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題名 團隊競爭下的最適獎酬規則
The Optimal Prize Sharing Rule in Group Contests
作者 羅祐辰
Lo, You-Chen
貢獻者 潘振宇<br>陳鎮洲
Pan, Chen-Yu<br>Chen, Jenn-Jou
羅祐辰
Lo, You-Chen
關鍵詞 團隊競賽
最適報酬分配
均分規則
績效規則
組別大小悖論
團隊公共財
Group contests
Optimal prize sharing rule
Egalitarian rule
Meritocratic rules
Group size paradox
Group public goods
日期 2024
上傳時間 1-Nov-2024 11:35:48 (UTC+8)
摘要 本文旨在研究團隊競賽中最適報酬分配。考慮一內生報酬分配的團 隊競賽，在第一階段，每一位組長決定該組的獎酬分配規則以極大化 組內勝率或福利。獎酬分配規則指定了公共財、基於均分規則和績效 規則所分配的私有財之佔比。在第二階段，每位組員僅能觀察該組之 獎酬規則，並決定要投入的努力程度。本文首先考慮線性獎酬函數。 接著考慮準線性獎酬函數，我們證明了在此設定下，若組長目標為極 大化勝率，則人數較多的組別會使用較多的績效規則且勝率較高。然 而，當組長目標為極大化福利，則可能發生組別大小悖論。
This paper aims to study the optimal prize-sharing rule in group contests. We consider a group contest with the endogenous choice of prize-sharing rule by leaders. In the first stage, each leader chooses the prize-sharing rule in her group to maximize their winning probability or utilitarian welfare. The prize-sharing rule specifies the proportion of public goods, meritocratic rule, or egalitarian rule. In the second stage, observing the prize-sharing rule chosen by their leader, group members put in their effort independently without observing other groups’ sharing rules. As a benchmark, we first solve a simple model with the linear prize-value function. Then, we consider the quasi-linear utility function. In this case, the larger group always uses a higher ratio of meritocratic rule if leaders are winning probability-maximizing, and the group size paradox never happens. However, when leaders are welfare-maximizing, the group-size paradox may reappear.
參考文獻 Baik, K. H. (1993): “Effort levels in contests: The public-good prize case,” Economics Letters, 41(4), 363–367. -----(2008): “Contests with group-specific public-good prizes,” Social Choice and Welfare, 30, 103–117. Baik, K. H., and S. Lee (1997): “Collective rent seeking with endogenous group sizes,” European Journal of Political Economy, 13(1), 121–130. -----(2007): “Collective rent seeking when sharing rules are private information,” European Journal of Political Economy, 23(3), 768–776. Balart, P., S. Flamand, O. Gürtler, and O. Troumpounis (2018): “Sequential choice of sharing rules in collective contests,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 20(5), 703–724. Balart, P., S. Flamand, and O. Troumpounis (2015): “Prize-sharing rules in collective rent seeking,” Companion to political economy of rent seeking, London: Edward Elgar, pp. 92–112. -----(2016): “Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests,” Social Choice and Welfare, 46, 239–262. Bloch, F. (2012): “Endogenous formation of alliances in conflicts,” in Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, ed. by R. Garfinkel, and S. Skaperdas. Oxford University Press, New York. Chamberlin, J. (1974): “Provision of collective goods as a function of group size,” American Political Science Review, 68(2), 707–716. Cornes, R., and R. Hartley (2005): “Asymmetric contests with general technologies,” Economic theory, 26, 923–946. Esteban, J., and D. Ray (2001): “Collective action and the group size paradox,” American Political Science Review, 95(3), 663–672. Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole (1991): Game theory. MIT Press. Gupta, D. (2023): “Prize sharing rules in collective contests: when do social norms matter?,” Review of Economic Design, 27(1), 221–244.33 Kobayashi, K., and H. Konishi (2021): “Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests,” Social Choice and Welfare, 56(2), 205–221. Kolmar, M., and H. Rommeswinkel (2013): “Contests with group-specific public goods and complementarities in efforts,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 89, 9–22. Lee, S. (1995): “Endogenous sharing rules in collective-group rent-seeking,” Public Choice, 85(1-2), 31–44. McGuire, M. (1974): “Group size, group homogeneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under Cournot behavior,” Public Choice, pp. 107–126. Nitzan, S. (1991): “Collective rent dissipation,” The Economic Journal, 101(409), 1522–1534. Nitzan, S., and K. Ueda (2009): “Collective contests for commons and club goods,” Journal of Public Economics, 93(1-2), 48–55. -----(2011): “Prize sharing in collective contests,” European Economic Review, 55(5), 678–687. -----(2014): “Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests,” Social Choice and Welfare, 43, 219–238. Olson, M. (1965): “The logic of collective action,” Cambridge, MA (USA) Harvard Univ. Press. Ryvkin, D. (2011): “The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups,” Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 564–572. Trevisan, F. (2020): “Optimal prize allocations in group contests,” Social Choice and Welfare, 55, 431–451. Tullock, G. (1980): “Efficient rent seeking,” in Efficient rent-seeking: Chronicle of an intellectual quagmire, pp. 3–16. Springer. Ueda, K. (2002): “Oligopolization in collective rent-seeking,” Social Choice and Welfare, 19, 613–626.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
112258002
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112258002
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 潘振宇<br>陳鎮洲zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Pan, Chen-Yu<br>Chen, Jenn-Jouen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 羅祐辰zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lo, You-Chenen_US
dc.creator (作者) 羅祐辰zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Lo, You-Chenen_US
dc.date (日期) 2024en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Nov-2024 11:35:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Nov-2024 11:35:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Nov-2024 11:35:48 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0112258002en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/154230-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 經濟學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 112258002zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本文旨在研究團隊競賽中最適報酬分配。考慮一內生報酬分配的團 隊競賽，在第一階段，每一位組長決定該組的獎酬分配規則以極大化 組內勝率或福利。獎酬分配規則指定了公共財、基於均分規則和績效 規則所分配的私有財之佔比。在第二階段，每位組員僅能觀察該組之 獎酬規則，並決定要投入的努力程度。本文首先考慮線性獎酬函數。 接著考慮準線性獎酬函數，我們證明了在此設定下，若組長目標為極 大化勝率，則人數較多的組別會使用較多的績效規則且勝率較高。然 而，當組長目標為極大化福利，則可能發生組別大小悖論。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This paper aims to study the optimal prize-sharing rule in group contests. We consider a group contest with the endogenous choice of prize-sharing rule by leaders. In the first stage, each leader chooses the prize-sharing rule in her group to maximize their winning probability or utilitarian welfare. The prize-sharing rule specifies the proportion of public goods, meritocratic rule, or egalitarian rule. In the second stage, observing the prize-sharing rule chosen by their leader, group members put in their effort independently without observing other groups’ sharing rules. As a benchmark, we first solve a simple model with the linear prize-value function. Then, we consider the quasi-linear utility function. In this case, the larger group always uses a higher ratio of meritocratic rule if leaders are winning probability-maximizing, and the group size paradox never happens. However, when leaders are welfare-maximizing, the group-size paradox may reappear.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 1 Introduction 1 2 LiteratureReview 6 3 ABenchmarkmodel 11 3.1 The Intra-Group Contest: Exogenous Prize-Sharing Rule 12 3.2 The Sharing Rule Decision Game: Endogenous Prize-Sharing Rule 16 4 Quasi-linearPrizeValuefunction 23 4.1 WinningProbability-MaximizatingLeaders 26 4.2 Welfare-MaximizingLeaders 31 5 AdditivelySeparablePrizeValueFunction 37 6 Conclusion 41 Reference 43zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1052377 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112258002en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 團隊競賽zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 最適報酬分配zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 均分規則zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 績效規則zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 組別大小悖論zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 團隊公共財zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Group contestsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Optimal prize sharing ruleen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Egalitarian ruleen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Meritocratic rulesen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Group size paradoxen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Group public goodsen_US
dc.title (題名) 團隊競爭下的最適獎酬規則zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The Optimal Prize Sharing Rule in Group Contestsen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Baik, K. H. (1993): “Effort levels in contests: The public-good prize case,” Economics Letters, 41(4), 363–367. -----(2008): “Contests with group-specific public-good prizes,” Social Choice and Welfare, 30, 103–117. Baik, K. H., and S. Lee (1997): “Collective rent seeking with endogenous group sizes,” European Journal of Political Economy, 13(1), 121–130. -----(2007): “Collective rent seeking when sharing rules are private information,” European Journal of Political Economy, 23(3), 768–776. Balart, P., S. Flamand, O. Gürtler, and O. Troumpounis (2018): “Sequential choice of sharing rules in collective contests,” Journal of Public Economic Theory, 20(5), 703–724. Balart, P., S. Flamand, and O. Troumpounis (2015): “Prize-sharing rules in collective rent seeking,” Companion to political economy of rent seeking, London: Edward Elgar, pp. 92–112. -----(2016): “Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests,” Social Choice and Welfare, 46, 239–262. Bloch, F. (2012): “Endogenous formation of alliances in conflicts,” in Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, ed. by R. Garfinkel, and S. Skaperdas. Oxford University Press, New York. Chamberlin, J. (1974): “Provision of collective goods as a function of group size,” American Political Science Review, 68(2), 707–716. Cornes, R., and R. Hartley (2005): “Asymmetric contests with general technologies,” Economic theory, 26, 923–946. Esteban, J., and D. Ray (2001): “Collective action and the group size paradox,” American Political Science Review, 95(3), 663–672. Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole (1991): Game theory. MIT Press. Gupta, D. (2023): “Prize sharing rules in collective contests: when do social norms matter?,” Review of Economic Design, 27(1), 221–244.33 Kobayashi, K., and H. Konishi (2021): “Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests,” Social Choice and Welfare, 56(2), 205–221. Kolmar, M., and H. Rommeswinkel (2013): “Contests with group-specific public goods and complementarities in efforts,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 89, 9–22. Lee, S. (1995): “Endogenous sharing rules in collective-group rent-seeking,” Public Choice, 85(1-2), 31–44. McGuire, M. (1974): “Group size, group homogeneity, and the aggregate provision of a pure public good under Cournot behavior,” Public Choice, pp. 107–126. Nitzan, S. (1991): “Collective rent dissipation,” The Economic Journal, 101(409), 1522–1534. Nitzan, S., and K. Ueda (2009): “Collective contests for commons and club goods,” Journal of Public Economics, 93(1-2), 48–55. -----(2011): “Prize sharing in collective contests,” European Economic Review, 55(5), 678–687. -----(2014): “Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests,” Social Choice and Welfare, 43, 219–238. Olson, M. (1965): “The logic of collective action,” Cambridge, MA (USA) Harvard Univ. Press. Ryvkin, D. (2011): “The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups,” Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 564–572. Trevisan, F. (2020): “Optimal prize allocations in group contests,” Social Choice and Welfare, 55, 431–451. Tullock, G. (1980): “Efficient rent seeking,” in Efficient rent-seeking: Chronicle of an intellectual quagmire, pp. 3–16. Springer. Ueda, K. (2002): “Oligopolization in collective rent-seeking,” Social Choice and Welfare, 19, 613–626.zh_TW