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題名 機構投資人對公司創新價值之影響
The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Economic Value of Innovation
作者 梁翌柔
Liang, Yi-Jou
貢獻者 車倫周
Cha, Yun-Ju
梁翌柔
Liang, Yi-Jou
關鍵詞 機構投資人
創新
創新經濟價值
專注型投資人
短暫型投資人
股票市場反應
專利授權
經濟價值
公司治理
長期支持
Institutional investors
innovation
economice value of innovation
dedicated investors
transient investors
stock market reactions
patent grants
corporate governance
long-term support
日期 2024
上傳時間 3-Mar-2025 14:40:06 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究探討不同類型機構投資人對公司創新的影響，並使用股票市場對專利授權的反應衡量創新的經濟價值。依據 Bushee (2001)之分類方法，機構投資人分為: 1. 專注型投資人；2. 短暫型投資人；及 3. 準指數投資人。實證結果顯示，專注型投資人透過較長的持有期間和較強的監督力道，對創新價值有正面影響，而短暫型投資人則有負面影響。專注型投資人對創新價值之影響，對於發展階段成熟、成長機會大、競爭激烈的公司中具有更顯著的效果。
This study examines the heterogenous impact of institutional investors on firm innovation, focusing on dedicated, transient, and quasi-indexer investors. Using marketable value of innovation following Kogan et al. (2017), we find that dedicated investors positively influence innovation through long-term support and governance, while transient investors negatively impact it. The positive effect of dedicated investors is stronger in firms with advanced stage of development, more growth opportunities, and intense competition.
參考文獻 Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P. (2009). The 'Wall Street Walk' and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 2645–2685. Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., & Howitt, P. (2005). Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(2), 701–728. Aghion, P., Van Reenen, J., & Zingales, L. (2013). Innovation and institutional ownership. American Economic Review, 103(1), 277–304. Aguilar, L. A. (2013). Institutional investors: Power and responsibility. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch041913laahtm. Appel, I. R., Gormley, T. A., & Keim, D. B. (2016). Passive investors, not passive owners. Journal of Financial Economics, 121(1), 111–141. Bird, A., & Karolyi, S. A. (2017). Governance and taxes: Evidence from regression discontinuity. The Accounting Review, 92(1), 29–50. Burns, N., Kedia, S., & Lipson, M. (2010). Institutional ownership and monitoring: Evidence from financial misreporting. Journal of Corporate Finance, 16(4), 443–455. Bushee, B. J. (1998). The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. The Accounting Review, 73(3), 305–333. Bushee, B. J. (2001). Do institutional investors prefer near-term earnings over long-run value? Contemporary Accounting Research, 18(2), 207–246. Carleton, W. T., Nelson, J. M., & Weisbach, M. S. (1998). The influence of institutions on corporate governance through private negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF. The Journal of Finance, 53(4), 1335–1362. Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 371–406. Connelly, B. L., Tihanyi, L., Certo, S. T., & Hitt, M. A. (2010). Marching to the Beat of Different Drummers: The Influence of Institutional Owners on Competitive Actions. Academy of Management Journal, 53(4), 784–813. Denis, D. J., & Mihov, V. T. (2003). The choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt: Evidence from new corporate borrowings. Journal of Financial Economics, 70(1), 3–28. Dikolli, S. S., Kulp, S. L., & Sedatole, K. L. (2009). Transient institutional ownership and CEO contracting. The Accounting Review, 84(3), 737–770. Dunne, P., & Hughes, A. (1994). Age, size, growth and survival: UK companies in the 1980s. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 42(2), 115–140. Edmans, A., & Manso, G. (2011). Governance through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders. Review of Financial Studies, 24(7), 2395–2428. Edmans, A. (2014). Blockholders and Corporate Governance. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 6(1), 23–50. Gaspar, J.-M., Massa, M., & Matos, P. (2005). Shareholder investment horizons and the market for corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), 135–165. Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 107–156. Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1983). An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica, 51(1), 7–45. Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1991). The theory of capital structure. The Journal of Finance, 46(1), 297–355. Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (2010). Control of Corporate Decisions: Shareholders vs. Management. Review of Financial Studies, 23(11), 4115–4147. Hirshleifer, D., Hsu, P.-H., & Li, D. (2013). Innovative efficiency and stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 107(3), 632–654. Hirshleifer, D., & Suh, R. (1992). Risk, Managerial Effort, and Project Choice. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2(3), 308–345. Huergo, E., & Jaumandreu, J. (2004). Firms' Age, Process Innovation, and Productivity Growth. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22(4), 541–559. Khan, M., Srinivasan, S., & Tan, L. (2017). Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: New Evidence. The Accounting Review, 92(2), 101–122. Kim, S., & Lee, M. (2023). The Plant-Level View of an Industrial Policy: The Korean Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 29252. Kogan, L., Papanikolaou, D., Seru, A., & Stoffman, N. (2017). Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(2), 665–712. Levit, D., & Malenko, N. (2011). Nonbinding Voting for Shareholder Proposals. The Journal of Finance, 66(5), 1579–1614. Li, D. (2011). Financial constraints, R&D investment, and stock returns. The Review of Financial Studies, 24(9), 2974–3007. Lin, C., Ma, Y., & Xuan, Y. (2011). Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 102(2), 416–431. Manso, G. (2011). Motivating innovation. The Journal of Finance, 66(5), 1823–1860. Maug, E. (1998). Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off Between Liquidity and Control? The Journal of Finance, 53(1), 65–98. Mueller, D. C. (1972). A Life Cycle Theory of the Firm. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 20(3), 199–219. Monks, R. A. G., & Minow, N. (1995). Corporate Governance. Blackwell Publishers. Porter, M. E. (1992). Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 5(2), 4–16. Sakaki, H., & Jory, S. R. (2019). Institutional Investors’ Ownership Stability and Firms’ Innovation. Journal of Business Research, 103, 10–22. Sayili, K., Yilmaz, G., Dyer, D., & Küllü, A. M. (2017). Style investing and firm innovation. Journal of Financial Stability, 32, 17–29. Shi, W., Connelly, B. L., & Hoskisson, R. E. (2017). External corporate governance and financial fraud: Cognitive evaluation theory insights on agency theory prescriptions. Strategic Management Journal, 38(6), 1268–1286. Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), 461–488. Tian, X., & Wang, T. Y. (2014). Tolerance for failure and corporate innovation. The Review of Financial Studies, 27(1), 211–255. Ye, & Yu. (2019). The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Innovation: New Evidence. Journal of Accounting and Finance, 19(8), 78–99.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
財務管理學系
111357039
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111357039
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 車倫周zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Cha, Yun-Juen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 梁翌柔zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Liang, Yi-Jouen_US
dc.creator (作者) 梁翌柔zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Liang, Yi-Jouen_US
dc.date (日期) 2024en_US
dc.date.accessioned 3-Mar-2025 14:40:06 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 3-Mar-2025 14:40:06 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 3-Mar-2025 14:40:06 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0111357039en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/156013-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 財務管理學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 111357039zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究探討不同類型機構投資人對公司創新的影響，並使用股票市場對專利授權的反應衡量創新的經濟價值。依據 Bushee (2001)之分類方法，機構投資人分為: 1. 專注型投資人；2. 短暫型投資人；及 3. 準指數投資人。實證結果顯示，專注型投資人透過較長的持有期間和較強的監督力道，對創新價值有正面影響，而短暫型投資人則有負面影響。專注型投資人對創新價值之影響，對於發展階段成熟、成長機會大、競爭激烈的公司中具有更顯著的效果。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study examines the heterogenous impact of institutional investors on firm innovation, focusing on dedicated, transient, and quasi-indexer investors. Using marketable value of innovation following Kogan et al. (2017), we find that dedicated investors positively influence innovation through long-term support and governance, while transient investors negatively impact it. The positive effect of dedicated investors is stronger in firms with advanced stage of development, more growth opportunities, and intense competition.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 1. Introduction 1 2. Literature Review 5 3. Research Question and Hypothesis Development 7 3.1 The Effect of Institutional Ownership Types on Innovation 7 3.1.1 Dedicated Investors 7 3.1.2 Transient Investors 7 3.1.3 Quasi-Indexers 8 3.2 The Effect of Firm Fundamentals on Innovation 9 3.2.1 Firm Age 9 3.2.2 Growth Opportunities 9 3.2.3 Market Competition 10 4. Data, Main Variables, and Summary Statistics 11 4.1 Data 11 4.2 Variable Description 11 4.2.1 Institutional Ownership 11 4.2.2 Innovation Value 11 4.2.3 Summary Statistics 12 5. Empirical Results 13 5.1 The Effect of Institutional Ownership Types on Innovation 13 5.1.1 Univariate Results 13 5.1.2 Regression Results 13 5.1.3 Endogeneity Tests: Two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions 14 5.2 The Effect of Firm Fundamentals on Innovation 15 5.2.1 Firm Age 15 5.2.2 Growth Opportunities 15 5.2.3 Market Competition 16 6. Conclusion 17 7. References 19zh_TW
dc.format.extent 870766 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0111357039en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 機構投資人zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 創新zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 創新經濟價值zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 專注型投資人zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 短暫型投資人zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 股票市場反應zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 專利授權zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經濟價值zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 公司治理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 長期支持zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Institutional investorsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) innovationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) economice value of innovationen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) dedicated investorsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) transient investorsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) stock market reactionsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) patent grantsen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) corporate governanceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) long-term supporten_US
dc.title (題名) 機構投資人對公司創新價值之影響zh_TW
dc.title (題名) The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Economic Value of Innovationen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Admati, A. R., & Pfleiderer, P. (2009). The 'Wall Street Walk' and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 2645–2685. Aghion, P., Bloom, N., Blundell, R., Griffith, R., & Howitt, P. (2005). Competition and Innovation: An Inverted-U Relationship. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(2), 701–728. Aghion, P., Van Reenen, J., & Zingales, L. (2013). Innovation and institutional ownership. American Economic Review, 103(1), 277–304. Aguilar, L. A. (2013). Institutional investors: Power and responsibility. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2013-spch041913laahtm. Appel, I. R., Gormley, T. A., & Keim, D. B. (2016). Passive investors, not passive owners. Journal of Financial Economics, 121(1), 111–141. Bird, A., & Karolyi, S. A. (2017). Governance and taxes: Evidence from regression discontinuity. The Accounting Review, 92(1), 29–50. Burns, N., Kedia, S., & Lipson, M. (2010). Institutional ownership and monitoring: Evidence from financial misreporting. Journal of Corporate Finance, 16(4), 443–455. Bushee, B. J. (1998). The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior. The Accounting Review, 73(3), 305–333. Bushee, B. J. (2001). Do institutional investors prefer near-term earnings over long-run value? Contemporary Accounting Research, 18(2), 207–246. Carleton, W. T., Nelson, J. M., & Weisbach, M. S. (1998). The influence of institutions on corporate governance through private negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF. The Journal of Finance, 53(4), 1335–1362. Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 371–406. Connelly, B. L., Tihanyi, L., Certo, S. T., & Hitt, M. A. (2010). Marching to the Beat of Different Drummers: The Influence of Institutional Owners on Competitive Actions. Academy of Management Journal, 53(4), 784–813. Denis, D. J., & Mihov, V. T. (2003). The choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt, and public debt: Evidence from new corporate borrowings. Journal of Financial Economics, 70(1), 3–28. Dikolli, S. S., Kulp, S. L., & Sedatole, K. L. (2009). Transient institutional ownership and CEO contracting. The Accounting Review, 84(3), 737–770. Dunne, P., & Hughes, A. (1994). Age, size, growth and survival: UK companies in the 1980s. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 42(2), 115–140. Edmans, A., & Manso, G. (2011). Governance through Trading and Intervention: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders. Review of Financial Studies, 24(7), 2395–2428. Edmans, A. (2014). Blockholders and Corporate Governance. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 6(1), 23–50. Gaspar, J.-M., Massa, M., & Matos, P. (2005). Shareholder investment horizons and the market for corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics, 76(1), 135–165. Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 107–156. Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1983). An analysis of the principal-agent problem. Econometrica, 51(1), 7–45. Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1991). The theory of capital structure. The Journal of Finance, 46(1), 297–355. Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (2010). Control of Corporate Decisions: Shareholders vs. Management. Review of Financial Studies, 23(11), 4115–4147. Hirshleifer, D., Hsu, P.-H., & Li, D. (2013). Innovative efficiency and stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 107(3), 632–654. Hirshleifer, D., & Suh, R. (1992). Risk, Managerial Effort, and Project Choice. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2(3), 308–345. Huergo, E., & Jaumandreu, J. (2004). Firms' Age, Process Innovation, and Productivity Growth. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22(4), 541–559. Khan, M., Srinivasan, S., & Tan, L. (2017). Institutional Ownership and Corporate Tax Avoidance: New Evidence. The Accounting Review, 92(2), 101–122. Kim, S., & Lee, M. (2023). The Plant-Level View of an Industrial Policy: The Korean Heavy and Chemical Industry Drive. National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 29252. Kogan, L., Papanikolaou, D., Seru, A., & Stoffman, N. (2017). Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(2), 665–712. Levit, D., & Malenko, N. (2011). Nonbinding Voting for Shareholder Proposals. The Journal of Finance, 66(5), 1579–1614. Li, D. (2011). Financial constraints, R&D investment, and stock returns. The Review of Financial Studies, 24(9), 2974–3007. Lin, C., Ma, Y., & Xuan, Y. (2011). Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 102(2), 416–431. Manso, G. (2011). Motivating innovation. The Journal of Finance, 66(5), 1823–1860. Maug, E. (1998). Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off Between Liquidity and Control? The Journal of Finance, 53(1), 65–98. Mueller, D. C. (1972). A Life Cycle Theory of the Firm. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 20(3), 199–219. Monks, R. A. G., & Minow, N. (1995). Corporate Governance. Blackwell Publishers. Porter, M. E. (1992). Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 5(2), 4–16. Sakaki, H., & Jory, S. R. (2019). Institutional Investors’ Ownership Stability and Firms’ Innovation. Journal of Business Research, 103, 10–22. Sayili, K., Yilmaz, G., Dyer, D., & Küllü, A. M. (2017). Style investing and firm innovation. Journal of Financial Stability, 32, 17–29. Shi, W., Connelly, B. L., & Hoskisson, R. E. (2017). External corporate governance and financial fraud: Cognitive evaluation theory insights on agency theory prescriptions. Strategic Management Journal, 38(6), 1268–1286. Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large Shareholders and Corporate Control. Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), 461–488. Tian, X., & Wang, T. Y. (2014). Tolerance for failure and corporate innovation. The Review of Financial Studies, 27(1), 211–255. Ye, & Yu. (2019). The Effect of Institutional Ownership on Innovation: New Evidence. Journal of Accounting and Finance, 19(8), 78–99.zh_TW