| dc.contributor.advisor | 賴育邦 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Lai, Yu-Bong | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 林皇志 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Lin, Huang-Chih | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 林皇志 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lin, Huang-Chih | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2024 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 1-Jul-2024 13:29:04 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 1-Jul-2024 13:29:04 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 1-Jul-2024 13:29:04 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0111255001 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/152134 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 財政學系 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 111255001 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 本文研究垂直相關市場的整合與非整合對政府之最適環境政策有何影響。本文以Sugeta and Matsumoto (2007)的模型為基礎，將政府的政策工具分為單一和雙重課稅工具，並利用兩階段賽局和三階段賽局的方式分析垂直市場為整合與非整合下的最適環境稅稅率。本文發現：整合的垂直市場中，汙染外部性是市場中唯一存在的扭曲，所以政府制定的最適環境稅會等於皮古稅；非整合的垂直市場中則因為上游市場將生產要素訂價過高而存在第二重扭曲，且由於兩種扭曲的力量相反，所以政府在制定稅率時必須綜合考量兩種扭曲力量的大小。因此，若政府僅擁有單一工具，其制定的最適環境稅稅率會低於皮古稅；在雙重工具下，政府則可以針對個別扭曲進行矯正，政府會同時對上游廠商進行補貼並對下游廠商課徵皮古稅。最後，本文也發現非整合垂直市場中的下游廠商數量越多，最適環境稅稅率會遞增。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This thesis studies the impact of integration and non-integration of vertically related markets on the government's environmental tax rates. Based on the model of Sugeta and Matsumoto (2007), this article divides government policy tools into single and double taxation tools, and uses two-stage and three-stage games to analyze the relationship between different types of vertical markets and the optimal environmental tax rates. I find that there is only a single distortion caused by pollution externality in an integrated vertical market. To correct the inefficiency of the market, the government only needs to make the environmental tax rate equal to the Pigouvian tax. In a non-integrated vertical market structure, there will be a second distortion due to the upstream firm’s overcharging. Since the forces of the two distortions work in opposite directions, the government must comprehensively consider the magnitude of the two distortions when formulating tax rates. With a single tax instrument, the government must deal with the inefficiency caused by two distortions at the same time, so it has to compromise, setting the optimal environmental tax rate lower than the Pigouvian tax. With a dual tax instrument, the government can correct distortions individually and it will subsidize the upstream firm and levy a Pigouvian tax on the downstream manufacturers. Finally, I also find that the downstream market structure plays an important role in determining the tax rates. When the number of downstream manufacturers increases, the optimal environmental tax rates will be higher as well. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與方法 1
第二節 本文架構 2
第二章 文獻回顧 3
第三章 基本模型 5
第四章 整合之垂直市場 7
第一節 單一工具 7
第二節 雙重工具 9
第五章 非整合之垂直市場 12
第一節 單一工具 12
第二節 雙重工具 18
第三節 整合與非整合垂直市場的最適稅率比較 20
第六章 結論 22
參考文獻 23 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 992962 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111255001 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 垂直市場 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 整合 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 環境稅 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 汙染外部性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 單一課稅工具 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 雙重課稅工具 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Vertically related market | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Integration | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Environmental tax | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Pollution externality | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Single tax instrument | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Multiple tax instruments | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 整合與非整合垂直市場中的最適環境政策 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Optimal Environmental Taxes in Vertical Markets: Integrated versus Non-integrated Markets | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en_US |
| dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) | 林燕淑. (2010). 垂直相關市場中之策略性環境與貿易政策. 農業與資源經濟, 7(1), 73-94.
Barnett, A. H. (1980). The Pigouvian Tax Rule under Monopoly. American Economic Review, 70(5), 1037-1041.
Baumol, W. J., Oates, W. E. (1988). The Theory of Environmental Policy. Cambridge University Press.
Buchanan, J. M. (1969). External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure. American Economic Review, 59(1), 174-177.
Canton, J., Soubeyran, A., Stahn, H. (2008). Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-Industries Matter. Environmental and Resource Economics, 40(3), 369-382.
Ebert, U. (1992). Pigouvian Taxes and Market Structure: The Case of Oligopoly and Different Abatement Technologies. Public Finance Analysis 49 (2), pp.154-166.
Hamilton, S. F., Requate, T. (2004). Vertical Structure and Strategic Environmental Trade Policy. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 47(2), 260-269.
Katsoulacos, Y., Xepapadeas, A. (1995). Environmental-Policy under Oligopoly with Endogenous Market-Structure. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97(3), 411-420.
Ohori, S. (2012). Environmental Tax and Public Ownership in Vertically Related Markets. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 12(2), 169-176.
Pigou, A. C. (1920). The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan, Lodon.
Simpson, R. D. (1995). Optimal Pollution Taxation in a Cournot Duopoly. Environmental and Resource Economics, 6(4), 359-369.
Sugeta, H., Matsumoto, S. (2007). Upstream and Downstream Pollution Taxations in Vertically Related Markets with Imperfect Competition. Environmental and Resource Economics, 38(3), 407-432. | zh_TW |
