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TitleWhy Have IPO Auctions Lost Market Share to Fixed-price Offers? Evidence from Taiwan
為何競價拍賣失去市場佔有率?
Creator徐政義
Shiu, Cheng-Yi;Hung, Chung-Wen;Hsu, Yen-Shan
Contributor國貿系
Key WordsIPOs; Under-pricing; Fixed-price offers; Hybrid auctions
首次公開發行; 價格低估; 公開申購; 混合型競價拍賣
Date2009-09
Date Issued2024-10-04
SummaryThis paper proposes three hypotheses based on stock market conditions to explain how Taiwanese issuer' choice over IPQ auctions or fixed-price offers: the risk-averse issuer hypothesis, the pricing conflict hypothesis, and the demand inelasticity of stocks hypothesis. The risk-averse issuer hypothesis asserts that the relative risk level of auctions increases as the market becomes more volatile, and so risk-averse issuers will avoid an auction. We find support for this hypothesis. The pricing conflict hypothesis posits that Taiwanese WO auctions sometimes serve as a mechanism to resolve the pricing conflict between issuers and underwriters. We argue that a pricing conflict likely arises when the initial returns of recent IPOs have increased and/or the market returns have remained unchanged or have declined. We find some weak support for this hypothesis. The demand inelasticity of stocks hypothesis predicts that large IPQs are more likely to be floated with an IPO auction so as to reduce under-pricing pressure. We find strong support for this hypothesis.
本研究提出三種假說來檢定為何競價拍賣制度在臺灣的IPO市場失去市場佔有率。發行者風險規避假說認為,由於市場風險高峙,採取競價拍賣的風險會提高,因此發行公司會傾向選擇公開承銷。訂價衝突假說主張當次級市場的走勢與發行市場平均的折價幅度不一致時,發行公司與承銷商之間對於承銷價格的訂定有不同的看法,此時,競價拍賣會被用來作為解決彼此訂價衝突的依據。證券需求負斜率假說預測,由於競價拍賣會有較低的折價,發行金額愈大的IPO愈有可能選擇競價拍賣來降低發行的成本。我們的實證結果強烈地支持發行者風險規避假說以及證券需求負斜率假說,而訂價衝突假說亦獲得實證上的支持。
RelationJournal of Financial Studies (財務金融學刊), Vol.17, No.3, pp.1-36
Typearticle
DOI https://doi.org/10.6545/JFS.2009.17(3).1
dc.contributor 國貿系
dc.creator (作者) 徐政義
dc.creator (作者) Shiu, Cheng-Yi;Hung, Chung-Wen;Hsu, Yen-Shan
dc.date (日期) 2009-09
dc.date.accessioned 2024-10-04-
dc.date.available 2024-10-04-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2024-10-04-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/153839-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper proposes three hypotheses based on stock market conditions to explain how Taiwanese issuer' choice over IPQ auctions or fixed-price offers: the risk-averse issuer hypothesis, the pricing conflict hypothesis, and the demand inelasticity of stocks hypothesis. The risk-averse issuer hypothesis asserts that the relative risk level of auctions increases as the market becomes more volatile, and so risk-averse issuers will avoid an auction. We find support for this hypothesis. The pricing conflict hypothesis posits that Taiwanese WO auctions sometimes serve as a mechanism to resolve the pricing conflict between issuers and underwriters. We argue that a pricing conflict likely arises when the initial returns of recent IPOs have increased and/or the market returns have remained unchanged or have declined. We find some weak support for this hypothesis. The demand inelasticity of stocks hypothesis predicts that large IPQs are more likely to be floated with an IPO auction so as to reduce under-pricing pressure. We find strong support for this hypothesis.
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究提出三種假說來檢定為何競價拍賣制度在臺灣的IPO市場失去市場佔有率。發行者風險規避假說認為,由於市場風險高峙,採取競價拍賣的風險會提高,因此發行公司會傾向選擇公開承銷。訂價衝突假說主張當次級市場的走勢與發行市場平均的折價幅度不一致時,發行公司與承銷商之間對於承銷價格的訂定有不同的看法,此時,競價拍賣會被用來作為解決彼此訂價衝突的依據。證券需求負斜率假說預測,由於競價拍賣會有較低的折價,發行金額愈大的IPO愈有可能選擇競價拍賣來降低發行的成本。我們的實證結果強烈地支持發行者風險規避假說以及證券需求負斜率假說,而訂價衝突假說亦獲得實證上的支持。
dc.format.extent 104 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) Journal of Financial Studies (財務金融學刊), Vol.17, No.3, pp.1-36
dc.subject (關鍵詞) IPOs; Under-pricing; Fixed-price offers; Hybrid auctions
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 首次公開發行; 價格低估; 公開申購; 混合型競價拍賣
dc.title (題名) Why Have IPO Auctions Lost Market Share to Fixed-price Offers? Evidence from Taiwan
dc.title (題名) 為何競價拍賣失去市場佔有率?
dc.type (資料類型) article
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6545/JFS.2009.17(3).1
dc.doi.uri (DOI) https://doi.org/10.6545/JFS.2009.17(3).1