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題名 拜登時期的美中科技戰對台灣半導體產業的影響：新現實主義視角分析
The Impact of the U.S.-China Tech War during the Biden Administration on Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry: Perspective from Neorealism作者 馬宇霖
Ma, Yu-Lin貢獻者 袁力強
Yuan, Li-Chung
馬宇霖
Ma, Yu-Lin關鍵詞 新現實主義
美中科技戰
台灣半導體產業
Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry
Neorealism
The US-China Tech War日期 2024 上傳時間 4-Sep-2024 15:19:38 (UTC+8) 摘要 新現實主義是國際關係理論中最具影響力的理論之一，為分析國家在無政府狀態的全球體系中的行為提供了一個引人注目的視角。本研究運用新現實主義框架來探討美中科技競爭對台灣半導體產業的影響，特別關注從拜登總統上任至今的發展。根據Kenneth Waltz所闡述的新現實主義，國家將生存置於考量，在一個以權力動態和安全考量為主的環境中謹慎行動。 本研究採用質性研究方法，共分為六個章節：從研究簡介開始，接著是新現實主義的理論，其次深入探討美中科技競爭的本質，然後分析拜登政府期間美中之間的技術競爭，接著檢視這一競爭對台灣半導體產業的影響，最後總結研究發現並提出結論。本研究的主要目的是透過新現實主義，來解析美國、中國與台灣之間複雜的三邊關係。 研究結果顯示，處於日益激烈的美中科技競爭核心的台灣半導體產業，已經做出了戰略性的回應，例如在美國鳳凰城、日本熊本和德國得勒斯登建立生產設施，同時推進其國內技術能力的發展，例如投資於2/3奈米製程技術的開發。這種雙重策略確保了台灣在全球供應鏈中的關鍵角色不受影響。此外，本研究還指出，隨著台灣半導體產業繼續支撐美國的軍事和技術優勢，美國保衛台灣抵禦中國壓力的決心可能會相應增強。因此，台灣必須在全球半導體供應鏈中保持不可或缺的地位，這或許是台灣在這場競爭中不得不選擇的一條路徑。
Neorealism is one of the most influential theories in the field of international relations, offering a compelling lens through which to analyze the behavior of states in an anarchic global system. This study employs a neorealist framework to examine the impact of U.S.-China technological competition on Taiwan's semiconductor industry, with a particular focus on developments since the inauguration of President Biden. According to Kenneth Waltz's articulation of neorealism, states prioritize survival and act cautiously in an environment dominated by power dynamics and security concerns. This research adopts a qualitative methodology and is divided into six chapters. It begins with an introduction, followed by a theoretical discussion of neorealism. The subsequent chapters delve into the nature of U.S.-China technological competition, analyze the technological rivalry between the two powers during the Biden administration, and then assess the impact of this competition on Taiwan's semiconductor industry. The final chapter summarizes the findings and presents the conclusions. The primary aim of this study is to decode the complex triangular relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan through the lens of neorealism. The findings indicate that Taiwan's semiconductor industry, at the epicenter of intensifying U.S.-China technological competition, has strategically responded by establishing production facilities in Phoenix, Arizona; Kumamoto, Japan; and Dresden, Germany, while simultaneously advancing domestic technological capabilities, such as investing in the development of 2/3 nanometer process technologies. This dual strategy ensures that Taiwan's critical role in the global supply chain remains unchallenged. 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國立政治大學
亞太研究英語碩士學位學程(IMAS)
110926007資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110926007 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 袁力強 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Yuan, Li-Chung en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 馬宇霖 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Ma, Yu-Lin en_US dc.creator (作者) 馬宇霖 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Ma, Yu-Lin en_US dc.date (日期) 2024 en_US dc.date.accessioned 4-Sep-2024 15:19:38 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 4-Sep-2024 15:19:38 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Sep-2024 15:19:38 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0110926007 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/153464 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程(IMAS) zh_TW dc.description (描述) 110926007 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 新現實主義是國際關係理論中最具影響力的理論之一，為分析國家在無政府狀態的全球體系中的行為提供了一個引人注目的視角。本研究運用新現實主義框架來探討美中科技競爭對台灣半導體產業的影響，特別關注從拜登總統上任至今的發展。根據Kenneth Waltz所闡述的新現實主義，國家將生存置於考量，在一個以權力動態和安全考量為主的環境中謹慎行動。 本研究採用質性研究方法，共分為六個章節：從研究簡介開始，接著是新現實主義的理論，其次深入探討美中科技競爭的本質，然後分析拜登政府期間美中之間的技術競爭，接著檢視這一競爭對台灣半導體產業的影響，最後總結研究發現並提出結論。本研究的主要目的是透過新現實主義，來解析美國、中國與台灣之間複雜的三邊關係。 研究結果顯示，處於日益激烈的美中科技競爭核心的台灣半導體產業，已經做出了戰略性的回應，例如在美國鳳凰城、日本熊本和德國得勒斯登建立生產設施，同時推進其國內技術能力的發展，例如投資於2/3奈米製程技術的開發。這種雙重策略確保了台灣在全球供應鏈中的關鍵角色不受影響。此外，本研究還指出，隨著台灣半導體產業繼續支撐美國的軍事和技術優勢，美國保衛台灣抵禦中國壓力的決心可能會相應增強。因此，台灣必須在全球半導體供應鏈中保持不可或缺的地位，這或許是台灣在這場競爭中不得不選擇的一條路徑。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) Neorealism is one of the most influential theories in the field of international relations, offering a compelling lens through which to analyze the behavior of states in an anarchic global system. This study employs a neorealist framework to examine the impact of U.S.-China technological competition on Taiwan's semiconductor industry, with a particular focus on developments since the inauguration of President Biden. According to Kenneth Waltz's articulation of neorealism, states prioritize survival and act cautiously in an environment dominated by power dynamics and security concerns. This research adopts a qualitative methodology and is divided into six chapters. It begins with an introduction, followed by a theoretical discussion of neorealism. The subsequent chapters delve into the nature of U.S.-China technological competition, analyze the technological rivalry between the two powers during the Biden administration, and then assess the impact of this competition on Taiwan's semiconductor industry. The final chapter summarizes the findings and presents the conclusions. The primary aim of this study is to decode the complex triangular relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan through the lens of neorealism. The findings indicate that Taiwan's semiconductor industry, at the epicenter of intensifying U.S.-China technological competition, has strategically responded by establishing production facilities in Phoenix, Arizona; Kumamoto, Japan; and Dresden, Germany, while simultaneously advancing domestic technological capabilities, such as investing in the development of 2/3 nanometer process technologies. This dual strategy ensures that Taiwan's critical role in the global supply chain remains unchallenged. Furthermore, the study suggests that as Taiwan’s semiconductor industry continues to bolster the United States' military and technological superiority, Washington's resolve to defend Taiwan against Chinese coercion may strengthen accordingly. Thus, maintaining an indispensable position in the global semiconductor supply chain might be the path Taiwan must choose in this competition. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents Title Page……………………………………………….……………… i Abstract……………………………………………………...……… ii 摘要………………………………………………………...................... iii Table of Contents……………………………………………...………. iv List of Figures…………………………………………………...……. vii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION…………………………………...…… 1 1.1. Background……………………………………………...…………. 1 1.2. Research Questions…………………………………..…………… 4 1.3. Literature Review………………………………..…..……………. 5 1.3.1. U.S.-China War………………………………..….……………. 5 1.3.2. U.S.-China Tech War……………………………….…….……. 9 1.3.3. Tech War’s Impacts on Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry and its Response……………………………………………………….…… 15 1.4. Theoretical Framework……………………………….………… 20 1.5. Research Objectives and Contribution…………………..……… 21 1.6. Research Methods………………………………..…………..…… 21 1.7. Thesis Arrangement………………………………….…………… 23 CHAPTER 2 NEOREALISM……………………………………..…… 24 2.1. Introduction to Neorealism……………………………….…….…. 24 2.2. The Evolution of Neorealism………………………..………….…. 25 2.3. Core Assumptions of Neorealism………………………..…….… 27 2.4. Neorealism and the U.S.-China Tech War……………..………… 30 2.5. Taiwan's Strategic Position in the U.S.-China Tech War……..….. 34 CHAPTER 3 THE U.S.-CHINA STRATEGIC RIVALRY…………. 38 3.1. The Five Factors………………………………………………..…. 38 3.1.1. Ideological Smackdown……………………….…………..…. 38 3.1.2. Bumping Heads for the Nation's Sake…………………...…… 39 3.1.3. Global Tug-of-War………………………..…………….…… 43 3.1.4. Battle for the Top Spot……………………….………….…… 45 3.1.5. Mind the Gap……………………….……………………..……. 46 3.2. From the Trade War to the Tech War……………………….…… 56 CHAPTER 4 THE U.S.-CHINA TECH WAR DURING THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION………..………………………………….…… 79 4.1. Sticking to the Tough Talk………………………………….…… 79 4.2. Chips on the Line………………..……………………………..… 82 4.3. Keeping the Lines Open……………….……………..………… 113 4.3.1. Face-off at the Summit (2021, November 15)…………...……. 113 4.3.2. Biden and Xi in Bali (2022, November 14)…………...………. 115 4.3.3. Redefining U.S.-China Diplomacy (2023, June 18-19)…..…… 117 4.3.4. Yellen’s Beijing Balle (2023, June 6-9)………..………...…. 123 4.3.5. Raimondo’s China Tango (2023, August 27-30)……....……… 126 4.3.6. When Biden and Xi Tried to Break the Ice in San Francisco…. 128 4.3.7. The Call that Rocked the Lines (2024, April 2)……………….. 130 4.3.8. When Yellen Took on Beijing (2024, April 4-9)…………….... 131 4.3.9. When Blinken Walked the Dragon’s Den (2024, April 24-26).. 133 4.4. Tech Tug-of-War………………………………………………… 135 4.4.1. America’s Race to Stay Ahead in Innovation……………… 135 4.4.2. Tech Growth's Uphill Battle in the U.S……………………… 141 4.4.3. China’s Tech Revolution……………..…………………… 149 4.5 The Long Haul…………………………………………………… 164 CHAPTER 5 THE IMPACTOF THE US-CHINA TECH WAR ON TAIWAN’S SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY................................... 166 5.1. Stuck in a Rock and a Hard Place………………………………… 166 5.2. The Silicon Shield……………………………………………… 169 5.2.1. Gradual Withdrawal from the Chinese Market……………… 170 5.2.2. Increasing Investment in Neighboring Asian Countries………. 171 5.2.3. TSMC’s Investment in Japan, the U.S., and Germany……… 180 5.2.4. Taiwan’s CHIPS Act………………………………………….. 180 5.3. Taiwan's Got to Be the One and Only…………………………… 181 CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION………………………………………… 183 6.1. Conclusion………………………………………………………. 183 6.2. Limitations of the Study and Future Research Suggestion….…… 184 Bibliography………………………………………………………….. 186 Appendix 1. Hsinchu Science Park and TSMC Confront the Challenge from South Korea's Semiconductor Industry…………………...…… 207 Appendix 2. U.S.-China Cyber Warfare………………………...……. 209 Appendix 3. TARIFFS HURT the HEARTLAND………..……………. 210 Appendix 4. Ren Zhengfei's Interview with New York Times Op-Ed Columnist Thomas L. Friedman…………..…………………..………. 211 Appendix 5. Taiwanese Rep. to the U.S. Bi-khim Hsiao on "Face the Nation," Aug. 7, 2022…………………………………………………. 219 Appendix 6. The Crisis and Opportunity from “Decoupling” to “De-risking”………………………………………………………….……. 224 Appendix 7. The Ban on TikTok……………………………..……… 229 Appendix 8. The 2024 Trump Presidential Campaign and Cross-Strait Relations…………………………………………………..……….…. 232 Appendix 9. The Six Five: Huawei To Introduce A Chip In Chinese Market To Compete With NVIDIA?……………………………………….… 234 Appendix 10. Alternative Supply Chains to Decoupling from China………….…………………………………………………….... 237 List of Figures Figure 1: The Belt and Road Initiative Has Gone Global: Official BRI participants by year of joining………………………………………… 33 Figure 2. Proportion of Consumer Goods Subject to U.S. Tariffs on China…………………………………………………………….……... 60 Figure 3. The Complexity of the U.S. Semiconductor Supply Chain….. 85 Figure 4. Semiconductor Manufacturers, Construction and Equipment Costs…………………………………………………………………… 96 Figure 5:US Manufacturing Employment between 2002 and 2022…. 140 Figure 6: The Companies that Benefited from the CHIPS Act…….... 143 Figure 7: U.S. Employment in Semiconductor and Other Electronic Component Manufacturing from January 2019 to January 2024……. 146 Figure 8: 2018-2023 Huawei Revenue and Revenue Growth Rate ....... 151 Figure 9: Tesla Global Deliveries vs BYD Passenger BEV Sales…... 155 Figure 10: China’s Role in the EV Car Value Chain………………..… 159 Figure 11: Intel Withdraws from DRAM Business ……………….….. 176 zh_TW dc.format.extent 8872234 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110926007 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 新現實主義 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 美中科技戰 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 台灣半導體產業 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Neorealism en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) The US-China Tech War en_US dc.title (題名) 拜登時期的美中科技戰對台灣半導體產業的影響：新現實主義視角分析 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Impact of the U.S.-China Tech War during the Biden Administration on Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry: Perspective from Neorealism en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Bibliography BOOKS Akoerovitch,D.&Graff,GarrettM.(2024,April30).WorldontheBrink:HowAmericaCanBeatChinaintheRacefortheTwenty-FirstCentury.PublicAffairs. 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