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題名 不忠誠董事與內幕交易
Disloyal Directors and the Profitability of Insider Trading
作者 葉琇月
Yeh, Hsiu-Yueh
貢獻者 車倫周
Cha, Yunju
葉琇月
Yeh, Hsiu-Yueh
關鍵詞 公司機會豁免
內幕交易
內線交易
內部人交易
交易獲利能力
法律風險
Corporate Opportunity Waiver (COW)
Insider trading
Trading profitability
Legal risk
日期 2024
上傳時間 1-Jul-2024 12:39:47 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究旨在探討公司機會豁免法實施後，董事是否會因為法律風險降低而在內幕交易中獲得較多盈利。從2003年至2020年間，美國有七個州前後採用了公司機會豁免法。本研究發現，當公司總部所在的州實施公司機會豁免法，董事在內幕交易中能夠獲得較多的盈利。本研究進一步發現，董事的年齡、性別以及地理位置對其獲取更大盈利的能力有所影響。此外，機構投資人持股比例較高的公司之董事，其從內幕交易中獲得的盈利較少。研究結果表明，當內部人士面臨較低的法律風險時，他們會追求更大的私人利益。
We examine whether the adoption of the Corporate Opportunity Waiver (COW) law enables directors to earn more profits from their informed trading by reducing the legal risk. Using the staggered adoption of the COW law across seven states from 2003 to 2020, we find that when firms’ incorporated states have enacted COW laws, directors earn more profits from their informed trading. We further find that directors’ age, gender, and geographical proximity help them to achieve greater profitability. Furthermore, directors in firms with higher institutional ownership earn less insider profit. Our findings suggest how insiders pursue their private benefits when facing lower legal risk.
參考文獻 Aboody, D., & Lev, B. (2000). Information asymmetry, R&D, and insider gains. The journal of Finance, 55(6), 2747-2766. Acharya, V. V., & Volpin, P. F. (2010). Corporate governance externalities. Review of Finance, 14(1), 1-33. Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2010). Individual and corporate social responsibility. Economica, 77(305), 1-19. Bettis, C., Coles, J., & Lemmon, M. (2000). Corporate policies restricting trades by insiders. Journal of Financial Economics, 57(2), 191–220. Boyd, N., Li, S., Wang, H. H., & Wang, X. (2022). Disloyal managers and corporate social responsibility. Available at SSRN 4136898. Byrnes, J. P., Miller, D. C., & Schafer, W. D. (1999). Gender differences in risk taking: A meta-analysis. Psychological bulletin, 125(3), 367. Carhart, M. (1997). On persistence in mutual fund performance. Journal of Finance, 52(1), 57–82. Charness, G., & Gneezy, U. (2012). Strong evidence for gender differences in risk taking. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 83(1), 50-58. Cheng, Q., & Lo, K. (2006). Insider trading and voluntary disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(5), 815-848. Chung, K. H., & Zhang, H. (2011). Corporate governance and institutional ownership. Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 46(1), 247-273. Dai, L., Fu, R., Kang, J. K., & Lee, I. (2016). Corporate governance and the profitability of insider trading. Journal of Corporate Finance, 40, 235-253. Dyer, T. A. (2021). The demand for public information by local and nonlocal investors: Evidence from investor-level data. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 72(1), 101417. Fich, E. M., Harford, J., & Tran, A. L. (2023). Disloyal managers and shareholders’ wealth. The Review of Financial Studies, 36(5), 1837-1888. Francis, J., Philbrick, D., & Schipper, K. (1994). Shareholder litigation and corporate disclosures. Journal of accounting research, 32(2), 137-164. Frankel, R., & Li, X. (2004). Characteristics of a firm's information environment and the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Journal of accounting and economics, 37(2), 229-259. Gao, M., & Huang, S. (2022). Independent Director Tenure and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Insider Trading. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1-36. Geng, H., Hau, H., Michaely, R., & Nguyen, B. (2021). The effect of board overlap on firm behavior. Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper, (21-40). Goergen, M., Renneboog, L., & Zhao, Y. (2019). Insider trading and networked directors. Journal of Corporate Finance, 56, 152-175. Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Puri, M. (2013). Managerial attitudes and corporate actions. Journal of financial economics, 109(1), 103-121. Hillier, D., Korczak, A., & Korczak, P. (2015). The impact of personal attributes on corporate insider trading. Journal of Corporate Finance, 30, 150-167. Hu, M., Jiang, C., John, K., & Ju, M. (2023). Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty and Corporate Culture. Available at SSRN 4313258. Huang, A., Hui, K. W., & Li, R. Z. (2019). Federal judge ideology: A new measure of ex ante litigation risk. Journal of Accounting Research, 57(2), 431-489. Huddart, S. J., & Ke, B. (2007). Information asymmetry and cross‐sectional variation in insider trading. Contemporary Accounting Research, 24(1), 195-232. Hurley, D., & Choudhary, A. (2020). Role of gender and corporate risk taking. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 20(3), 383-399. Ivković, Z., & Weisbenner, S. (2005). Local does as local is: Information content of the geography of individual investors' common stock investments. The Journal of Finance, 60(1), 267-306. Jagolinzer, A., & Roulstone, D. (2009). The effects of insider trading regulation on trade timing, litigation risk. and profitability. Working paper. Johnson, M. F., Nelson, K. K., & Pritchard, A. C. (2007). Do the merits matter more? The impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 23(3), 627-652. Kaplan, S. N., Sensoy, B. A., & Strömberg, P. (2009). Should investors bet on the jockey or the horse? Evidence from the evolution of firms from early business plans to public companies. The Journal of Finance, 64(1), 75-115. Kim, K., & Kim, T. N. (2023). CEO career concerns and ESG investments. Finance Research Letters, 55, 103819. Khalilov, A., & Osma, B. G. (2020). Accounting conservatism and the profitability of corporate insiders. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 47(3-4), 333-364. Khan, W. A., & Vieito, J. P. (2013). CEO gender and firm performance. Journal of Economics and Business, 67, 55-66. Kraft, A., Lee, B., & Lopatta, K. (2014). Management earnings forecasts, insider trading, and information asymmetry. Journal of Corporate Finance, 26, 96–123. Lee, I., Lemmon, M., Li, Y., & Lee, I., Lemmon, M., Li, Y., & Sequeira, J. M. (2014). Do voluntary corporate restrictions on insider trading eliminate informed insider trading?. Journal of Corporate Finance, 29, 158-178. Li, D., & Ni, X. (2023). A Farewell to Loyalty, a Farewell to Care? Evidence from Takeover Targets. Evidence from Takeover Targets (June 6, 2023). Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. The journal of finance, 60(6), 2661-2700. Massa, M., Qian, W., Xu, W., & Zhang, H. (2015). Competition of the informed: Does the presence of short sellers affect insider selling?. Journal of Financial Economics, 118(2), 268-288. Sequeira, J. (2014). Do voluntary corporate restrictions on insider trading eliminate informed insider trading? Journal of Corporate Finance, 29, 158–178. Jagolinzer, A., Larcker, D., & Taylor, D. (2011). Corporate governance and the information content of insider trades. Journal of Accounting Research, 49(5), 1249– 1274. Rauterberg, G., & Talley, E. (2017). Contracting out of the fiduciary duty of loyalty: An empirical analysis of corporate opportunity waivers. Colum. L. Rev., 117, 1075. Rogers, J. L. (2008). Disclosure quality and management trading incentives. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(5), 1265-1296. Wang, X. (2022). Disloyal managers and proxy voting. Finance Research Letters, 44, 102636. Wu, W. (2019). Information asymmetry and insider trading. Fama-Miller Working Paper, Chicago Booth Research Paper, (13-67).
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理學系
111357018
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111357018
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 車倫周zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Cha, Yunjuen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 葉琇月zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Yeh, Hsiu-Yuehen_US
dc.creator (作者) 葉琇月zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Yeh, Hsiu-Yuehen_US
dc.date (日期) 2024en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2024 12:39:47 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Jul-2024 12:39:47 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2024 12:39:47 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0111357018en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/152067-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 111357018zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究旨在探討公司機會豁免法實施後，董事是否會因為法律風險降低而在內幕交易中獲得較多盈利。從2003年至2020年間，美國有七個州前後採用了公司機會豁免法。本研究發現，當公司總部所在的州實施公司機會豁免法，董事在內幕交易中能夠獲得較多的盈利。本研究進一步發現，董事的年齡、性別以及地理位置對其獲取更大盈利的能力有所影響。此外，機構投資人持股比例較高的公司之董事，其從內幕交易中獲得的盈利較少。研究結果表明，當內部人士面臨較低的法律風險時，他們會追求更大的私人利益。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) We examine whether the adoption of the Corporate Opportunity Waiver (COW) law enables directors to earn more profits from their informed trading by reducing the legal risk. Using the staggered adoption of the COW law across seven states from 2003 to 2020, we find that when firms’ incorporated states have enacted COW laws, directors earn more profits from their informed trading. We further find that directors’ age, gender, and geographical proximity help them to achieve greater profitability. Furthermore, directors in firms with higher institutional ownership earn less insider profit. Our findings suggest how insiders pursue their private benefits when facing lower legal risk.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 摘要 I Abstract II Contents III List of Tables IV 1. Introduction 1 2. Literature Review 5 2.1 Corporate Opportunity Waivers 5 2.2 Insider trading profitability 6 3. Hypothesis development 7 3.1 Relationship between the adoption of the COW law and insider trading profitability 7 3.2 Trading profitability of directors compared to top executives 8 3.3 Trading profitability of directors and COW depending on director characteristics 8 3.3.1 Directors’ age 8 3.3.2 Directors’ gender 9 3.3.3 Local directors 9 3.4 Trading profitability of directors and COW depending on firm characteristics- Firms’ institutional ownership 9 3.5 Trading profitability of directors and COW depending on legal risk 10 4. Research design 10 4.1 Data 10 4.2 Variable description 11 4.2.1 Corporate Opportunity Waivers 11 4.2.2 Insider Trading Profitability 12 4.3 Summary Statistics 12 4.4 Empirical Models 13 5. Results 16 5.1 COW and insider trading profitability: Main evidence 16 5.2 Trading profitability of directors compared to top executives 16 5.3 Trading profitability of directors and COW depending on director characteristics 17 5.4 Trading profitability of directors and COW depending on firm characteristics 18 5.5 Trading profitability of directors and COW depending on legal risk 18 6. Conclusion 19 References 20 Appendix A: Definition of variables 34 Appendix B: State adoption of Corporate Opportunity Waivers law 35zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1032122 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111357018en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司機會豁免zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 內幕交易zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 內線交易zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 內部人交易zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 交易獲利能力zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 法律風險zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Corporate Opportunity Waiver (COW)en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Insider tradingen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Trading profitabilityen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Legal risken_US
dc.title (題名) 不忠誠董事與內幕交易zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Disloyal Directors and the Profitability of Insider Tradingen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Aboody, D., & Lev, B. (2000). Information asymmetry, R&D, and insider gains. The journal of Finance, 55(6), 2747-2766. Acharya, V. V., & Volpin, P. F. (2010). Corporate governance externalities. Review of Finance, 14(1), 1-33. Bénabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2010). Individual and corporate social responsibility. Economica, 77(305), 1-19. Bettis, C., Coles, J., & Lemmon, M. (2000). Corporate policies restricting trades by insiders. Journal of Financial Economics, 57(2), 191–220. Boyd, N., Li, S., Wang, H. H., & Wang, X. (2022). Disloyal managers and corporate social responsibility. Available at SSRN 4136898. Byrnes, J. P., Miller, D. C., & Schafer, W. D. (1999). Gender differences in risk taking: A meta-analysis. Psychological bulletin, 125(3), 367. Carhart, M. (1997). On persistence in mutual fund performance. Journal of Finance, 52(1), 57–82. Charness, G., & Gneezy, U. (2012). Strong evidence for gender differences in risk taking. Journal of economic behavior & organization, 83(1), 50-58. Cheng, Q., & Lo, K. (2006). Insider trading and voluntary disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 44(5), 815-848. Chung, K. H., & Zhang, H. (2011). Corporate governance and institutional ownership. Journal of financial and quantitative analysis, 46(1), 247-273. Dai, L., Fu, R., Kang, J. K., & Lee, I. (2016). Corporate governance and the profitability of insider trading. Journal of Corporate Finance, 40, 235-253. Dyer, T. A. (2021). The demand for public information by local and nonlocal investors: Evidence from investor-level data. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 72(1), 101417. Fich, E. M., Harford, J., & Tran, A. L. (2023). Disloyal managers and shareholders’ wealth. The Review of Financial Studies, 36(5), 1837-1888. Francis, J., Philbrick, D., & Schipper, K. (1994). Shareholder litigation and corporate disclosures. Journal of accounting research, 32(2), 137-164. Frankel, R., & Li, X. (2004). Characteristics of a firm's information environment and the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Journal of accounting and economics, 37(2), 229-259. Gao, M., & Huang, S. (2022). Independent Director Tenure and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Insider Trading. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1-36. Geng, H., Hau, H., Michaely, R., & Nguyen, B. (2021). The effect of board overlap on firm behavior. Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper, (21-40). Goergen, M., Renneboog, L., & Zhao, Y. (2019). Insider trading and networked directors. Journal of Corporate Finance, 56, 152-175. Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Puri, M. (2013). Managerial attitudes and corporate actions. Journal of financial economics, 109(1), 103-121. Hillier, D., Korczak, A., & Korczak, P. (2015). The impact of personal attributes on corporate insider trading. Journal of Corporate Finance, 30, 150-167. Hu, M., Jiang, C., John, K., & Ju, M. (2023). Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty and Corporate Culture. Available at SSRN 4313258. Huang, A., Hui, K. W., & Li, R. Z. (2019). Federal judge ideology: A new measure of ex ante litigation risk. Journal of Accounting Research, 57(2), 431-489. Huddart, S. J., & Ke, B. (2007). Information asymmetry and cross‐sectional variation in insider trading. Contemporary Accounting Research, 24(1), 195-232. Hurley, D., & Choudhary, A. (2020). Role of gender and corporate risk taking. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 20(3), 383-399. Ivković, Z., & Weisbenner, S. (2005). Local does as local is: Information content of the geography of individual investors' common stock investments. The Journal of Finance, 60(1), 267-306. Jagolinzer, A., & Roulstone, D. (2009). The effects of insider trading regulation on trade timing, litigation risk. and profitability. Working paper. Johnson, M. F., Nelson, K. K., & Pritchard, A. C. (2007). Do the merits matter more? The impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 23(3), 627-652. Kaplan, S. N., Sensoy, B. A., & Strömberg, P. (2009). Should investors bet on the jockey or the horse? Evidence from the evolution of firms from early business plans to public companies. The Journal of Finance, 64(1), 75-115. Kim, K., & Kim, T. N. (2023). CEO career concerns and ESG investments. Finance Research Letters, 55, 103819. Khalilov, A., & Osma, B. G. (2020). Accounting conservatism and the profitability of corporate insiders. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 47(3-4), 333-364. Khan, W. A., & Vieito, J. P. (2013). CEO gender and firm performance. Journal of Economics and Business, 67, 55-66. Kraft, A., Lee, B., & Lopatta, K. (2014). Management earnings forecasts, insider trading, and information asymmetry. Journal of Corporate Finance, 26, 96–123. Lee, I., Lemmon, M., Li, Y., & Lee, I., Lemmon, M., Li, Y., & Sequeira, J. M. (2014). Do voluntary corporate restrictions on insider trading eliminate informed insider trading?. Journal of Corporate Finance, 29, 158-178. Li, D., & Ni, X. (2023). A Farewell to Loyalty, a Farewell to Care? Evidence from Takeover Targets. Evidence from Takeover Targets (June 6, 2023). Malmendier, U., & Tate, G. (2005). CEO overconfidence and corporate investment. The journal of finance, 60(6), 2661-2700. Massa, M., Qian, W., Xu, W., & Zhang, H. (2015). Competition of the informed: Does the presence of short sellers affect insider selling?. Journal of Financial Economics, 118(2), 268-288. Sequeira, J. (2014). Do voluntary corporate restrictions on insider trading eliminate informed insider trading? Journal of Corporate Finance, 29, 158–178. Jagolinzer, A., Larcker, D., & Taylor, D. (2011). Corporate governance and the information content of insider trades. Journal of Accounting Research, 49(5), 1249– 1274. Rauterberg, G., & Talley, E. (2017). Contracting out of the fiduciary duty of loyalty: An empirical analysis of corporate opportunity waivers. Colum. L. Rev., 117, 1075. Rogers, J. L. (2008). Disclosure quality and management trading incentives. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(5), 1265-1296. Wang, X. (2022). Disloyal managers and proxy voting. Finance Research Letters, 44, 102636. Wu, W. (2019). Information asymmetry and insider trading. Fama-Miller Working Paper, Chicago Booth Research Paper, (13-67).zh_TW