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題名 論晶圓代工廠商研發策略的演進：以聯電放棄先進製程為例
The Evolution of IC Foundries’ Strategies: The Case of UMC’s Current R&D Strategy作者 黃柏盛
Huang, Po-Sheng貢獻者 李文傑<br>王信實
Lee, Wen-Chieh<br>Wang, Shinn-Shyr
黃柏盛
Huang, Po-Sheng關鍵詞 賽局理論
信譽累積
晶圓代工
Game theory
Semiconductor
Foundry
Process innovation日期 2023 上傳時間 1-Sep-2023 15:32:56 (UTC+8) 摘要 本文利用賽局理論研究晶圓代工廠商研發策略的演進並使用信譽累積模型，對較晚加入純晶圓代工市場的廠商進行信譽累積的計算，再由該廠商累積的信譽判斷該廠商在某時間點會選擇違反合約或是遵守合約的行為。除此之外，本文亦透過此模型對於較晚加入純晶圓代工市場的廠商進行該廠商是否會在某時間點退出先進製程的市場改為加入成熟製程的市場的分析。最後，本文透過現有資料模擬實際晶圓代工廠商的狀況，分析何種因素會導致晶圓代工廠商放棄先進製程。
This article sets out to investigate the process innovation strategies of semiconductor subcontracting business that is named after the pure-play foundry industry. By analyzing whether the integrated device manufacturer (IDM) would like to enter the foundry business and keep the promise to its customers to only stick to the contracting manufacturing businesses, foundry’s innovation strategies are proved to correlate with parameters describing business dynamics. Besides, numerical exercises are also introduced here to calibrate key parameters to match the business dynamics of foundry industry. The provided research framework can apply to the future predictions to forecast research and development roadmap of foundry competitions.參考文獻 中文部分1.三星官方網站 (2023) . https://semiconductor.samsung.com/foundry/manufacturing/2.太田泰彦 (2022) . 半導體地緣政治學 (卓惠娟譯) . 野人文化.3.台積電官方網站 (2023) https://www.tsmc.com/chinese4.邱品蓉 (2023年4月10日) . 【圖解】台積電封王3挑戰解析：摩爾定律如何續命？下一個2兆營收哪裡來？. 數位時代. https://www.bnext.com.tw/article/74707/tsmc-semiconductor-april-mag5.邵樂峰 (2020年8月7日) . 迎戰後摩爾定律時代：半導體製程演進之路走向何方？. 電子工程專輯 https://www.eettaiwan.com/20200807nt31-challenges-in-the-era-of-post-moore-s-law/6.林子元 (2022) . 專業晶圓代工策略分析-資源依賴觀點[碩士論文]. 國立台灣大學.7.書摘精選、曲建仲、葉芷娟 (2023年4月12日) . 台積電的2奈米、3奈米是什麼？和最強競爭者英特爾差距多少？. 天下雜誌. https://www.cw.com.tw/article/51253268.聯電官方網站 (2023) . https://www.umc.com/zh-TW/Home/Index英文部分1.Baker, G., Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (2002) . Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (1) , 39–84.2.Doornik, K. (2006) . Relational contracting in partnerships. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 15 (2) , 517-548.3.Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1990) . “Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games. Journal of Economic Theory”, 51 (1) , 194-206.4. Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1991) . Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth. The Review of Economic Studies, 58 (1) , 43–61. https://doi.org/10.2307/22980445.Levin, J. (2003) . Relational incentive contracts. American Economic Review, 93 (3) , 835-857.6.Miller, C. (2022) . Chip War: The Fight for the World`s Most Critical Technology. Simon and Schuster.7.Radner, R. (1985) . Repeated principal-agent games with discounting. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1173-1198.8.Rubinstein, A. (1979) . Offenses that may have been committed by accident—an optimal policy of retribution. Applied game theory, 25, 406-413.9.Shin, N., Kraemer, K. L., & Dedrick, J. (2017) . R&D and firm performance in the semiconductor industry. Industry and Innovation, 24 (3) , 280-297.10.Su, Y. H., Guo, R. S., & Chang, S. C. (2004, September) . Inter-firm collaboration mechanism in process development and product design between foundry and fabless design house. In 2004 Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Workshop Proceedings (IEEE Cat. No. 04EX846) (pp. 47-50) . IEEE.11.Watson, J. (2021) . Theoretical foundations of relational incentive contracts. Annual Review of Economics, 13, 631-659. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
110258020資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110258020 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 李文傑<br>王信實 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Lee, Wen-Chieh<br>Wang, Shinn-Shyr en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 黃柏盛 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Huang, Po-Sheng en_US dc.creator (作者) 黃柏盛 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Huang, Po-Sheng en_US dc.date (日期) 2023 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Sep-2023 15:32:56 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Sep-2023 15:32:56 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Sep-2023 15:32:56 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0110258020 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/147067 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 經濟學系 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 110258020 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文利用賽局理論研究晶圓代工廠商研發策略的演進並使用信譽累積模型，對較晚加入純晶圓代工市場的廠商進行信譽累積的計算，再由該廠商累積的信譽判斷該廠商在某時間點會選擇違反合約或是遵守合約的行為。除此之外，本文亦透過此模型對於較晚加入純晶圓代工市場的廠商進行該廠商是否會在某時間點退出先進製程的市場改為加入成熟製程的市場的分析。最後，本文透過現有資料模擬實際晶圓代工廠商的狀況，分析何種因素會導致晶圓代工廠商放棄先進製程。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This article sets out to investigate the process innovation strategies of semiconductor subcontracting business that is named after the pure-play foundry industry. By analyzing whether the integrated device manufacturer (IDM) would like to enter the foundry business and keep the promise to its customers to only stick to the contracting manufacturing businesses, foundry’s innovation strategies are proved to correlate with parameters describing business dynamics. Besides, numerical exercises are also introduced here to calibrate key parameters to match the business dynamics of foundry industry. The provided research framework can apply to the future predictions to forecast research and development roadmap of foundry competitions. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 致謝 ii摘要 iiiAbstract iv1 緒論 72 半導體產業簡介 92.1 半導體歷史演進 92.2 現代主要晶圓代工廠 102.3 先進製程市場現況 113 文獻回顧 133.1 無窮賽局與信譽累積 133.2 晶圓代工廠的研發策略 143.3 本文貢獻 154 研究方法 164.1 賽局理論與玩家策略 164.1.1 單期賽局 164.1.2 優勢策略 174.1.3 Nash均衡 184.1.4 重複賽局 194.1.5 本文模型架構與假設 204.1.6 信譽影響模型 264.2 聯電分析 314.2.1 聯電在兩種市場分析 314.2.2 比較靜態分析 334.3 小結 345 市場模擬 366 結論與建議 43參考文獻 45 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1670733 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110258020 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 賽局理論 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 信譽累積 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 晶圓代工 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Game theory en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Semiconductor en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Foundry en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Process innovation en_US dc.title (題名) 論晶圓代工廠商研發策略的演進：以聯電放棄先進製程為例 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Evolution of IC Foundries’ Strategies: The Case of UMC’s Current R&D Strategy en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 中文部分1.三星官方網站 (2023) . https://semiconductor.samsung.com/foundry/manufacturing/2.太田泰彦 (2022) . 半導體地緣政治學 (卓惠娟譯) . 野人文化.3.台積電官方網站 (2023) https://www.tsmc.com/chinese4.邱品蓉 (2023年4月10日) . 【圖解】台積電封王3挑戰解析：摩爾定律如何續命？下一個2兆營收哪裡來？. 數位時代. https://www.bnext.com.tw/article/74707/tsmc-semiconductor-april-mag5.邵樂峰 (2020年8月7日) . 迎戰後摩爾定律時代：半導體製程演進之路走向何方？. 電子工程專輯 https://www.eettaiwan.com/20200807nt31-challenges-in-the-era-of-post-moore-s-law/6.林子元 (2022) . 專業晶圓代工策略分析-資源依賴觀點[碩士論文]. 國立台灣大學.7.書摘精選、曲建仲、葉芷娟 (2023年4月12日) . 台積電的2奈米、3奈米是什麼？和最強競爭者英特爾差距多少？. 天下雜誌. https://www.cw.com.tw/article/51253268.聯電官方網站 (2023) . https://www.umc.com/zh-TW/Home/Index英文部分1.Baker, G., Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (2002) . Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (1) , 39–84.2.Doornik, K. (2006) . Relational contracting in partnerships. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 15 (2) , 517-548.3.Fudenberg, D., & Maskin, E. (1990) . “Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games. Journal of Economic Theory”, 51 (1) , 194-206.4. Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (1991) . Quality Ladders in the Theory of Growth. The Review of Economic Studies, 58 (1) , 43–61. https://doi.org/10.2307/22980445.Levin, J. (2003) . Relational incentive contracts. American Economic Review, 93 (3) , 835-857.6.Miller, C. (2022) . Chip War: The Fight for the World`s Most Critical Technology. Simon and Schuster.7.Radner, R. (1985) . Repeated principal-agent games with discounting. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1173-1198.8.Rubinstein, A. (1979) . Offenses that may have been committed by accident—an optimal policy of retribution. Applied game theory, 25, 406-413.9.Shin, N., Kraemer, K. L., & Dedrick, J. (2017) . R&D and firm performance in the semiconductor industry. Industry and Innovation, 24 (3) , 280-297.10.Su, Y. H., Guo, R. S., & Chang, S. C. (2004, September) . Inter-firm collaboration mechanism in process development and product design between foundry and fabless design house. In 2004 Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Workshop Proceedings (IEEE Cat. No. 04EX846) (pp. 47-50) . IEEE.11.Watson, J. (2021) . Theoretical foundations of relational incentive contracts. Annual Review of Economics, 13, 631-659. zh_TW
