Economics, 33, 665−673.Pigou, A. (1920), “The Economics of Welfare,” The Economic Journal, 31, 206−213.Ramsey, F. (1927), “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation,” The Economic Journal, 37, 47–61.Rausch, S., G. Metcalf, J. Reilly (2011), “Distributional Impacts of Carbon Pricing: A General Equibrium Approach with Micro-data for Households,” Energy Economics, 33, s20−s33.Saez, E. (2001), “Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates,” Review of Economic Studies, 68, 205-229.Sandmo, A. (1975), “Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities,” The Swedish Journal of Economics, 77, 86−98.Sandmo, A. (1986), “A Reinterpretation of Elasticity Formulae in Optimum Tax Theory,” Economica, 54, 89−96.Seade, J. (1977), “On the Shape of Optimal Tax Schedules,” Journal of Pubic Economics, 7, 203−236.Stiglitz, J. (1987), “Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and New New Welfare Economics,” in Auerbach, A. and M. Feldstein (eds), Handbook of Public Economics, 991-1042, North-Holland, Amsterdam.Tuomala, M. (1984), “On the Optimal Income Taxation: Some Further Numerical Results,” Journal of Public Economics, 23, 351-366.van der Ploeg, F. and C. Withagen (2014), “Growth, Renewables, and the Optimal Carbon Tax,” International Economic Review, 55, 283−311.Zoutman, F., E. Gavrilova, and A. Hopland (2018), “Estimating both Supply and Demand Elasticities Using Variation in a Single Tax Rate,” Econometrica, 86, 763−771.網際網路ESG遠見 (2022)，「歐洲議會最新草案/一次看懂CBAM碳關稅、ETS碳排交易重點」，上網日期2023年5月29日，檢自：https://esg.gvm.com.tw/article/7796.ESG遠見 (2023)，「2023年10月試行! 一文搞懂什麼是『碳邊境調整機制』CBAM?」，上網日期2023年5月29日，檢自：https://esg.gvm.com.tw/article/5120.永續溝通與知識平台 (2021)，「5項基礎概念，一次看懂『碳定價』!」，上網日期2023年5月10日，檢自：https://csrone.com/topics/6941.行政院環境保護署國家溫室氣體減量法規資訊網 (2023)，「溫管法簡介」，上網日期2023年5月10日，檢自：https://ghgrule.epa.gov.tw/greenhouse/greenhouse_page/23/100.行政院環境保護署環保新聞專區 (2021)，「環保署預告修正『溫室氣體減量及管理法』為『氣候變遷因應法』」，上網日期2023年4月15日，檢自：https://enews.epa.gov.tw/page/3b3c62c78849f32f/de5ace9a-814a-47cb-8273-342ec0664511.經濟部2050淨零排放 (2023)，「2050淨零排放」，上網日期2023年4月15日，檢自：https://www.go-moea.tw/.臺灣氣候變遷推估資訊與調適知識平台 (2021)，「英國氣象局預測：2021年大氣中的二氧化碳量恐較工業時代前的平均高出50%」，上網日期2023年5月29日，檢自：https://tccip.ncdr.nat.gov.tw/km_news_one.aspx?kid=20210119225454.數位時代 (2021)，「碳關稅將上路、零碳新賽局開跑！台灣為何該擔憂國際競爭力?」，上網日期2023年5月29日，檢自：https://www.bnext.com.tw/article/63625/carbon-tax-eu-global? 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
110255028資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110255028 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 陳國樑<br>羅時萬 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) 簡靖峰 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) 簡靖峰 zh_TW dc.date (日期) 2023 en_US dc.date.accessioned 2-Aug-2023 13:59:49 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 2-Aug-2023 13:59:49 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Aug-2023 13:59:49 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0110255028 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/146549 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 財政學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 110255028 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文依循Sandmo (1975) 的模型設定，透過極大化社會的淨效用，分析最適碳稅架構。結果發現，在伯瑞圖最適與個人消費選擇之下，若是不存在排碳外部性，則其最適資源配置條件同傳統觀點：財貨間的消費者評價與廠商邊際成本相等；若是存在排碳外部性，則消費者的邊際替代率 (marginal rate of substitution, MRS) 不會直接等於廠商的邊際轉換率 (marginal rate of transformation, MRT)，但可透過皮古稅提高財貨價格使消費者承擔外部成本，最終讓市場均衡量下降，達到伯瑞圖最適；且若是一個財貨的排碳程度較高，則應負擔較高的皮古稅。若消費者認為自身消費對於總產量的影響不為零，則透過本文模型得出，最適皮古稅將相較於消費者認為其對於總產量的影響為零的情況要低，甚至為零。而在次佳理論 (second-best theory) 當中，財貨課稅的最適稅額會受到個人所得邊際效用與政府稅收對社會邊際效用大小影響，並且在考量排碳總量限制之下，得出若是排碳超出限制，應提高最適稅額降低產量與排碳；若排碳在限制範圍內，則無需變動稅額。最後，結合淨零排放政策達成碳中和，得出淨零碳費應與單位減碳成本和單位排碳量的乘積有關，且若各財貨的單位減碳成本不同，則有較高減碳成本的財貨應負擔較高的淨零碳費。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper follows the model set by Sandmo (1975) to analyze the optimal carbon tax framework by maximizing social net utility. The results reveal that under the Pareto optimality and individual consumption choice, in the absence of carbon externalities, the optimal resource allocation conditions are consistent with the traditional perspective: consumer valuation of goods equals firm marginal costs. However, in the presence of carbon externalities, the consumer`s Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) does not directly equal the firm`s Marginal Rate of Transformation (MRT). Nevertheless, the use of Pigouvian taxes to increase the prices of goods enables consumers to bear the external costs, leading to a decrease in market equilibrium quantity and achieving Pareto optimality. Additionally, if a good has a higher carbon intensity, it should bear a higher Pigouvian tax. If consumers perceive that their own consumption affects total output, the model shows that the optimal Pigouvian tax is lower compared to the scenario where consumers perceive their impact on total output to be zero, and it may even be zero.Under the second-best scenario, the optimal tax rate on goods is influenced by individual marginal utility of income and the social marginal utility of government`s tax revenue. Considering the carbon emission constraint, it is concluded that if carbon emissions exceed the limit, the optimal tax rate should be increased to reduce output and carbon emissions. If carbon emissions are within the limit, there is no need to change the tax rate.Lastly, integrating the net-zero emission policy to achieve carbon neutrality, it is found that the optimal carbon fee should be related to the product of the unit cost of carbon reduction and the unit amount of carbon emissions. If the unit costs of carbon reduction vary across goods, goods with higher reduction costs should bear higher carbon fees. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究背景 1第二節 研究動機與目的 4第三節 研究架構 6第二章 文獻回顧 7第一節 最適租稅 7第二節 外部成本內部化 12第三章 模型與理論分析 15第一節 基本模型 15第二節 模型設定 19第三節 伯瑞圖最適與個人消費選擇 21第四節 次佳理論 29第五節 淨零排放下的碳費 37第四章 結論 43第一節 研究貢獻 43第二節 研究限制 45參考文獻 46附錄 52附錄一 次佳理論最適碳稅證明 52附錄二 Corlett-Hague 證明 55 zh_TW dc.format.extent 955270 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110255028 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 碳稅 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 外部性 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 次佳理論 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 淨零排放 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 最適租稅 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Carbon tax en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Externalities en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Second-best theory en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Net zero en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) The optimal taxation en_US dc.title (題名) 排碳外部性與最適碳稅 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Externality of Carbon Emissions and the Optimal Carbon Tax en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 專書論文吳佩凌 (2005)，《不對稱資訊下最適所得稅與租稅逃漏及查核策略之研究》，博士論文，國立政治大學財政學研究所。蕭代基、黃琝琇、林師模與傅俞瑄 (2022)，「國際碳邊境調整機制對臺灣減碳與經濟的影響」，《臺灣能源期刊》，9，1−24。Atkinson, A. (1973), “How Progressive Should Income Tax Be ?” in M. Parkin and A. R. Nobay (eds), Essays in modern economics, 90-109, London: Longman.Boadway, R. and M. Keen (1993), “Public Goods, Self-selection and Optimal Income Taxation,” International Economic Review, 34, 463-478.Bovenberg, A. and F. van der Ploeg (1994), “Environmental Policy, Public Finance and the Labour Market in a Second-best World,” Journal of Public Economics, 55, 349−390.Chander, P. and L. Wilde (1998), “A Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement,” Review of Economic Studies, 65, 165-183.Coase, R. (1960), “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, 3, 1−44.Corlett, W. and D. Hague (1953), “Complementarity and the Excess Burden of Taxation,” The Review of Economic Studies, 21, 21−30.Cremer, H. and F. Gahvari (1995), “Tax Evasion and the Optimal General Income Tax,” Journal of Public Economics, 60, 235-249.Cremer, H., F. Gahvari, N. Ladoux (1998), “Externalities and Optimal Taxation,” Journal of Public Economics, 70, 343−364.Dalton, T. and E. Sadka (1979), “A Many-Good Corlett-Hague Tax Rule,” Economics Letters, 4, 169−172.Dixit, A. (1985), “Tax Policy in Open Economies,” in A. Auerbach, and M. Feldstein (eds), Handbook of Public Economics, 313−374, North-Holland, Amsterdam.Dong, B., W. Wei, X. Ma, P. Li (2017), “On the Impacts of Carbon Tax and Technological Progress on China,” Applied Economics, 50, 389−406.Edgeworth, F. (1897), “The Pure Theory of Taxation,” The Economic Journal, 7, 550−571.Fuest, C. and B. Huber (1997), “Wage Bargaining, Labor-tax Progression, and Welfare,” Journal of Economics, 66, 127−150.Goulder, L. (1995), “Effects of Carbon Taxes in an Economy with Prior Tax Distortions: An Intertemporal General Equilibrium Analysis,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 29, 271−297.Hoel, M. (1996), “Should a Carbon Tax Be Differentiated across Sectors?” Journal of Public Economics, 59, 17−32.Hungerbuelher, M., E. Lehmann, A. Parmentier, B. van der Linden (2006), “Optimal Redistributive Taxation in a Search Equilibrium Model,” The Review of Economic Studies, 73, 743−767.Jaqua, D. and D. Schaffa (2016), “Pigouvian Taxation with Costly Administration and Multiple Externalities,” National Tax Association, 109, 1−27.Ley, E. (1992), “A Note on Ramsey and Corlett-Hague Rules,” working paper.Lin, B. and X. Li (2011), “The Effect of Carbon Tax on Per Capital CO2 Emissions,” Energy Policy, 39, 5137−5146.Metcalf, G. and D. Weisbach (2009), “The Design of a Carbon Tax,” The Harvard Environmental Law Review, 33, 499−556.Metcalf, G. and J. Stock (2020), “The Macroeconomic Impact of Europe’s Carbon Taxes,” working paper.Mirrlees, J. (1971), “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,” The Review of Economic Studies, 38, 175−208.Nordhaus, W. (2011), “Designing a Friendly Space for Technological Change to Slow Global Warming,” Energy Economics, 33, 665−673.Pigou, A. (1920), “The Economics of Welfare,” The Economic Journal, 31, 206−213.Ramsey, F. (1927), “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation,” The Economic Journal, 37, 47–61.Rausch, S., G. Metcalf, J. Reilly (2011), “Distributional Impacts of Carbon Pricing: A General Equibrium Approach with Micro-data for Households,” Energy Economics, 33, s20−s33.Saez, E. (2001), “Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates,” Review of Economic Studies, 68, 205-229.Sandmo, A. (1975), “Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities,” The Swedish Journal of Economics, 77, 86−98.Sandmo, A. (1986), “A Reinterpretation of Elasticity Formulae in Optimum Tax Theory,” Economica, 54, 89−96.Seade, J. (1977), “On the Shape of Optimal Tax Schedules,” Journal of Pubic Economics, 7, 203−236.Stiglitz, J. (1987), “Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and New New Welfare Economics,” in Auerbach, A. and M. Feldstein (eds), Handbook of Public Economics, 991-1042, North-Holland, Amsterdam.Tuomala, M. (1984), “On the Optimal Income Taxation: Some Further Numerical Results,” Journal of Public Economics, 23, 351-366.van der Ploeg, F. and C. Withagen (2014), “Growth, Renewables, and the Optimal Carbon Tax,” International Economic Review, 55, 283−311.Zoutman, F., E. Gavrilova, and A. Hopland (2018), “Estimating both Supply and Demand Elasticities Using Variation in a Single Tax Rate,” Econometrica, 86, 763−771.網際網路ESG遠見 (2022)，「歐洲議會最新草案/一次看懂CBAM碳關稅、ETS碳排交易重點」，上網日期2023年5月29日，檢自：https://esg.gvm.com.tw/article/7796.ESG遠見 (2023)，「2023年10月試行! 一文搞懂什麼是『碳邊境調整機制』CBAM?」，上網日期2023年5月29日，檢自：https://esg.gvm.com.tw/article/5120.永續溝通與知識平台 (2021)，「5項基礎概念，一次看懂『碳定價』!」，上網日期2023年5月10日，檢自：https://csrone.com/topics/6941.行政院環境保護署國家溫室氣體減量法規資訊網 (2023)，「溫管法簡介」，上網日期2023年5月10日，檢自：https://ghgrule.epa.gov.tw/greenhouse/greenhouse_page/23/100.行政院環境保護署環保新聞專區 (2021)，「環保署預告修正『溫室氣體減量及管理法』為『氣候變遷因應法』」，上網日期2023年4月15日，檢自：https://enews.epa.gov.tw/page/3b3c62c78849f32f/de5ace9a-814a-47cb-8273-342ec0664511.經濟部2050淨零排放 (2023)，「2050淨零排放」，上網日期2023年4月15日，檢自：https://www.go-moea.tw/.臺灣氣候變遷推估資訊與調適知識平台 (2021)，「英國氣象局預測：2021年大氣中的二氧化碳量恐較工業時代前的平均高出50%」，上網日期2023年5月29日，檢自：https://tccip.ncdr.nat.gov.tw/km_news_one.aspx?kid=20210119225454.數位時代 (2021)，「碳關稅將上路、零碳新賽局開跑！台灣為何該擔憂國際競爭力?」，上網日期2023年5月29日，檢自：https://www.bnext.com.tw/article/63625/carbon-tax-eu-global? zh_TW
