| dc.contributor | 財管系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 黃嘉威 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Huang, Chia-Wei;Chen, Sheng-Syan;Lin, Chih-Yen | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2023-12 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 29-Jan-2024 09:12:02 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 29-Jan-2024 09:12:02 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 29-Jan-2024 09:12:02 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/149412 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | In this study, we examine the influence of CEO general managerial ability on M&A voting events. The results indicate that CEO general managerial ability relates positively to M&A voting outcomes. Furthermore, firms run by CEOs with high levels of general managerial skill tend to enjoy better short-term and long-term stock performances. In addition, we find active funds to be more (less) likely to vote in line with the recommendations of the management of invested firms when market reactions around announcement dates are positive (negative). The main results are the same after using the state-level non-compete agreement to address possible omitted variable bias. | |
| dc.format.extent | 106 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol.92, pp.14-24 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | CEO general managerial ability; M&A voting; Short-run abnormal return; Long-run abnormal return | |
| dc.title (題名) | Does CEO general managerial ability matter in M&A voting? | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1016/j.qref.2023.08.005 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2023.08.005 | |
