dc.contributor.advisor | 江彌修<br>葉尚鑫 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.advisor | Chiang, Mi-Hsiu<br>Yeh, Shang-Hsin | en_US |
dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 許光宇 | zh_TW |
dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Hsu, Kuang-Yu | en_US |
dc.creator (作者) | 許光宇 | zh_TW |
dc.creator (作者) | Hsu, Kuang-Yu | en_US |
dc.date (日期) | 2024 | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 1-Feb-2024 11:32:23 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.date.available | 1-Feb-2024 11:32:23 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 1-Feb-2024 11:32:23 (UTC+8) | - |
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0111ZB1039 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/149621 | - |
dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
dc.description (描述) | 國際金融碩士學位學程 | zh_TW |
dc.description (描述) | 111ZB1039 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 公司支付股利或股票買回都是針對股東的友善政策,過去學者研究大都指出公司實行親股東政策對後續股價具有正面影響,同時不會損及公司利益,且獲利能力越強公司更有積極實施親股東政策的傾向,不過鮮少有學者針對此類政策從債權人角度進行分析,探討花費越多帳上現金去討好股東下,對後續公司償還債務能力是否具有差異,故本研究旨在探討當公司進行不同程度的股東友善政策時,對未來償債能力影響,研究對象以2017年至2022年期間S&P500中10大產業之10大龍頭公司為樣本,各樣本之財務資料取自公司該年度財務報告。
根據本研究發現: 公司進行不同程度的股東友善政策時,對後續不管是流動比率、速動比率或利息保障倍數的償債能力指標,都沒有顯著關聯性。同時本研究也使用卡方檢定來測試不同產業別是否會因為自身產業特性不同而有相異結果,不過結論同樣發現即便分各產業獨立檢視,公司在實施不同程度股東友善政策下,對後續償債能力表現亦無顯著關聯。 | zh_TW |
dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The cash dividend payment and stock buyback are shareholder-friendly policies. Previous studies have pointed out that a company's shareholder-friendly policies have a positive impact on subsequent stock prices without harming the company's interests. Moreover, companies with stronger profitability are more likely to actively implement shareholder-friendly policies. However, few studies have analyzed such policies from the perspective of creditors and explored whether spending more cash to please shareholders will have a different impact on a company's ability to repay debt in the future. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to explore when companies implement shareholder-friendly policies of varying degrees, will it have a different impact on its future solvency. Samples are selected from 10 leading companies in the 10 major industries of S&P500 from 2016 to 2022. The financial data are derived from each company’s financial report.
In this research, we found that when companies implement different degrees of shareholder-friendly policies, there is no significant correlation with subsequent solvency indicators, whether it is current ratio, quick ratio or interest coverage ratio. At the same time, this research also used the chi-square test to examine whether different industries would have different results due to their specific industrial characteristics. But it turns out that even if each industry is examined independently, there is no significant correlation between the company's subsequent solvency performance and their shareholder-friendly policies. | en_US |
dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論 9
第一節 研究動機 9
第二節 研究目的 9
第三節 論文架構 10
第二章 文獻探討 11
第一節 股利政策相關研究 11
第二節 股票買回的相關研究和財務槓桿假說 12
第三節 償債能力相關研究 13
第三章 研究設計 15
第一節 研究架構 15
第二節 研究假說 15
第三節 股東友善政策和公司償債能力指標選用 16
第四節 資料來源和樣本選擇 17
第五節 研究方法 19
第四章 實證結果與分析 20
第一節 資料說明 20
第二節 股東友善政策公布後之償債能力變化 21
第三節 各產業償債能力指標變化 23
第五章 結論與建議 33
第一節 研究結論 33
第二節 研究建議 34
參考文獻 35 | zh_TW |
dc.format.extent | 1259937 bytes | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111ZB1039 | en_US |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 股利發放 | zh_TW |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 股票買回 | zh_TW |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 股東友善政策 | zh_TW |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 償債能力 | zh_TW |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Dividend Payment | en_US |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Stock Buyback | en_US |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Shareholder-Friendly Policies | en_US |
dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Solvency | en_US |
dc.title (題名) | 股東友善政策對公司償債能力影響 | zh_TW |
dc.title (題名) | The Impact of Shareholder-Friendly Policies on Corporate Solvency | en_US |
dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en_US |
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | 中文文獻
1. 王象康,台灣上市公司現金股利與庫藏股政策之探討,交通大學財務金融研究所,民國94年。
2. 莊宗勳,台灣上市公司現金減資與現金股利、庫藏股政策之實證研究,中央大學財務金融學系碩士在職專班,民國96年。
3. 陳淑華,信用評等與財務指標對公司採行減資與庫藏股政策的影響,中原大學國際貿易研究所碩士論文,民國94年。
4. 詹信元,減資對公司營運績效影響之研究,交通大學管理學院碩士在職專班管理科學組,民國97年。
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