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題名 獨立董事對公司重視程度與ESG績效之相關性分析
The relationship between independent directors’ attention and ESG performance
作者 汪德翰
Wang, Te-Han
貢獻者 詹凌菁
Chan, Ling-Ching, Ann
汪德翰
Wang, Te-Han
關鍵詞 獨立董事
董事關注程度
董事會監督
ESG評級
ESG績效
Independent director
Director attention
Board monitoring
ESG rating
ESG performance
日期 2024
上傳時間 4-Oct-2024 10:52:22 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究旨在探討獨立董事對公司重視程度與ESG績效之關聯性。根據 Masulis and Mobbs (2014)，擁有多個獨立董事職務者會投注較多的時間與精力於社會聲望較高的公司中，並以公司市場價值作為社會聲望的衡量標準。本文使用ESG綜合評級作為公司ESG績效的代理變數，以2014年至2021年美國S&P 1500公司作為樣本計算獨立董事對公司之重視程度，並與ESG綜合評級進行實證分析。原始回歸模型的實證結果顯示，ESG綜合評級越高的公司，會有更多獨立董事將公司的重視程度分類為高或低，證明獨立董事對公司的重視程度與公司ESG績效呈顯著正相關。此外，運用一階差分模型之額外實證測試結果顯示，當公司ESG綜合評級相較於兩年前上升時，獨立董事對公司重視程度分類為高或低的數量會相較兩年前減少。綜上所述，本研究之模型均證明獨立董事對公司重視程度與ESG績效呈顯著相關。
This study explores the relationship between independent directors’ attention and the ESG performance of companies. According to Masulis and Mobbs (2014), independent directors with multiple directorships dedicate more time and effort to boards of companies with higher social prestige, as measured by market capitalization. In this study, I use the ESG overall rating as a proxy variable for the ESG performance of companies. By calculating the importance of independent directorships and analyze them in conjunction with the ESG overall rating, I apply a sample of the U.S. data from S&P 1500 companies during the period from 2014 to 2021. The empirical results of the original regression model reveal that firms with higher ESG overall ratings are associated with more independent directors who devote either high or low attention to the companies, indicating a positive relationship between independent directors’ attention and the ESG performance of companies. Additionally, the first-difference analysis model suggests that when the ESG overall ratings of companies increase over two consecutive years, fewer independent directors classify these companies as having high or low attention. This further supports the association between independent directors’ attention and the ESG performance of companies. The above results are consistent with the hypothesis I made in this study.
參考文獻 Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2008). Do directors perform for pay? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 46(1), 154-171. Albuquerque, R., Koskinen, Y., & Zhang, C. (2018). Corporate social responsibility and firm risk: Theory and empirical evidence. Management science, 65(10), 4451-4469. Allayannis, G., Lel, U., & Miller, D. P. (2012). The use of foreign currency derivatives, corporate governance, and firm value around the world. Journal of International Economics, 87(1), 65-79. Arrow, K. J. (1973). Social responsibility and economic efficiency. Public policy, 21(3), 303-317. Asimakopoulos, P., Asimakopoulos, S., & Li, X. (2023). The role of environmental, social, and governance rating on corporate debt structure. Journal of Corporate Finance, 83, 102488. Attig, N., Boubakri, N., El Ghoul, S., & Guedhami, O. (2016). Firm internationalization and corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 134, 171-197. Beasley, M. S. (1996). An Emperical Analysis Between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud. The Accounting Review, 71(4), 443-465. Beatty, R. P. (1989). Auditor reputation and the pricing of initial public offerings. Accounting Review, 693-709. Bowen, H. R. (2013). Social responsibilities of the businessman. University of Iowa Press. Cadbury, A. (1999). What are the trends in corporate governance? How will they impact your company? Long Range Planning, 32(1), 12-19. Carroll, A. B. (1991). The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: Toward the moral management of organizational stakeholders. Business Horizons, 34(4), 39-48. Carroll, A. B. (2015). Corporate social responsibility: The centerpiece of competing and complementary frameworks. Organizational Dynamics. Carter, R. B., Dark, F. H., & Singh, A. K. (1998). Underwriter reputation, initial returns, and the long‐run performance of IPO stocks. The Journal of Finance, 53(1), 285-311. Carter, R., & Manaster, S. (1990). Initial public offerings and underwriter reputation. The Journal of Finance, 45(4), 1045-1067. Chemmanur, T. J., & Fulghieri, P. (1994). Investment bank reputation, information production, and financial intermediation. The Journal of Finance, 49(1), 57-79. Cochran, P. L., & Wood, R. A. (1984). Corporate social responsibility and financial performance. Academy of Management Journal, 27(1), 42-56. Cohen, S., Kadach, I., Ormazabal, G., & Reichelstein, S. (2022). Executive Compensation Tied to ESG Performance: International Evidence (No. 17267). CEPR Discussion Papers. Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 371-406. Davis, K. (1960). Can business afford to ignore social responsibilities? California management review, 2(3), 70-76. Eells, R. S. F., & Walton, C. C. (1961). Conceptual foundations of business. (No Title). Fahlenbrach, R., Low, A., & Stulz, R. M. (2010). The dark side of outside directors: Do they quit when they are most needed? (No. w15917). National Bureau of Economic Research. Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288-307. Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1992). The cross‐section of expected stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 47(2), 427-465. Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 33(1), 3-56. Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325. Fang, L. H. (2005). Investment bank reputation and the price and quality of underwriting services. The Journal of Finance, 60(6), 2729-2761. Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2003). Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. The Journal of finance, 58(3), 1087-1111. Fich, E. M. (2005). Are some outside directors better than others? Evidence from director appointments by Fortune 1000 firms. The Journal of Business, 78(5), 1943-1972. Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are busy boards effective monitors? The Journal of Finance, 61(2), 689-724. Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2007). Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 86(2), 306-336. Friedman, M. (1970). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. New York Times Magazine, 13 September 1970, 122-126. Gilson, S. C. (1990). Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders: Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default. Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 355-387. Glück, M., Hübel, B., & Scholz, H. (2021). ESG rating events and stock market reactions. Available at SSRN 3803254. Harjoto, M. A., & Jo, H. (2011). Corporate governance and CSR nexus. Journal of Business Ethics, 100, 45-67. Huang, H. H., Lobo, G. J., Wang, C., & Zhou, J. (2018). Do banks price independent directors’ attention? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 53(4), 1755-1780. Huang, H. H., Wang, C., Xie, H., & Zhou, J. (2021). Independent director attention and the cost of equity capital. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 48(7-8), 1468-1493. Hwang, B. H., & Kim, S. (2009). It pays to have friends. Journal of Financial Economics, 93(1), 138-158. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976), 305-360. Jo, H., & Harjoto, M. A. (2012). The causal effect of corporate governance on corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 106, 53-72. Johnson, H. L. (1971). Business in contemporary society: Framework and issues. (No Title). Kim, Y., Park, M. S., & Wier, B. (2012). Is earnings quality associated with corporate social responsibility? The Accounting Review, 87(3), 761-796. Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., & Masulis, R. W. (2013). The supply of corporate directors and board independence. The Review of Financial Studies, 26(6), 1561-1605. Krishnan, C. N. V., Ivanov, V. I., Masulis, R. W., & Singh, A. K. (2011). Venture capital reputation, post-IPO performance, and corporate governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(5), 1295-1333. Mackey, A., Mackey, T. B., & Barney, J. B. (2007). Corporate social responsibility and firm performance: Investor preferences and corporate strategies. Academy of Management Review, 32(3), 817-835. Masulis, R. W., & Mobbs, S. (2014). Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy? Journal of Financial Economics, 111(2), 406-429. Masulis, R. W., & Mobbs, S. (2023). Influential independent directors' reputation incentives: Impacts on CEO compensation contracts and financial reporting. Journal of Corporate Finance, 82, 102449. Masulis, R. W., & Zhang, E. J. (2019). How valuable are independent directors? Evidence from external distractions. Journal of Financial Economics, 132(3), 226-256. Mayers, D., Shivdasani, A., & Smith Jr, C. W. (1997). Board composition and corporate control: Evidence from the insurance industry. Journal of Business, 33-62. McGuire, J. B., Sundgren, A., & Schneeweis, T. (1988). Corporate social responsibility and firm financial performance. Academy of management Journal, 31(4), 854-872. McGuire, J. W. (1963). Business and society. (No Title). McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2000). Corporate social responsibility and financial performance: correlation or misspecification? Strategic Management Journal, 21(5), 603-609. Megginson, W. L., & Weiss, K. A. (2022). Venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings. In Venture Capital (pp. 371-395). Routledge. Prevost, A. K., Rao, R. P., & Hossain, M. (2002). Determinants of board composition in New Zealand: a simultaneous equations approach. Journal of Empirical Finance, 9(4), 373-397. Prior, D., Surroca, J., & Tribó, J. A. (2008). Are socially responsible managers really ethical? Exploring the relationship between earnings management and corporate social responsibility. Corporate governance: An international review, 16(3), 160-177. Rosenberg, B., Reid, K., & Lanstein, R. (1985). Persuasive evidence of market inefficiency. Journal of Portfolio Management, 11(3), 9-16. Ryan Jr, H. E., & Wiggins III, R. A. (2004). Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(3), 497-524. Sharfman, M. P., & Fernando, C. S. (2008). Environmental risk management and the cost of capital. Strategic Management Journal, 29(6), 569-592. Shivdasani, A. (1993). Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16(1-3), 167-198. Shivdasani, A., & Yermack, D. (1999). CEO involvement in the selection of new board members: An empirical analysis. The Journal of Finance, 54(5), 1829-1853. Titman, S., & Trueman, B. (1986). Information quality and the valuation of new issues. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 8(2), 159-172. Van Beurden, P., & Gössling, T. (2008). The worth of values–a literature review on the relation between corporate social and financial performance. Journal of Business Ethics, 82, 407-424. Van de Velde, E., Vermeir, W., & Corten, F. (2005). Corporate social responsibility and financial performance. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 5(3), 129-138. Weisbach, M. S. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 431-460. Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-211. Yermack, D. (2004). Remuneration, retention, and reputation incentives for outside directors. The Journal of Finance, 59(5), 2281-2308.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
111353105
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111353105
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 詹凌菁zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Chan, Ling-Ching, Annen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 汪德翰zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Wang, Te-Hanen_US
dc.creator (作者) 汪德翰zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Wang, Te-Hanen_US
dc.date (日期) 2024en_US
dc.date.accessioned 4-Oct-2024 10:52:22 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 4-Oct-2024 10:52:22 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Oct-2024 10:52:22 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0111353105en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/153918-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 111353105zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究旨在探討獨立董事對公司重視程度與ESG績效之關聯性。根據 Masulis and Mobbs (2014)，擁有多個獨立董事職務者會投注較多的時間與精力於社會聲望較高的公司中，並以公司市場價值作為社會聲望的衡量標準。本文使用ESG綜合評級作為公司ESG績效的代理變數，以2014年至2021年美國S&P 1500公司作為樣本計算獨立董事對公司之重視程度，並與ESG綜合評級進行實證分析。原始回歸模型的實證結果顯示，ESG綜合評級越高的公司，會有更多獨立董事將公司的重視程度分類為高或低，證明獨立董事對公司的重視程度與公司ESG績效呈顯著正相關。此外，運用一階差分模型之額外實證測試結果顯示，當公司ESG綜合評級相較於兩年前上升時，獨立董事對公司重視程度分類為高或低的數量會相較兩年前減少。綜上所述，本研究之模型均證明獨立董事對公司重視程度與ESG績效呈顯著相關。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study explores the relationship between independent directors’ attention and the ESG performance of companies. According to Masulis and Mobbs (2014), independent directors with multiple directorships dedicate more time and effort to boards of companies with higher social prestige, as measured by market capitalization. In this study, I use the ESG overall rating as a proxy variable for the ESG performance of companies. By calculating the importance of independent directorships and analyze them in conjunction with the ESG overall rating, I apply a sample of the U.S. data from S&P 1500 companies during the period from 2014 to 2021. The empirical results of the original regression model reveal that firms with higher ESG overall ratings are associated with more independent directors who devote either high or low attention to the companies, indicating a positive relationship between independent directors’ attention and the ESG performance of companies. Additionally, the first-difference analysis model suggests that when the ESG overall ratings of companies increase over two consecutive years, fewer independent directors classify these companies as having high or low attention. This further supports the association between independent directors’ attention and the ESG performance of companies. The above results are consistent with the hypothesis I made in this study.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents I. Introduction 1 II. Literature Review 5 1. The determinants of ESG performance 5 (1) CSR trend and related studies 5 (2) ESG trend and related studies 8 2. Role of independent directors and multiple directorships 11 (1) Independent directors and related studies 11 (2) Multiple directorships and related studies 14 III. Research Design 17 1. Hypothesis development 17 2. Sample data collection 20 (1) Director data: ISS database 20 (2) ESG rating data: S&P Global ESG Scores database 22 3. Variable description 24 (1) Independent variables 24 (2) Control variables 25 (3) Dependent variable 28 4. Model construction 29 IV. Empirical Results 31 1. Descriptive statistics 31 (1) Dependent and independent variables 31 (2) Control variables 31 2. Correlation matrix 33 3. Multivariate regression model 38 V. Additional Analysis 40 1. First-difference analysis model 40 2. Additional regression results 41 VI. Conclusion 43 1. Research conclusion 43 2. Research limitation and contribution 45 Reference 46 Appendix 53zh_TW
dc.format.extent 2333231 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111353105en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 獨立董事zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 董事關注程度zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 董事會監督zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) ESG評級zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) ESG績效zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Independent directoren_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Director attentionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Board monitoringen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) ESG ratingen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) ESG performanceen_US
dc.title (題名) 獨立董事對公司重視程度與ESG績效之相關性分析zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The relationship between independent directors’ attention and ESG performanceen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2008). Do directors perform for pay? Journal of Accounting and Economics, 46(1), 154-171. Albuquerque, R., Koskinen, Y., & Zhang, C. (2018). Corporate social responsibility and firm risk: Theory and empirical evidence. Management science, 65(10), 4451-4469. Allayannis, G., Lel, U., & Miller, D. P. (2012). The use of foreign currency derivatives, corporate governance, and firm value around the world. Journal of International Economics, 87(1), 65-79. Arrow, K. J. (1973). Social responsibility and economic efficiency. Public policy, 21(3), 303-317. Asimakopoulos, P., Asimakopoulos, S., & Li, X. (2023). The role of environmental, social, and governance rating on corporate debt structure. Journal of Corporate Finance, 83, 102488. Attig, N., Boubakri, N., El Ghoul, S., & Guedhami, O. (2016). Firm internationalization and corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 134, 171-197. Beasley, M. S. (1996). An Emperical Analysis Between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud. The Accounting Review, 71(4), 443-465. Beatty, R. P. (1989). Auditor reputation and the pricing of initial public offerings. Accounting Review, 693-709. Bowen, H. R. (2013). Social responsibilities of the businessman. University of Iowa Press. Cadbury, A. (1999). What are the trends in corporate governance? How will they impact your company? Long Range Planning, 32(1), 12-19. Carroll, A. B. (1991). The pyramid of corporate social responsibility: Toward the moral management of organizational stakeholders. Business Horizons, 34(4), 39-48. Carroll, A. B. (2015). Corporate social responsibility: The centerpiece of competing and complementary frameworks. Organizational Dynamics. Carter, R. B., Dark, F. H., & Singh, A. K. (1998). Underwriter reputation, initial returns, and the long‐run performance of IPO stocks. The Journal of Finance, 53(1), 285-311. Carter, R., & Manaster, S. (1990). Initial public offerings and underwriter reputation. The Journal of Finance, 45(4), 1045-1067. Chemmanur, T. J., & Fulghieri, P. (1994). Investment bank reputation, information production, and financial intermediation. The Journal of Finance, 49(1), 57-79. Cochran, P. L., & Wood, R. A. (1984). Corporate social responsibility and financial performance. Academy of Management Journal, 27(1), 42-56. Cohen, S., Kadach, I., Ormazabal, G., & Reichelstein, S. (2022). Executive Compensation Tied to ESG Performance: International Evidence (No. 17267). CEPR Discussion Papers. Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 371-406. Davis, K. (1960). Can business afford to ignore social responsibilities? California management review, 2(3), 70-76. Eells, R. S. F., & Walton, C. C. (1961). Conceptual foundations of business. (No Title). Fahlenbrach, R., Low, A., & Stulz, R. M. (2010). The dark side of outside directors: Do they quit when they are most needed? (No. w15917). National Bureau of Economic Research. Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288-307. Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1992). The cross‐section of expected stock returns. The Journal of Finance, 47(2), 427-465. Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 33(1), 3-56. Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325. Fang, L. H. (2005). Investment bank reputation and the price and quality of underwriting services. The Journal of Finance, 60(6), 2729-2761. Ferris, S. P., Jagannathan, M., & Pritchard, A. C. (2003). Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments. The Journal of finance, 58(3), 1087-1111. Fich, E. M. (2005). Are some outside directors better than others? Evidence from director appointments by Fortune 1000 firms. The Journal of Business, 78(5), 1943-1972. Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2006). Are busy boards effective monitors? The Journal of Finance, 61(2), 689-724. Fich, E. M., & Shivdasani, A. (2007). Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 86(2), 306-336. Friedman, M. (1970). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. New York Times Magazine, 13 September 1970, 122-126. Gilson, S. C. (1990). Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders: Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default. Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 355-387. Glück, M., Hübel, B., & Scholz, H. (2021). ESG rating events and stock market reactions. Available at SSRN 3803254. Harjoto, M. A., & Jo, H. (2011). Corporate governance and CSR nexus. Journal of Business Ethics, 100, 45-67. Huang, H. H., Lobo, G. J., Wang, C., & Zhou, J. (2018). Do banks price independent directors’ attention? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 53(4), 1755-1780. Huang, H. H., Wang, C., Xie, H., & Zhou, J. (2021). Independent director attention and the cost of equity capital. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 48(7-8), 1468-1493. Hwang, B. H., & Kim, S. (2009). It pays to have friends. Journal of Financial Economics, 93(1), 138-158. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976), 305-360. Jo, H., & Harjoto, M. A. (2012). The causal effect of corporate governance on corporate social responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 106, 53-72. Johnson, H. L. (1971). Business in contemporary society: Framework and issues. (No Title). Kim, Y., Park, M. S., & Wier, B. (2012). Is earnings quality associated with corporate social responsibility? The Accounting Review, 87(3), 761-796. Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., & Masulis, R. W. (2013). The supply of corporate directors and board independence. The Review of Financial Studies, 26(6), 1561-1605. Krishnan, C. N. V., Ivanov, V. I., Masulis, R. W., & Singh, A. K. (2011). Venture capital reputation, post-IPO performance, and corporate governance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(5), 1295-1333. Mackey, A., Mackey, T. B., & Barney, J. B. (2007). Corporate social responsibility and firm performance: Investor preferences and corporate strategies. Academy of Management Review, 32(3), 817-835. Masulis, R. W., & Mobbs, S. (2014). Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy? Journal of Financial Economics, 111(2), 406-429. Masulis, R. W., & Mobbs, S. (2023). Influential independent directors' reputation incentives: Impacts on CEO compensation contracts and financial reporting. Journal of Corporate Finance, 82, 102449. Masulis, R. W., & Zhang, E. J. (2019). How valuable are independent directors? Evidence from external distractions. Journal of Financial Economics, 132(3), 226-256. Mayers, D., Shivdasani, A., & Smith Jr, C. W. (1997). Board composition and corporate control: Evidence from the insurance industry. Journal of Business, 33-62. McGuire, J. B., Sundgren, A., & Schneeweis, T. (1988). Corporate social responsibility and firm financial performance. Academy of management Journal, 31(4), 854-872. McGuire, J. W. (1963). Business and society. (No Title). McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2000). Corporate social responsibility and financial performance: correlation or misspecification? Strategic Management Journal, 21(5), 603-609. Megginson, W. L., & Weiss, K. A. (2022). Venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings. In Venture Capital (pp. 371-395). Routledge. Prevost, A. K., Rao, R. P., & Hossain, M. (2002). Determinants of board composition in New Zealand: a simultaneous equations approach. Journal of Empirical Finance, 9(4), 373-397. Prior, D., Surroca, J., & Tribó, J. A. (2008). Are socially responsible managers really ethical? Exploring the relationship between earnings management and corporate social responsibility. Corporate governance: An international review, 16(3), 160-177. Rosenberg, B., Reid, K., & Lanstein, R. (1985). Persuasive evidence of market inefficiency. Journal of Portfolio Management, 11(3), 9-16. Ryan Jr, H. E., & Wiggins III, R. A. (2004). Who is in whose pocket? Director compensation, board independence, and barriers to effective monitoring. Journal of Financial Economics, 73(3), 497-524. Sharfman, M. P., & Fernando, C. S. (2008). Environmental risk management and the cost of capital. Strategic Management Journal, 29(6), 569-592. Shivdasani, A. (1993). 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