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題名 分析TCL v. Ericsson案之FRAND權利金計算方法及其對資通訊產業之影響
Analysis of the FRAND Royalty Calculation Methods in TCL v. Ericsson Case and Its Impact on the ITC Industry作者 張凱博
Chang, Kai-Po貢獻者 陳秉訓
Chen, Ping-Hsun
張凱博
Chang, Kai-Po關鍵詞 標準必要專利
公平合理無歧視
合理權利金
由上而下計算法
可比較授權法
standard essential patents(SEPs)
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (F/RAND)
reasonable royalties
top-down approach
comparable license日期 2023 上傳時間 1-Feb-2024 11:45:04 (UTC+8) 摘要 資通訊產業自通訊技術以及標準制定組織開始發展以來，標準必要專利(Standard Essemtial Patents, SEPs)相關案件在全球各地法院層出不窮，至今為止已經累積不少經典之標準必要專利案件，而隨著通訊技術發展至5G及5G技術之應用愈趨成熟和多樣化，未來5G標準必要專利之案件亦勢必大量發生。 在過往之標準必要專利案件中，有關F/RAND原則之定義以及合理權利金之計算一直是被廣泛討論之爭點，而經過多年後，F/RAND原則之定義似有逐漸明顯之輪廓，然合理權利金之計算方法則是百家爭鳴並無一統一之方式，全憑各案件之法官和當事人共同建構一項合乎F/RAND原則且具可信性的合理權利金計算方式。 而在各標準必要專利案件中，TCL v. Ericsson案實屬對於F/RAND原則定義以及合理權利金計算方式討論內容相當豐富之案件，本文亦希望能透過分析TCL案了解影響合理權利金計算結果之關鍵性因素，以期能為未來之5G標準必要專利之案件提供一些洞見。本文首先介紹標準必要專利之定義及可能帶來之正反面影響。再來介紹F/RAND承諾之定義以及F/RAND承諾在實務上運作之爭議。接著進入本文之重點，即TCL案，此部分可分為四小部分，第一是有關TCL案地方法院判斷授權要約是否符合F/RAND原則之方法及細節；第二是TCL案地方法院計算合理權利金之方法，即以「由上而下計算法為主，可比較授權法為輔」的方式進行計算；第三是上訴法院對於Ericsson是否有請求陪審團審理之權利之見解；第四則是對於TCL案整體之分析。最後，本文整理出TCL案之重點並提供建議予將來之標準必要專利合理權利金計算案件當事人。
Since the beginning of the development of communication technology and standards-setting organizations (SSOs) in ITC industry, cases related to standard essential patents (SEPs) have emerged in an endless stream in courts around the world. So far, many classic SEP cases have accumulated. As communication technology develops to 5G and the applications of 5G technology become more mature and diversified, a large number of 5G standard essential patent cases are bound to occur in the future. In past standard essential patent cases, the definition of the F/RAND principle and the calculation of reasonable royalties have always been widely discussed issues. After many years, the definition of the F/RAND principle seems to have gradually become clearer. However, there is no unified method for calculating reasonable royalties, and it depends on the judges and parties in each case to jointly construct a reasonable and credible method of calculating royalties that is consistent with the F/RAND principle. Among the various SEP cases, the TCL v. Ericsson case is indeed a case that contains a full discussion of the definition of the F/RAND principle and the calculation methods of reasonable royalties. This article also hopes to understand which key factors will impact the result of reasonable royalty calculation by analyzing the TCL case. Besides, these key factors are expected to provide some insights into 5G SEP cases in future. This article first introduces the definition of SEPs and the possible positive and negative impacts. Next, this article will introduce the definition of F/RAND commitment and the disputes over the practical operation of F/RAND commitment. Then, here comes to the key point of this article, the TCL case. This part can be divided into four subsections. The first is about the methods and details of how did district court in the TCL case determine whether the licensing offer complied with the F/RAND principle; the second is the calculation method adopted by the district court in the TCL case, which is taking "top-down approach as the main method, comparable license as the supplementary method" the third is the Court of Appeal's opinion on whether Ericsson has the right to request a jury trial; the fourth is an overall analysis of the TCL case. Finally, this article summarizes the key points of the TCL case and provides suggestions to potential parties involved in future SEP reasonable royalty calculation cases.參考文獻 壹、中文文獻 一、專書 ‧ 王澤鑑，〈債法原理：基本理論債之發生〉，2006年9月。 ‧ 李亭林編譯，Schilling, Melissa A.著，〈科技創新管理〉，2011年3版。 ‧ 林誠二，〈債法總論新解：體系化解說（下）〉， 2010年3月。 ‧ 經濟部智慧財產局，〈通訊標準專利訴訟教戰手冊〉，2014年4月。 二、期刊 ‧ 王立達，〈標準必要專利權行使之國際規範發展與比較分析──FRAND承諾法律性質、禁制令、權利金與競爭法規制〉，月旦法學雜誌，第275期， 2018年。 ‧ 李素華，〈技術標準制定之競爭法規範與調和〉，東吳法律學報，第15卷第1期，2003年。 ‧ 沈宗倫，〈標準必要專利之法定授權與專利權濫用──以誠實信用原則為中心〉，政大法學評論，第149期，2017年。 ‧ 林誠二，〈預約之認定與不履行之損害賠償範圍－－最高法院一○三年度台上字第一九八一號民事判決評釋〉，裁判時報，第35期，2015年。 ‧ 莊弘鈺、鍾京州、劉尚志，〈標準必要專利FRAND權利金計算〉，交大法學評論，第5期，2019年。 ‧ 陳皓芸，〈標準必要專利權之行使、權利濫用與獨占地位濫用〉，公平交易季刊，第25卷第1期，2017年。 ‧ 黃惠敏，〈標準必要專利之戰爭─禁制令行不行〉，月旦財經法雜誌，第39期，2016年。 ‧ 黃惠敏，〈F/RAND授權聲明之性質〉，萬國法律，第234期，2020年。 ‧ 楊宏暉，〈標準關鍵專利之濫用與限制競爭〉，公平交易季刊，第 23 卷第 4 期，2015年。 ‧ 楊宏暉，〈論FRAND 授權聲明之意義與性質〉，月旦民商法雜誌，第50期，2015年。 ‧ 楊智傑，〈美國智慧產權訴訟中核發禁制今之審査〉，智慧財産權月刊，第160期，2012年。 三、學位論文 ‧ 李兆國，〈標準制定組織及標準專利權之爭議〉，國立交通大學科技法律研究所碩士論文，2003年12月。 ‧ 李德倫，〈標準必要專利授權與合理權利金研究〉，東吳大學法學院法律學系碩士班碩士論文，2016年7月。 ‧ 束孟軒，〈標準必要專利爭議探討─以FRAND授權承諾下之合理權利金為中心〉，國立台灣大學法律學院法律學系碩士論文，2019年7月。 ‧ 陳俐妤，〈標準必要專利權利金爭議之探討〉，國立政治大學智慧財產研究所碩士論文，2014年7月。 ‧ 葉家齊，〈標準制定組織之專利集管型態與授權爭議分析〉，國立交通大學科技法律研究所碩士論文，2015年1月。 四、司法判決及其他政府機關決定 ‧ 最高法院29年渝上字第762號民事判例。 ‧ 最高法院64年台上字第1567號民事判例。 ‧ 最高法院89年台上字第2606號民事判決。 ‧ 最高法院98年台上字第690號民事判決。 貳、外文文獻 一、研究報告 ‧ Jorge L. Contreras, TCL v. Ericsson The First Major U.S. Top-Down FRAND Royalty Decision, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH COLLEGE OF LAW RESEARCH PAPER NO. 245 (Dec. 27, 2017), https://dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1083&context=scholarship#:~:text=The%20court%20recognized%20that%20Ericsson's,provides%20the%20SEP%20owner%20a. ‧ Justus Baron & Daniel F. Spulber, Technology Standards and Standard Setting Organizations Introduction to the Searle Center Database, NORTHWESTERN LAW & ECON RESEARCH PAPER NO. 17-16 (2018). ‧ Nicolas Petit, EU Competition Law Analysis of FRAND Disputes, THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW (Dec., 2017). 二、期刊 ‧ Brian Dean Abramson, The Patent Ambush: Misuse or Caveat Emptor?, 51 IDEA 71 (2011). ‧ Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse? A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-up, Royalty Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. COMPET. J. 101, (2007). ‧ Damien Geradin et al., The Complements Problem Within Standard Setting: Assessing the Evidence on Royalty Stacking, 14 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 144 (2008). ‧ Dennis W. Carlton & Allan L. Shampine, An Economic Interpretation of FRAND, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 531 (2013). ‧ Florian Mueller, The German approach to FRAND: let's err on the side of injunctions, FOSS PATENTS (May 23, 2012), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/german-approach-to-frand-lets-err-on.html. ‧ Gregory K. Leonard & Mario A. Lopez, Determining Rand Royalty Rates for Standard-Essential Patents, 29(1) ANTITRUST 86 (2014). ‧ Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH LAW REVIEW 479 (2015). ‧ Jorge L. Contreras, Global Rate Setting: A Solution for Standards-Essential Patents?, 94 WASH. L. REV. 701 (2019). ‧ Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002). ‧ Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135 (2013). ‧ Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1991 (2007). ‧ Richard Vary, Dissecting TCL v Ericsson – what went wrong?, 91 IAM 9 (2018), https://www.twobirds.com/-/media/pdfs/iam91_tclvericsson.pdf. ‧ Richard Wingfield, SPOTLIGHT ON THE ITU #2: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE ITU, GLOBAL PARTNERS DIGITAL (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.gp-digital.org/spotlight-on-the-itu-2-a-brief-introduction-to-the-itu/. ‧ Roger G. Brooks & Damien Geradin, Interpreting and Enforcing the Voluntary FRAND Commitment (2010). ‧ Rudi Bekkers et al., An Empirical Study on the Determinants of Essential Patent Claims in Compatibility Standards, 40 RESEARCH POLICY 1001 (2011). ‧ Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents and Frand Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311 (2014). ‧ Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, JOURNAL OF CORPORATION LAW, 34 J. CORP. L. 1151 (2009). 三、政府機關公告文件 ‧ JAPAN PATENT OFFICE, GUIDE TO LICENSING NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS 2ND EDITION (July, 2022). 四、司法判決及其他政府機關決定 ‧ Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (W.D. Wis. 2012). ‧ Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962). ‧ eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). ‧ Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings, Ltd., 2018 WL 2149736 (E.D. Tex. May 10, 2018). ‧ Ericsson Inc. v. TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings Ltd., 955 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2020). ‧ General Instrument Corporation v. Microsoft, case no. 2O240/11. ‧ Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd v. ZTE Corp., C-170/13 (CJEU) (July 16, 2015). ‧ In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Pat. Litig., No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill. 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Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 2018 WL 4488286 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2018). ‧ TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, 943 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2019). ‧ TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings, Ltd v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, 2020 WL 11193553 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2020). ‧ TCL Commc'n Tech. Holdings, Ltd v. Ericsson, 2020 WL 12762767 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2020). 五、網路資料 ‧ Blake Brittain, Ericsson, TCL settle long-running smartphone patent disputes, REUTERS, (July 20, 2021): https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/ericsson-tcl-settle-long-running-smartphone-patent-disputes-2021-07-19/ ‧ ETSI, ABOUT US: https://www.etsi.org/about#mytoc1 (last visited July 21, 2022). ‧ ETSI, ETSI Directives ANNEX 6: ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy: https://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf ‧ Florian Mueller, The German approach to FRAND: let's err on the side of injunctions, FOSS PATENTS (May 23, 2012): http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/05/german-approach-to-frand-lets-err-on.html ‧ Haris Tsilikas, Comparable Agreements and the “Top-Down” Approach to FRAND Royalties Determination, COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL, (Jul. 21, 2020): https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/comparable-agreements-and-the-top-down-approach-to-frand-royalties-determination/ ‧ IEEE, ABOUT US: https://standards.ieee.org/about/ (last visited July 18, 2022). ‧ IEEE, HOW IS FINAL APPROVAL OBTAINED?: https://standards.ieee.org/develop/gaining-final-approval/finalapp/ (last visited Sep. 29, 2022). ‧ IEEE , IEEE AT A GLANCE: https://www.ieee.org/about/at-a-glance.html (last visited July 18, 2022). ‧ IEEE, IEEE SA Standards Board Bylaws, CLAUSE 6.1 DEFINITIONS: https://standards.ieee.org/about/policies/bylaws/sect6-7/ ‧ IEEE, THE SA BALLOTING PROCESS: https://standards.ieee.org/develop/balloting-standard/balloting/ (last visited Sep. 29, 2022). ‧ Integration, Interoperability, Compatibility and Portability: http://www.testingstandards.co.uk/interop_et_al.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2021). ‧ ISO, STANDARDS: https://www.iso.org/standards.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2021). ‧ ITU, ABOUT INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION (ITU): https://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited July 18, 2022). ‧ ITU, COMMON PATENT POLICY FOR ITU-T/ITU -R/ISO/IEC, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/ipr/Pages/policy.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2022). ‧ ITU, STANDARDS APPROVAL: https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/about/Pages/approval.aspx (last visited Sep. 29, 2022). ‧ ITU/ISO/IEC, Guidelines for Implementation of the Common Patent Policy for ITU-T/ITU-R/ISO/IEC (16/12/2022), PART I-2 (2022): https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/oth/04/04/T04040000010006PDFE.pdf ‧ Kevin Post et al., Why evidence remains king when it comes to pricing SEPs, IAM (Mar. 28, 2023): https://www.iam-media.com/hub/sepfrand-hub/2022/article/why-evidence-remains-king-when-it-comes-pricing-seps. ‧ Kevin Post et al., Juries to play key role in SEP litigation for infringement and damages, IAM (Jan. 6, 2023): https://www.iam-media.com/hub/sepfrand-hub/2022/article/juries-play-key-role-in-sep-litigation-infringement-and-damages 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
科技管理與智慧財產研究所
107364212資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107364212 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 陳秉訓 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Chen, Ping-Hsun en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 張凱博 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Chang, Kai-Po en_US dc.creator (作者) 張凱博 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Chang, Kai-Po en_US dc.date (日期) 2023 en_US dc.date.accessioned 1-Feb-2024 11:45:04 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 1-Feb-2024 11:45:04 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Feb-2024 11:45:04 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0107364212 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/149662 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 科技管理與智慧財產研究所 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 107364212 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 資通訊產業自通訊技術以及標準制定組織開始發展以來，標準必要專利(Standard Essemtial Patents, SEPs)相關案件在全球各地法院層出不窮，至今為止已經累積不少經典之標準必要專利案件，而隨著通訊技術發展至5G及5G技術之應用愈趨成熟和多樣化，未來5G標準必要專利之案件亦勢必大量發生。 在過往之標準必要專利案件中，有關F/RAND原則之定義以及合理權利金之計算一直是被廣泛討論之爭點，而經過多年後，F/RAND原則之定義似有逐漸明顯之輪廓，然合理權利金之計算方法則是百家爭鳴並無一統一之方式，全憑各案件之法官和當事人共同建構一項合乎F/RAND原則且具可信性的合理權利金計算方式。 而在各標準必要專利案件中，TCL v. Ericsson案實屬對於F/RAND原則定義以及合理權利金計算方式討論內容相當豐富之案件，本文亦希望能透過分析TCL案了解影響合理權利金計算結果之關鍵性因素，以期能為未來之5G標準必要專利之案件提供一些洞見。本文首先介紹標準必要專利之定義及可能帶來之正反面影響。再來介紹F/RAND承諾之定義以及F/RAND承諾在實務上運作之爭議。接著進入本文之重點，即TCL案，此部分可分為四小部分，第一是有關TCL案地方法院判斷授權要約是否符合F/RAND原則之方法及細節；第二是TCL案地方法院計算合理權利金之方法，即以「由上而下計算法為主，可比較授權法為輔」的方式進行計算；第三是上訴法院對於Ericsson是否有請求陪審團審理之權利之見解；第四則是對於TCL案整體之分析。最後，本文整理出TCL案之重點並提供建議予將來之標準必要專利合理權利金計算案件當事人。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Since the beginning of the development of communication technology and standards-setting organizations (SSOs) in ITC industry, cases related to standard essential patents (SEPs) have emerged in an endless stream in courts around the world. So far, many classic SEP cases have accumulated. As communication technology develops to 5G and the applications of 5G technology become more mature and diversified, a large number of 5G standard essential patent cases are bound to occur in the future. In past standard essential patent cases, the definition of the F/RAND principle and the calculation of reasonable royalties have always been widely discussed issues. After many years, the definition of the F/RAND principle seems to have gradually become clearer. However, there is no unified method for calculating reasonable royalties, and it depends on the judges and parties in each case to jointly construct a reasonable and credible method of calculating royalties that is consistent with the F/RAND principle. Among the various SEP cases, the TCL v. Ericsson case is indeed a case that contains a full discussion of the definition of the F/RAND principle and the calculation methods of reasonable royalties. This article also hopes to understand which key factors will impact the result of reasonable royalty calculation by analyzing the TCL case. Besides, these key factors are expected to provide some insights into 5G SEP cases in future. This article first introduces the definition of SEPs and the possible positive and negative impacts. Next, this article will introduce the definition of F/RAND commitment and the disputes over the practical operation of F/RAND commitment. Then, here comes to the key point of this article, the TCL case. This part can be divided into four subsections. The first is about the methods and details of how did district court in the TCL case determine whether the licensing offer complied with the F/RAND principle; the second is the calculation method adopted by the district court in the TCL case, which is taking "top-down approach as the main method, comparable license as the supplementary method" the third is the Court of Appeal's opinion on whether Ericsson has the right to request a jury trial; the fourth is an overall analysis of the TCL case. Finally, this article summarizes the key points of the TCL case and provides suggestions to potential parties involved in future SEP reasonable royalty calculation cases. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 研究範圍與限制 3 第三節 研究方法 4 第四節 本文架構 4 第二章 標準必要專利 6 第一節 標準之意義 6 第二節 標準之類型 8 第一項 事實上標準(de facto standards) 8 第二項 法律上標準(de jure standards) 9 第三項 私人標準制定組織所制定之標準 9 第三節 標準制定組織 10 第一項 標準制定組織之類型 10 第二項 通訊產業標準制定組織 12 第四節 標準必要專利的制定過程 14 第一項 標準必要專利之「必要性」 16 第二項 標準制定之過程 17 第五節 標準制定組織之智慧財產權政策 19 第一項 揭露義務 19 第二項 授權義務 21 第六節 標準化之影響 21 第一項 標準化之正面影響 21 第二項 標準化之負面影響與風險 22 第一款 專利箝制(patent hold-up) 23 第二款 權利金堆疊(royalty stacking) 24 第三章 F/RAND承諾 26 第一節 前言 26 第二節 F/RAND承諾之定義 26 第一項 前言 27 第二項 公平、合理 27 第三項 無歧視 29 第三節 F/RAND承諾之模式 31 第四節 F/RAND承諾之性質 36 第一項 第三人利益契約說 37 第二項 第三人利益預約說 42 第三項 違反誠實信用原則說 43 第四項 本文見解 44 第五節 F/RAND承諾之實務爭議 46 第一項 F/RAND承諾對禁制令之影響 46 第二項 F/RAND授權義務是否會移轉給標準必要專利受讓人 50 第四章 TCL v. Ericsson案 53 第一節 案件背景 53 第一項 TCL和Ericsson協商及訴訟過程 53 第二項 ETSI和F/RAND義務 58 第二節 本案爭點 58 第一項 地方法院爭點 58 第二項 上訴法院爭點 59 第三節 地方法院法官審判 59 第一項 TCL和Ericsson提出之權利金計算方法 59 第一款 TCL之由上而下計算法(Top-down Approach) 59 第二款 Ericsson之納入標準前後價值比較法(Ex Standard Approach) 63 第二項 地方法院法官審判裁定 63 第一款 步驟一：法院判斷Ericsson提出之要約是否符合 F/RAND要件 63 第一目 法院利用修正後之由上而下計算法判斷Ericsson之要 約是否符合F/RAND之「公平」和「合理」要件 64 第二目 法院利用可比較授權法判斷Ericsson之要約是否符合 F/RAND之「無歧視」要件 75 第二款 步驟二：法院設定過去和未來之F/RAND權利金費率 85 第一目 設定未來F/RAND權利金費率 85 第二目 設定過去F/RAND權利金費率和免除責任金 90 第四節 上訴法院見解 90 第一項 免除責任金屬於普通法上之救濟 91 第二項 Ericsson並未拋棄其請求陪審團審理免除責任金之權 利 93 第三項 小結 95 第五節 本案之分析 95 第一項 地方法院兩步驟作法分析 95 第一款 本判決值得肯定之部分 96 第一目 妥適地分別運用由上而下計算法和可比較授權法判斷 Ericsson提出之要約否符合F/RAND要件 96 第二目 妥適地以由上而下計算法為主、可比較授權法為輔的方 式決定F/RAND權利金費率 98 第二款 本判缺失之部分 99 第一目 由上而下計算法之總累計權利金費率有誤 99 第二目 由上而下計算法之必要性分析過程有爭議 101 第二項 本案對資通訊產業SEP權利金計算和訴訟實務之影 102 第一款 為由上而下計算法和混合型權利金計算法提供背書 102 第二款 開創高端產品公司成為低端產品公司定位類似公司之可 能性 103 第三款 陪審團在SEP 損害賠償、F/RAND判斷及侵權認定之重 要性漸增 104 第五章 結論與建議 106 第一節 結論 106 第一項 標準化之影響 106 第二項 F/RAND承諾之定性 108 第三項 TCL v. Ericsson案地方法院之權利金計算方法 109 第四項 TCL v. Ericsson案上訴法院對請求陪審團審理權利 之見解 112 第二節 建議 113 參考文獻 115 壹、中文文獻 115 貳、外文文獻 116 zh_TW dc.format.extent 2319560 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107364212 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 標準必要專利 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公平合理無歧視 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 合理權利金 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 由上而下計算法 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 可比較授權法 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) standard essential patents(SEPs) en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (F/RAND) en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) reasonable royalties en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) top-down approach en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) comparable license en_US dc.title (題名) 分析TCL v. Ericsson案之FRAND權利金計算方法及其對資通訊產業之影響 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Analysis of the FRAND Royalty Calculation Methods in TCL v. 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