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| Title | 引領中國在印度洋的海軍野心：「一帶一路」倡議、共同繁榮和海權原則的作用 Navigating China’s Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean: The Role of BRI, Common Prosperity and Sea Power Principles |
| Creator | 莫曉萱 Lawniczak, Monika Sylwia |
| Contributor | 劉復國 Liu, Fu-Kuo 莫曉萱 Monika Sylwia Lawniczak |
| Key Words | 印度洋地區 能源安全 一帶一路 共同繁榮 海權原則 珍珠鏈 Indian Ocean Region energy security Belt and Road Initiative Common Prosperity Sea Power Principles String of Pearls |
| Date | 2025 |
| Date Issued | 3-Mar-2025 15:39:13 (UTC+8) |
| Summary | 多年來，印太地區一直是全球商業的重要十字路口，許多海軍和貿易路線穿過其廣闊的水域。隨著時間的推移，該地區對於世界主要大國的重要性日益增強，該地區的海上安全問題也更加突顯。領土爭端、海盜、航道安全、能源安全和航行自由等都已成為印度洋地區的迫切問題，而中國是這些議題中最重要的當事人之一。中國海外基礎建設規劃構想了廣泛的合作機制，承載著中國與印度洋地區國家重要的政治和商業往來，對區域秩序和發展具有極為重要的戰略意義。
本論文研究了中國在印度洋地區不斷演變的海軍戰略和經濟舉措，同時重點關注中國在瓜達爾（巴基斯坦）、漢班托塔（斯里蘭卡）和皎漂（緬甸）三個主要港口的投資。透過使用海軍上校馬漢的海權原則分析視角，本研究試圖將中國在「一帶一路」倡議和共同繁榮理念下的行動情境化。透過對政策文件、學術文獻、網頁、期刊和案例研究等相關資料進行定性分析，本論文的研究凸顯了這些港口在增強中國海上存在和經濟影響力方面的戰略意義。
這項研究的結果表明，雖然中國投資承諾經濟成長、共同繁榮和改善區域聯通性，但它們也引發了人們對經濟依賴、債務可持續性和潛在地緣政治緊張局勢的擔憂。本文的結論是，透過馬漢的視角來理解中國的海洋野心，可以更細緻地了解其戰略目標，並強調需要建立平衡、合作的框架來應對區域挑戰和機會。 Over the years, the Indo-Pacific region has served as a vital crossroads for global commerce, with many naval trade routes crossing through its vast waters. With time, the region has grown increasingly important for major world powers, and maritime security issues within the area have become more prominent. Territorial disputes, piracy, sea lane safety, energy security, and freedom of navigation – have all become urging problems in the Indian Ocean Region, and China has been one of the most important parties in these issues. Chinese overseas infrastructure buildup plans envision a broad range of cooperation mechanisms and carry crucial political and business exchanges between China and IOR countries, thus their strategic implications for the regional order and development are incredibly significant. This thesis examines China’s evolving naval strategy and economic initiatives within the IOR while focusing on the Chinese investments in three key ports: Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Kyaukpyu (Myanmar). By using the analytical lens of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea power principles, this study attempts to contextualize Chinese actions under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Common Prosperity concept. Through conducting a qualitative analysis of secondary data, such as policy documents, academic literature, web pages, journals, and case studies, this thesis’s research highlights the strategic significance of these ports in enhancing China’s maritime presence and economic influence. The findings of this study indicate that while Chinese investments promise economic growth, common prosperity, and improved regional connectivity, they also raise concerns about economic dependency, debt sustainability, and potential geopolitical tensions. This thesis concludes that understanding China's maritime ambitions through Mahanian perspectives provides a more nuanced view of its strategic objectives and underscores the need for balanced, cooperative frameworks to address regional challenges and opportunities. |
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| Description | 碩士 國立政治大學 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程(IMAS) 110926017 |
| 資料來源 | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110926017 |
| Type | thesis |
| dc.contributor.advisor | 劉復國 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Liu, Fu-Kuo | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 莫曉萱 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Monika Sylwia Lawniczak | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 莫曉萱 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lawniczak, Monika Sylwia | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2025 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 3-Mar-2025 15:39:13 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 3-Mar-2025 15:39:13 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 3-Mar-2025 15:39:13 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0110926017 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/156100 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 亞太研究英語碩士學位學程(IMAS) | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 110926017 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 多年來，印太地區一直是全球商業的重要十字路口，許多海軍和貿易路線穿過其廣闊的水域。隨著時間的推移，該地區對於世界主要大國的重要性日益增強，該地區的海上安全問題也更加突顯。領土爭端、海盜、航道安全、能源安全和航行自由等都已成為印度洋地區的迫切問題，而中國是這些議題中最重要的當事人之一。中國海外基礎建設規劃構想了廣泛的合作機制，承載著中國與印度洋地區國家重要的政治和商業往來，對區域秩序和發展具有極為重要的戰略意義。 本論文研究了中國在印度洋地區不斷演變的海軍戰略和經濟舉措，同時重點關注中國在瓜達爾（巴基斯坦）、漢班托塔（斯里蘭卡）和皎漂（緬甸）三個主要港口的投資。透過使用海軍上校馬漢的海權原則分析視角，本研究試圖將中國在「一帶一路」倡議和共同繁榮理念下的行動情境化。透過對政策文件、學術文獻、網頁、期刊和案例研究等相關資料進行定性分析，本論文的研究凸顯了這些港口在增強中國海上存在和經濟影響力方面的戰略意義。 這項研究的結果表明，雖然中國投資承諾經濟成長、共同繁榮和改善區域聯通性，但它們也引發了人們對經濟依賴、債務可持續性和潛在地緣政治緊張局勢的擔憂。本文的結論是，透過馬漢的視角來理解中國的海洋野心，可以更細緻地了解其戰略目標，並強調需要建立平衡、合作的框架來應對區域挑戰和機會。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Over the years, the Indo-Pacific region has served as a vital crossroads for global commerce, with many naval trade routes crossing through its vast waters. With time, the region has grown increasingly important for major world powers, and maritime security issues within the area have become more prominent. Territorial disputes, piracy, sea lane safety, energy security, and freedom of navigation – have all become urging problems in the Indian Ocean Region, and China has been one of the most important parties in these issues. Chinese overseas infrastructure buildup plans envision a broad range of cooperation mechanisms and carry crucial political and business exchanges between China and IOR countries, thus their strategic implications for the regional order and development are incredibly significant. This thesis examines China’s evolving naval strategy and economic initiatives within the IOR while focusing on the Chinese investments in three key ports: Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Kyaukpyu (Myanmar). By using the analytical lens of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea power principles, this study attempts to contextualize Chinese actions under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Common Prosperity concept. Through conducting a qualitative analysis of secondary data, such as policy documents, academic literature, web pages, journals, and case studies, this thesis’s research highlights the strategic significance of these ports in enhancing China’s maritime presence and economic influence. The findings of this study indicate that while Chinese investments promise economic growth, common prosperity, and improved regional connectivity, they also raise concerns about economic dependency, debt sustainability, and potential geopolitical tensions. This thesis concludes that understanding China's maritime ambitions through Mahanian perspectives provides a more nuanced view of its strategic objectives and underscores the need for balanced, cooperative frameworks to address regional challenges and opportunities. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | Table of Contents Chapter One - Introduction 1 1.1 Background 1 1.2 On Chinese Port Investments 2 1.3 On String of Pearls Strategy 7 1.4 On Common Prosperity 8 1.6 On Belt and Road and Maritime Silk Road Initiatives 9 1.6 Research Purpose 10 1.7 Research Question 12 1.7.1 Addressing the Research Question 12 1.8 Research Method 13 1.7.1 Case studies: Chinese overseas ports buildup in Gwadar, Hambantota, and Kyaukpyu. 13 1.9 Analytical Framework 14 1.10 Potential Contributions 14 1.11 Limitations of the Research 15 1.11.1 Scope and Focus 15 1.11.2 Challenges Encountered During the Research Process 16 1.12 Thesis Structure 17 Chapter Two: Foundations of Chinese Naval Strategy 19 2.1 Background of Chinese Maritime Expansion 19 2.2 China’s Maritime Strategy and Security 20 2.2.1 Liu Huaqing and Beginning of Naval Development 22 2.2.2 Deng Xiaoping Era 24 2.2.3 Jiang Zemin Era 25 2.2.4 Hu Jintao Era 26 2.2.5 Xi Jinping Era 28 2.3 China’s Approaches Toward the Indian Ocean Region 29 2.3.1 China’s Indian Ocean Strategies Throughout the Years 33 2.4 Alfred Thayer Mahan Sea Power Perspectives 37 2.4.1 Principal Conditions Affecting the Sea Power Nations 38 2.5 Conclusion 42 Chapter Three: Chinese Motivations and Strategic Initiatives in the Indian Ocean Region 44 3.1 Chinese Motivations Around the IOR Through Mahan’s Lens 44 3.2 BRI and MSR Initiatives 45 3.2.1 Chinese Overseas Port Construction Plans 47 3.2.2 China on BRI 51 3.3 Common Prosperity 52 3.3.1 Common Prosperity After Establishing the PRC 53 3.3.2 Xi Jinping and Common Prosperity 54 3.4 String of Pearls Strategy 59 3.4.1 Locations of the “Pearls” 60 3.4.2 Alleged Objectives of the String of Pearls 61 3.4.3 Maritime Silk Road = expanded String of Pearls? 62 3.4.4 China’s response 64 3.5 Conclusion 66 Chapter Four: Case Study Analysis 69 4.1 Introduction 69 4.2 Introduction of the three case studies 70 4.2.1 Gwadar in Pakistan 70 4.1.2 Hambantota in Sri Lanka 74 4.1.3 Kyaukpyu in Myanmar 78 4.2 Analysis through Mahanian lens 81 4.2.1 Strategic Locations, Power Projection and Control Over Sea Lanes 81 4.2.2 Applying Mahan Theories 87 3.2.3 Potential Geostrategic Implications 88 4.3 Integrating BRI, MSR, Common Prosperity, and the String of Pearls Strategy 91 3.3.1 Looking into Relevance 91 4.3.2 Application to Case Studies 93 4.3.3 Synthesis 96 4.4 Comparative Analysis of Case Studies 98 4.4.1 Strategic Locations, Geopolitical Significance, Mahan’s principles 99 3.4.2. Economic Impact and Development 100 4.5 Addressing concerns and mitigating fears 113 4.5.1 Economic Dependency and Debt Sustainability 113 4.5.2 Geopolitical Implications 115 4.5.3 Environmental and Social Impacts 117 4.6 Conclusion 118 Chapter Five: Conclusion 121 5.1 Summary of Key Findings 121 5.1.1 Revisiting China’s Maritime Strategy and Security 122 5.1.2 Development and Strategic Importance of Gwadar, Hambantota, and Kyaukpyu ports 124 5.1.3 Application of Mahanian Sea Power Principles 126 5.1.4 Revisiting Economic Impact and Development 127 5.1.5 Revisiting concerns and mitigation strategies 129 5.2 Implications of the Findings 131 5.2.1 Regional Development and Integration 131 5.2.2 Global Maritime Dynamics 133 5.3 Suggestions for Future Research 134 Bibliography 135 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 3094355 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110926017 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 印度洋地區 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 能源安全 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 一帶一路 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 共同繁榮 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 海權原則 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 珍珠鏈 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Indian Ocean Region | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | energy security | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Belt and Road Initiative | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Common Prosperity | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Sea Power Principles | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | String of Pearls | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 引領中國在印度洋的海軍野心：「一帶一路」倡議、共同繁榮和海權原則的作用 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Navigating China’s Naval Ambitions in the Indian Ocean: The Role of BRI, Common Prosperity and Sea Power Principles | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en_US |
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