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題名 通訊科技競爭與標準必要專利之研究 -以高通案為例
A Study on the Competition of Communications Technology and Standard Essential Patents- An Example of the Case of Qualcomm作者 張舒涵
Chang, Shu-Han貢獻者 許耀明
Hsu, Yao-Ming
張舒涵
Chang, Shu-Han關鍵詞 標準必要專利
行動通訊
高通
公平合理無歧視
專利授權
競爭法
Standard Essential Patent (SEP)
Mobile Communication
Qualcomm
Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND)
Patent License
Competition Law日期 2023 上傳時間 2-Aug-2023 14:32:23 (UTC+8) 摘要 科技的競逐不曾停歇，隨著動通訊技術迅速發展，各國都希望打入通訊標準制定核心、掌握更多話語權，以在國際貿易中取得優勢地位，奪得市場先機，因此紛紛遊說標準制定組織選定自身專利技術採納為技術標準，進而運用標準必要專利（standards-essential patents，SEPs）展開智慧財產權戰略，在市場上作為攻擊與防禦的武器，以達到維持競爭力或擴大市場佔有率之目標。為避免專利權人有壟斷市場與不公平競爭問題，國際標準制定組織要求標準專利權人應提出「公平、合理、無歧視(Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory，FRAND)」承諾，以求公平合理的處理相關授權關係， 然因FRAND授權承諾定義未明，在國際上衍生許多討論。本研究自標準必要專利的形成與FRAND授權承諾切入，探討美國、歐盟、日本、台灣等各國主管機關對於標準必要專利的形成與FRAND授權承諾相關規範及重要案例，進一步討論主流國家對於高通(Qualcomm)案的處置方式，並分析我國公平交易委員會於106年10月20日對高通公司之裁罰案影響。此外，在中美貿易戰後科技業成為重點戰場之一，因疫情而生的邊境管控措施促使供應鏈模式改變，各國紛紛將重大戰略物資產線留在國內並推動相關保護政策，本論文最後就各國制定的晶片法案進行說明，並自就企業面與政府面提出相應策略。期望我國企業能積極備戰，取得更多的籌碼換取對自己有利的條件並謹慎應對國際局勢，布局核心技術，維持我國產業地位立於不墜。
The contest in technology never stops, and with the rapid development of mobile communication technology, countries are eager to penetrate the core of communication standard setting organization and gain more influence to secure advantageous positions in international trade and seize market opportunities. Consequently, they actively lobby standard-setting organizations to adopt their own patents and technologies as technical standards. Subsequently, they utilize Standards-Essential Patents (SEPs) as part of their intellectual property strategies, wielding these SEPs as both offensive and defensive weapons in the market. Their ultimate aim is to maintain competitiveness or expand their market share.To prevent patent holders from monopolizing the market and engaging in unfair competition, international standard-setting organizations require standard patent holders to make a "Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory" (FRAND) commitment. This commitment aims to ensure a fair and reasonable approach to handling relevant licensing relationships. However, due to the lack of a clear definition of FRAND commitments, it has led to numerous discussions and debates internationally.This study focuses on the formation of Standards-Essential Patents (SEPs) and the associated commitments of Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. It explores the regulations and important cases related to the formation of SEPs and FRAND commitments by the regulatory authorities in the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Taiwan. Furthermore, the study delves into the handling of the Qualcomm case by major countries and analyzes the impact of the Fair Trade Commission of Taiwan`s ruling against Qualcomm on October 20, 106. The research aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the various approaches and consequences of dealing with SEPs and FRAND commitments in different jurisdictions.Furthermore, after the trade war between China and the United States, the technology industry has become a key battleground. The border control measures arising from the pandemic have prompted changes in supply chain models. In response, countries around the world have taken measures to retain critical strategic supply chain within their borders and have implemented relevant protectionist policies.In the concluding part of this thesis, various countries` chip laws are explained, and corresponding strategies are proposed from both the perspectives of enterprises and governments. The hope is that Taiwanese companies will proactively prepare for the potential challenges, secure more leverage to negotiate favorable conditions, and respond cautiously to the evolving dynamics. 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國立政治大學
法學院碩士在職專班
108961013資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108961013 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 許耀明 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Hsu, Yao-Ming en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 張舒涵 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chang, Shu-Han en_US dc.creator (作者) 張舒涵 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chang, Shu-Han en_US dc.date (日期) 2023 en_US dc.date.accessioned 2-Aug-2023 14:32:23 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 2-Aug-2023 14:32:23 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Aug-2023 14:32:23 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0108961013 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/146688 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 法學院碩士在職專班 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 108961013 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 科技的競逐不曾停歇，隨著動通訊技術迅速發展，各國都希望打入通訊標準制定核心、掌握更多話語權，以在國際貿易中取得優勢地位，奪得市場先機，因此紛紛遊說標準制定組織選定自身專利技術採納為技術標準，進而運用標準必要專利（standards-essential patents，SEPs）展開智慧財產權戰略，在市場上作為攻擊與防禦的武器，以達到維持競爭力或擴大市場佔有率之目標。為避免專利權人有壟斷市場與不公平競爭問題，國際標準制定組織要求標準專利權人應提出「公平、合理、無歧視(Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory，FRAND)」承諾，以求公平合理的處理相關授權關係， 然因FRAND授權承諾定義未明，在國際上衍生許多討論。本研究自標準必要專利的形成與FRAND授權承諾切入，探討美國、歐盟、日本、台灣等各國主管機關對於標準必要專利的形成與FRAND授權承諾相關規範及重要案例，進一步討論主流國家對於高通(Qualcomm)案的處置方式，並分析我國公平交易委員會於106年10月20日對高通公司之裁罰案影響。此外，在中美貿易戰後科技業成為重點戰場之一，因疫情而生的邊境管控措施促使供應鏈模式改變，各國紛紛將重大戰略物資產線留在國內並推動相關保護政策，本論文最後就各國制定的晶片法案進行說明，並自就企業面與政府面提出相應策略。期望我國企業能積極備戰，取得更多的籌碼換取對自己有利的條件並謹慎應對國際局勢，布局核心技術，維持我國產業地位立於不墜。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) The contest in technology never stops, and with the rapid development of mobile communication technology, countries are eager to penetrate the core of communication standard setting organization and gain more influence to secure advantageous positions in international trade and seize market opportunities. Consequently, they actively lobby standard-setting organizations to adopt their own patents and technologies as technical standards. Subsequently, they utilize Standards-Essential Patents (SEPs) as part of their intellectual property strategies, wielding these SEPs as both offensive and defensive weapons in the market. Their ultimate aim is to maintain competitiveness or expand their market share.To prevent patent holders from monopolizing the market and engaging in unfair competition, international standard-setting organizations require standard patent holders to make a "Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory" (FRAND) commitment. This commitment aims to ensure a fair and reasonable approach to handling relevant licensing relationships. However, due to the lack of a clear definition of FRAND commitments, it has led to numerous discussions and debates internationally.This study focuses on the formation of Standards-Essential Patents (SEPs) and the associated commitments of Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms. It explores the regulations and important cases related to the formation of SEPs and FRAND commitments by the regulatory authorities in the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Taiwan. Furthermore, the study delves into the handling of the Qualcomm case by major countries and analyzes the impact of the Fair Trade Commission of Taiwan`s ruling against Qualcomm on October 20, 106. The research aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the various approaches and consequences of dealing with SEPs and FRAND commitments in different jurisdictions.Furthermore, after the trade war between China and the United States, the technology industry has become a key battleground. The border control measures arising from the pandemic have prompted changes in supply chain models. In response, countries around the world have taken measures to retain critical strategic supply chain within their borders and have implemented relevant protectionist policies.In the concluding part of this thesis, various countries` chip laws are explained, and corresponding strategies are proposed from both the perspectives of enterprises and governments. The hope is that Taiwanese companies will proactively prepare for the potential challenges, secure more leverage to negotiate favorable conditions, and respond cautiously to the evolving dynamics. Emphasizing the development of core technologies is crucial to maintaining Taiwan`s position in the industry and ensuring the stability and continuity of its industrial standing. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1第一節 研究動機及目的 1第二節 研究範圍 3第三節 研究方法與研究架構 5第四節 文獻回顧 6第二章 標準必要專利之意義與應用限制-以通訊標準為例 11第一節 標準之類型與形成 11第一項 標準的定義 11第二項 常見的標準類型 12第二節 標準必要專利 14第一項 標準制訂組織的專利政策 14第二項 標準必要專利之定義 15第三項 標準必要專利具備之特色 16第三節 行動通訊技術發展 16第四節 通訊標準之制定與專利授權 23第一項 通訊標準制定組織 23第二項 第三代合作伙伴計劃 25第三項 第五代行動通訊系統與其標準專利 27第四項 第六代行動通訊標準 32第五節 專利箝制與權利金堆疊 34第六節 小結 38第三章 公平、合理、無歧視原則之規範與國際實務運作 39第一節 標準制定組織之智慧財產權政策與公平、合理、無歧視授權義務(FRAND) 39第一項 公平、合理且無歧視授權條件之法律性質 40第二項 公平、合理且無歧視之授權條件 42第三項 合理授權金之計算基礎 43第二節 公平、合理、無歧視原則適用於競爭法之檢討 48第一項 專利權之意義 48第二項 競爭法之意義 50第三項 專利法與競爭法立場之衝突與調和 51第三節 各國針對公平、合理、無歧視授權原則之規範 52第一項 美國 53第二項 歐盟 58第三項 日本 65第四項 台灣 72第四節 國際重要標準必要專利授權與FRAND條款案例 78第一項 2015 年HUAWEI V ZTE案 79第二項 2020年SISVEL V. HAIER 84第三項 2020年UNWIRED PLANET V. HUAWEI案 87第五節 小結 93第四章 高通案於各國所受之處分與評析 97第一節 高通案之背景 97第一項 高通公司簡介 97第二項 高通公司之授權交易模式 99第二節 各國處分案 106第一項 日本公正取引委員會禁制令 107第二項 中國人民共和國國家發展和改革委員會決定 107第三項 歐盟執委會之處分 112第四項 韓國公平交易委員會決議 114第五項 美國法院判決 118第六項 各國處分之比較與評析 121第三節 我國公平會處分 125第一項 公平會處分書之內容 125第二項 高通與公平會達成和解 127第三項 高通案和解內容之履行 127第四項 和解案引發之爭議 129第四節 通訊專利的下一個戰場 133第一項 新世代通訊專利 134第二項 車聯網 137第三項 新世代通訊產業的專利授權模式 139第五章 結論 144第一節 晶片市場現況 144第一項 各國晶片市場的保護政策 145第二項 台灣晶片法案 151第二節 面對未來科技競爭的建議與展望 153參考文獻 158 zh_TW dc.format.extent 8217908 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0108961013 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 標準必要專利 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 行動通訊 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 高通 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公平合理無歧視 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 專利授權 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 競爭法 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Standard Essential Patent (SEP) en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Mobile Communication en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Qualcomm en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Fair Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Patent License en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Competition Law en_US dc.title (題名) 通訊科技競爭與標準必要專利之研究 -以高通案為例 zh_TW dc.title (題名) A Study on the Competition of Communications Technology and Standard Essential Patents- An Example of the Case of Qualcomm en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文文獻(一)專書1.經濟部智慧財產局，專利法逐條釋義，2021年6月。2.黃銘傑，競爭法與智慧財產法之交會 相生與相剋之間，PART II，第參章，拒絕授權與公平交易法，元照，2009年4月。3.楊智傑,專利法，新學林，2014年9月。4.劉孔中，解構智財法及其與競爭法的衝突與調和，新學林，2015年5月。(二)期刊論文1.工研院資通所(2020)，全球5G標準系統與技術效能評估，趨勢觀點，第181期。(頁37 - 42)2.王立達(2018)，標準必要專利權行使之國際規範發展與比較分析-FRAND承諾法律性質、禁制令、權利金與競爭法規制，月旦法學雜誌第 275 卷。(頁87-110)3.王立達(2018)，魔鬼藏在細節裡：高通案和解筆錄透露的真實訊息，北美智權報225期，載於：http://www.naipo.com/Portals/1/web_tw/Knowledge_Center/Industry_Economy/IPNC_181128_0702.htm (最後瀏覽日:02/01/2023)。4.李素華(2003)，技術標準制定之競爭法規範與調和，東吳法律學報，第15卷第1期。(頁117-178)5.李素華(2008)，專利權行使與公平交易法-以近用技術標準之關鍵專利為中心，公平交易季刊，第16卷第2期。(頁85-121)6.李素華(2018)，公平會高通公司處分案之簡評與省思，月旦法學雜誌第275期。(頁111-121)7.李素華(2023)，從德國新近之專利法修正談除去及防止侵害請求權對於實現專利權價值之重要性，月旦法學雜誌，第334期。(頁165-191)8.李崇僖(2012)，專利技術價值在侵權訴訟中之認定─兼論美國法上的專利政策思維，專利師，第 9 期。(頁1-16)9.李建鵬、葛鑑霆(2021)，行動通信技術發展對軍事應用之研究，空軍學術雙月刊第683期。(頁86-104)10.沈宗倫，(2017)。標準必要專利之法定授權與專利權濫用──以誠實信用原則為中心，政大法學評論，第149期。 (頁1-83)11.林金榮(2015)，專利授權教戰守則：授權誠信條款 F/RAND 介紹－Microsoft v. 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