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| Title | Tacit collusion among dominant banks: Evidence from round-yard loan pricing |
| Creator | 詹育儒 Chan, Yu-Ju;Lin, Chih-Yung;Lin, Tse-Chun |
| Contributor | 金融系 |
| Key Words | Tacit collusion; Dominant banks; Round-yard pricing; Bargaining power; Loan spreads; Round up |
| Date | 2025-06 |
| Date Issued | 14-Apr-2025 09:24:08 (UTC+8) |
| Summary | While there is no apparent reason for loan spreads to cluster at certain numbers, we find that approximately 70 % of bank loans have round-yard spreads (i.e., multiples of 25 basis points). We hypothesize that dominant banks implicitly collude using round yards as focal pricing points when negotiating with borrowers. Tacit collusion leads to higher spreads and total costs of round yard priced loans than of non-round yard priced loans. Consistent with our tacit collusion hypothesis, dominant banks round up loans to multiple yards rather than rounding them down. Moreover, round-yard pricing is more prevalent among lower-quality and nonrepeat borrowers. |
| Relation | Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.92, 102750 |
| Type | article |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102750 |
| dc.contributor | 金融系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 詹育儒 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chan, Yu-Ju;Lin, Chih-Yung;Lin, Tse-Chun | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2025-06 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 14-Apr-2025 09:24:08 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 14-Apr-2025 09:24:08 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 14-Apr-2025 09:24:08 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/156520 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | While there is no apparent reason for loan spreads to cluster at certain numbers, we find that approximately 70 % of bank loans have round-yard spreads (i.e., multiples of 25 basis points). We hypothesize that dominant banks implicitly collude using round yards as focal pricing points when negotiating with borrowers. Tacit collusion leads to higher spreads and total costs of round yard priced loans than of non-round yard priced loans. Consistent with our tacit collusion hypothesis, dominant banks round up loans to multiple yards rather than rounding them down. Moreover, round-yard pricing is more prevalent among lower-quality and nonrepeat borrowers. | |
| dc.format.extent | 110 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol.92, 102750 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Tacit collusion; Dominant banks; Round-yard pricing; Bargaining power; Loan spreads; Round up | |
| dc.title (題名) | Tacit collusion among dominant banks: Evidence from round-yard loan pricing | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102750 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2025.102750 |