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題名 世界貿易組織第三國參與爭端解決機制之研究—以中國和美國貿易爭端案件為例
Third Parties Participation in World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System: A Case Study of the Trade War between the United States and China
作者 傅璿
Fu, Syuan
貢獻者 吳文欽
Wu, Wen-Chin
傅璿
Fu, Syuan
關鍵詞 世界貿易組織
第三國
美中貿易戰
爭端解決機制
聯合國大會投票
WTO
Third Party
China–United States trade war
Dispute Settlement System
State Performances from United Nations General Assembly
日期 2023
上傳時間 1-Sep-2023 16:10:08 (UTC+8)
摘要 本論文旨在探討美國與中國互為原告或被告的狀況下，一國選擇參與爭端成為第三國之動機。並在此前提下提出三個假設：第一，第三國對美國的總貿易額或中國的總貿易額比非第三國高；第二，當一國與美國或中國的外交政策距離接近時，會加入爭端成為第三國；第三，在美國與中國的外交政策距離接近時，會有較多的國家成為第三國。
本論文有幾項發現：首先，假設一為顯著，貿易額是影響一國參與的重要因素；其次，假設二呈現不顯著，一國外交偏好不一定代表其在國際組織中的選擇；再者，假設三出現顯著，兩國的關係會影響他國參與之決定；最後，預測機率顯示，貿易額要達到一定程度，才會影響一國選擇參與爭端之決定。
This thesis analyzes the incentives which make a member, as a third party, to participate in the disputes between the United States and China, and the analysis is under the situation that two great powers could be either complainant or respondent to each other. Hence, The thesis states three assumptions. First, each of the third parties total trade volume with either the United States or China is higher than that with other non-third parties. Second, if a member`s foreign policy distance is closer to either the United States or China, it is more likely to join the dispute as a third party. Third, when the foreign policy distance of two great power is closer, there will be more members inclined to the participate in the dispute as third parties. In addition, the thesis examines three independent variables.
This study makes several findings. Firstly, when the first assumption is significant, trade volume is an important factor influencing a member’s participation as a third party. Secondly, When the second assumption isn’t significant, therefore a member’s foreign policy preferences do not necessarily reflect its decisions within international organizations. In addition, as the third assumption is significant, the relations between two great powers will influence other members’ decision to participate as third members. Lastly, probability forecast indicates that trade volume needs to reach a certain level to affect a member`s decision to join in disputes.
參考文獻 BBC News，2019，⟨中美貿易站時間軸：一場逐漸升溫的持久戰⟩，https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/world-49986037，查閱時間：2023/5/31。
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中華經濟研究院，2019，⟨WTO臨時上訴仲裁多邊協議正式運作⟩，https://web.wtocenter.org.tw/Mobile/page?pid=343322&nid=120，查閱時間：2023/5/31。Chung Hua Institute for Economic Research. “WTO lin shishang su zhong cai duo bian xie yi zheng shi yun zuo.”[WTO Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement was Formally Operated]. （Accessed on May 31, 2023）.
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描述 碩士
國立政治大學
東亞研究所
106260012
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106260012
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 吳文欽zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Wu, Wen-Chinen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 傅璿zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Fu, Syuanen_US
dc.creator (作者) 傅璿zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Fu, Syuanen_US
dc.date (日期) 2023en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Sep-2023 16:10:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Sep-2023 16:10:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Sep-2023 16:10:08 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0106260012en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/147223-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 東亞研究所zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 106260012zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本論文旨在探討美國與中國互為原告或被告的狀況下，一國選擇參與爭端成為第三國之動機。並在此前提下提出三個假設：第一，第三國對美國的總貿易額或中國的總貿易額比非第三國高；第二，當一國與美國或中國的外交政策距離接近時，會加入爭端成為第三國；第三，在美國與中國的外交政策距離接近時，會有較多的國家成為第三國。
本論文有幾項發現：首先，假設一為顯著，貿易額是影響一國參與的重要因素；其次，假設二呈現不顯著，一國外交偏好不一定代表其在國際組織中的選擇；再者，假設三出現顯著，兩國的關係會影響他國參與之決定；最後，預測機率顯示，貿易額要達到一定程度，才會影響一國選擇參與爭端之決定。		zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This thesis analyzes the incentives which make a member, as a third party, to participate in the disputes between the United States and China, and the analysis is under the situation that two great powers could be either complainant or respondent to each other. Hence, The thesis states three assumptions. First, each of the third parties total trade volume with either the United States or China is higher than that with other non-third parties. Second, if a member`s foreign policy distance is closer to either the United States or China, it is more likely to join the dispute as a third party. Third, when the foreign policy distance of two great power is closer, there will be more members inclined to the participate in the dispute as third parties. In addition, the thesis examines three independent variables.
This study makes several findings. Firstly, when the first assumption is significant, trade volume is an important factor influencing a member’s participation as a third party. Secondly, When the second assumption isn’t significant, therefore a member’s foreign policy preferences do not necessarily reflect its decisions within international organizations. In addition, as the third assumption is significant, the relations between two great powers will influence other members’ decision to participate as third members. Lastly, probability forecast indicates that trade volume needs to reach a certain level to affect a member`s decision to join in disputes.		en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論1
第二章 爭端解決機制介紹6
第一節 世界貿易組織組織架構6
第二節 程序規範主體11
第三節 爭端解決之工作程序12
第三章 文獻探討17
第一節 選擇加入爭端解決與否19
第二節 第三國加入之影響23
第三節 貿易額對第三國參與之影響31
第四節 外交政策對第三國加入之影響36
第四章 研究設計與統計分析38
第一節 統計變項描述38
第二節 統計模型57
第三節 統計結果分析59
第五章 結論65
參考文獻68
附錄77		zh_TW
dc.format.extent 2405588 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106260012en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 世界貿易組織zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 第三國zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 美中貿易戰zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 爭端解決機制zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 聯合國大會投票zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) WTOen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Third Partyen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) China–United States trade waren_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Dispute Settlement Systemen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) State Performances from United Nations General Assemblyen_US
dc.title (題名) 世界貿易組織第三國參與爭端解決機制之研究—以中國和美國貿易爭端案件為例zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Third Parties Participation in World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System: A Case Study of the Trade War between the United States and Chinaen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) BBC News，2019，⟨中美貿易站時間軸：一場逐漸升溫的持久戰⟩，https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/world-49986037，查閱時間：2023/5/31。
中華經濟研究院，2019，⟨WTO組織與決策⟩，https://web.wtocenter.org.tw/Page/35/809，查閱時間：2021/3/20。
中華經濟研究院，2019，⟨WTO臨時上訴仲裁多邊協議正式運作⟩，https://web.wtocenter.org.tw/Mobile/page?pid=343322&nid=120，查閱時間：2023/5/31。Chung Hua Institute for Economic Research. “WTO lin shishang su zhong cai duo bian xie yi zheng shi yun zuo.”[WTO Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement was Formally Operated]. （Accessed on May 31, 2023）.
方宗鑫，2017，⟪國際貿易法規⟫，臺北：三民書局。Fang, Zong-xin. 2017. Guo ji mao yi fa gui. [International Trade Regulations]. Taipei: Sanmin publishing.
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