| dc.contributor | 會計系 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | 張祐慈;梁嘉紋;俞京和 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | Chang, Yu-Tzu;Liang, Jia-Wen;Yu, Kyunghwa;Hsiao, Fan-En | - |
| dc.date (日期) | 2025-12 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 30-Apr-2025 15:03:26 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 30-Apr-2025 15:03:26 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 30-Apr-2025 15:03:26 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/156777 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This study examines the factors influencing firms’ disclosure behavior in response to the mandated CEO pay ratio disclosure, effective from January 1, 2017. Specifically, we investigate the association between a firm’s performance in employee relations and its approach to disclosing pay ratios. The results suggest that firms with superior employee relations exercise less discretion when calculating and reporting pay ratios. Additionally, these firms are less likely to provide lengthy discussions or utilize spin language to justify their compensation practices. For firms providing supplementary pay ratios, we find that those with stronger employee relations make fewer downward adjustments. Overall, our results suggest that firms valuing employee relations are less likely to engage in opportunistic reporting when disclosing pay ratio information. This study has implications for the importance and informativeness of disclosures related to environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG), as well as the increasing demand for transparency in human capital practices. | - |
| dc.format.extent | 100 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Accounting and the Public Interest, Vol.25, No.1, pp.1-35 | - |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | pay ratio disclosure; employee relations; environmental; social; and corporate governance (ESG); discretionary information | - |
| dc.title (題名) | It Goes without Saying: The Role of Employee Relations in Pay Ratio Disclosure | - |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | - |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.2308/API-2023-028 | - |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.2308/API-2023-028 | - |
