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題名 知己知彼？供應鏈中資訊接收的福利分析
Knowing Me, Knowing You? Welfare Analysis of Information Reception in a Supply Chain
作者 葉軒秀
Yeh, Hsuan-Hsiu
貢獻者 溫偉任<br>潘振宇
葉軒秀
Yeh, Hsuan-Hsiu
關鍵詞 資訊洩漏
資訊接收
完美貝氏均衡
貝氏納許均衡
Information leakage
Information reception
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Bayesian Nash equilibrium
日期 2024
上傳時間 5-Aug-2024 11:56:56 (UTC+8)
摘要 本文研究了供應鏈中兩下游競爭廠商在不同策略下資訊的洩漏與接收，以及進入廠商（entrant）的利潤分析與社會總福利分析。兩下游競爭廠商中，既有廠商（incumbent）擁有市場需求的相關資訊，而進入廠商無法獲得任何市場需求的相關資訊。根據Anand and Goyal（2009）的研究結果指出，供應商永遠有動機洩漏既有廠商的資訊給進入廠商。本文假設進入廠商可以決定是否接收供應商提供的資訊，既有廠商則根據市場需求向供應商下訂單，然而，當進入廠商選擇接收資訊時，在某些情況下，既有廠商會扭曲其訂單，不會如實反映市場需求。本文分別探討了進入廠商接收供應商提供的資訊與否對其利潤的影響，以及對整體社會福利的影響，本文發現當進入廠商選擇不接收資訊時，其利潤表現較好，然而整體的社會福利在供應鏈中有資訊的洩漏與接收時表現較佳。
This paper investigates the leakage and reception of information under different strategies of two downstream competitors, an incumbent and an entrant, in the supply chain, and the profit analysis of the entrant, and the total social welfare analysis. Among the two downstream competing firms, the incumbent has information about the market demand while the entrant does not have access to any information about the market demand. According to Anand and Goyal (2009), the supplier always has an incentive to leak the incumbent's production quantities to the entrant. We hypothesize that the entrant can decide whether to receive information from the supplier, and then the incumbent places order with the supplier based on the market demand. However, when the entrant chooses to receive the information, the incumbent will distort its order in some cases, which will not reflect the market demand faithfully. In this paper, we examine the impact of whether the entrant receives information from the supplier on its profit and the impact on overall social welfare, respectively. We find that the entrant earns a higher profit when it chooses not to receive the information, but social welfare performs better when there is leakage and reception in the supply chain.
參考文獻 侯詠晴（2024年4月19日）。〈1年市值蒸發12.9兆！特斯拉設廠中國「技術被偷光」…當局「養套殺陷阱」內幕曝〉。《風傳媒》。取自https://shorturl.at/kH52Z 郭士瑋（2011）。兩方市場的價格競爭與數量競爭。國立暨南國際大學經濟學系學位論文（碩士）。 劉揚銘（2008年8月20日）。〈【賽局理論】先行者優勢，還是後進者優勢？〉。《經理人月刊》。取自https://www.managertoday.com.tw/articles/view/1369 盧亞蘭（2020年11月25日）。〈【特斯拉起飛前，早被「偷」光了】曾對中共感激涕零的馬斯克，成了首富才後悔〉。《公民報橘》。取自https://buzzorange.com/citiorange/2020/11/25/tesla-xpeng/ Adewole, A (2005). Developing a strategic framework for efficient and effective optimization of information in the supply chains of the UK clothing manufacture industry. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 10(5), 357-366. Anand, K., and Goyal, M. (2009). Strategic Information Management Under Leakage in a Supply Chain. Management Science, 55(3), 438-452. Bradsher, K. (2024). How China Built BYD, Its Tesla Killer. The New York Times. Chen, J., and Zhang, J. (2013). Coordination of information sharing in a supply chain. Int J of Production Economics, 143, 178-187. Chin, K. S., Feng, G., Jiang, W., and Liu, H. (2020). Information leakage and supply chain contracts. Omega, 90, 1-15. Dai, R., Feng, L., Wang, K., and Zhang, Q. (2023). For better or worse: Impacts of information leakage by a common supplier with innovation imitation of downstream firms. Transportation Research Part E, 170, Article 103020. Hays, C. L., (2004). What Wal-Mart Knows About Customers’ Habits. The New York Times. Kong, G., Rajagopalan, S., and Zhang, H. (2013). Revenue sharing and information leakage in a supply chain. Manage. Management Science, 59(3), 556-572. Kong, G., Rajagopalan, S., and Zhang, H. (2016). Information Leakage in Supply Chains. Handbook of Information Exchange in Supply Chain Management, 5, 313-341 Lee, H. L., So, K. T., and Tang, C. S. (2000) Value of information sharing in a two-level supply chain. Management Science, 46(5), 626-643. Lee, H. L., and Whang, S. (2000). Information sharing in a supply chain. Int J Technology Management, 1(1), 79-93 Li, L. (2002). Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition. Management Science, 48(9), 1196-1212. Li, Y. (2021). In China, Tesla Is a Catfish, and Turns Auto Companies Into Sharks. The New York Times. Murphy, T. (2007). Protection in Question. Survey: Detroit Compromises Intellectual Property. Ward’s AutoWorld, 20-21. Wisner, J. D., Tan, G., Leong, Κ. (2008). Principles of Supply Chain Management: A balanced approach. (Cengage Learning, Independence, KY).
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營與貿易學系
111351023
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111351023
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 溫偉任<br>潘振宇zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 葉軒秀zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Yeh, Hsuan-Hsiuen_US
dc.creator (作者) 葉軒秀zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Yeh, Hsuan-Hsiuen_US
dc.date (日期) 2024en_US
dc.date.accessioned 5-Aug-2024 11:56:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 5-Aug-2024 11:56:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 5-Aug-2024 11:56:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0111351023en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/152397-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國際經營與貿易學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 111351023zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文研究了供應鏈中兩下游競爭廠商在不同策略下資訊的洩漏與接收，以及進入廠商（entrant）的利潤分析與社會總福利分析。兩下游競爭廠商中，既有廠商（incumbent）擁有市場需求的相關資訊，而進入廠商無法獲得任何市場需求的相關資訊。根據Anand and Goyal（2009）的研究結果指出，供應商永遠有動機洩漏既有廠商的資訊給進入廠商。本文假設進入廠商可以決定是否接收供應商提供的資訊，既有廠商則根據市場需求向供應商下訂單，然而，當進入廠商選擇接收資訊時，在某些情況下，既有廠商會扭曲其訂單，不會如實反映市場需求。本文分別探討了進入廠商接收供應商提供的資訊與否對其利潤的影響，以及對整體社會福利的影響，本文發現當進入廠商選擇不接收資訊時，其利潤表現較好，然而整體的社會福利在供應鏈中有資訊的洩漏與接收時表現較佳。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper investigates the leakage and reception of information under different strategies of two downstream competitors, an incumbent and an entrant, in the supply chain, and the profit analysis of the entrant, and the total social welfare analysis. Among the two downstream competing firms, the incumbent has information about the market demand while the entrant does not have access to any information about the market demand. According to Anand and Goyal (2009), the supplier always has an incentive to leak the incumbent's production quantities to the entrant. We hypothesize that the entrant can decide whether to receive information from the supplier, and then the incumbent places order with the supplier based on the market demand. However, when the entrant chooses to receive the information, the incumbent will distort its order in some cases, which will not reflect the market demand faithfully. In this paper, we examine the impact of whether the entrant receives information from the supplier on its profit and the impact on overall social welfare, respectively. We find that the entrant earns a higher profit when it chooses not to receive the information, but social welfare performs better when there is leakage and reception in the supply chain.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與背景 1 第二節 研究目的 4 第二章 文獻回顧 4 第三章 模型設定 6 第四章 資訊傳遞賽局推導 9 第一節 分離均衡（Separating Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, SPBNE） 11 第二節 混同均衡（Pooling Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, PPBNE） 14 第三節 複合均衡（Composite equilibrium） 16 第四節 貝氏納許均衡（Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, BNE） 17 第五章 研究結果分析 18 第一節 進入廠商的利潤分析 18 第二節 社會福利分析 23 第六章 結論與建議 33 第一節 結論 33 第二節 未來研究建議 33 參考文獻 35zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1690523 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111351023en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資訊洩漏zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 資訊接收zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 完美貝氏均衡zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 貝氏納許均衡zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Information leakageen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Information receptionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Perfect Bayesian equilibriumen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Bayesian Nash equilibriumen_US
dc.title (題名) 知己知彼？供應鏈中資訊接收的福利分析zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Knowing Me, Knowing You? Welfare Analysis of Information Reception in a Supply Chainen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 侯詠晴（2024年4月19日）。〈1年市值蒸發12.9兆！特斯拉設廠中國「技術被偷光」…當局「養套殺陷阱」內幕曝〉。《風傳媒》。取自https://shorturl.at/kH52Z 郭士瑋（2011）。兩方市場的價格競爭與數量競爭。國立暨南國際大學經濟學系學位論文（碩士）。 劉揚銘（2008年8月20日）。〈【賽局理論】先行者優勢，還是後進者優勢？〉。《經理人月刊》。取自https://www.managertoday.com.tw/articles/view/1369 盧亞蘭（2020年11月25日）。〈【特斯拉起飛前，早被「偷」光了】曾對中共感激涕零的馬斯克，成了首富才後悔〉。《公民報橘》。取自https://buzzorange.com/citiorange/2020/11/25/tesla-xpeng/ Adewole, A (2005). Developing a strategic framework for efficient and effective optimization of information in the supply chains of the UK clothing manufacture industry. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 10(5), 357-366. Anand, K., and Goyal, M. (2009). Strategic Information Management Under Leakage in a Supply Chain. Management Science, 55(3), 438-452. Bradsher, K. (2024). How China Built BYD, Its Tesla Killer. The New York Times. Chen, J., and Zhang, J. (2013). Coordination of information sharing in a supply chain. Int J of Production Economics, 143, 178-187. Chin, K. S., Feng, G., Jiang, W., and Liu, H. (2020). Information leakage and supply chain contracts. Omega, 90, 1-15. Dai, R., Feng, L., Wang, K., and Zhang, Q. (2023). For better or worse: Impacts of information leakage by a common supplier with innovation imitation of downstream firms. Transportation Research Part E, 170, Article 103020. Hays, C. L., (2004). What Wal-Mart Knows About Customers’ Habits. The New York Times. Kong, G., Rajagopalan, S., and Zhang, H. (2013). Revenue sharing and information leakage in a supply chain. Manage. Management Science, 59(3), 556-572. Kong, G., Rajagopalan, S., and Zhang, H. (2016). Information Leakage in Supply Chains. Handbook of Information Exchange in Supply Chain Management, 5, 313-341 Lee, H. L., So, K. T., and Tang, C. S. (2000) Value of information sharing in a two-level supply chain. Management Science, 46(5), 626-643. Lee, H. L., and Whang, S. (2000). Information sharing in a supply chain. Int J Technology Management, 1(1), 79-93 Li, L. (2002). Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition. Management Science, 48(9), 1196-1212. Li, Y. (2021). In China, Tesla Is a Catfish, and Turns Auto Companies Into Sharks. The New York Times. Murphy, T. (2007). Protection in Question. Survey: Detroit Compromises Intellectual Property. Ward’s AutoWorld, 20-21. Wisner, J. D., Tan, G., Leong, Κ. (2008). Principles of Supply Chain Management: A balanced approach. (Cengage Learning, Independence, KY).zh_TW