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題名 ESG面向對金融機構併購之影響
Impacts on the Merger and Acquisition of Financial Institutions from ESG Perspective
作者 林佳穎
Lin, Chia-Yin
貢獻者 陳明進
Chen, Ming-Chin
林佳穎
Lin, Chia-Yin
關鍵詞 ESG
環境
社會及公司治理
金融機構併購
股東行動主義
董事受託義務
併購防禦措施
ESG
Environment
Social and Governance
Financial Institution M&A
Shareholder Activism
Fiduciary Duty
Anti-takeover Defense
日期 2025
上傳時間 2-Jun-2025 14:45:30 (UTC+8)
摘要 ESG(環境、社會及公司治理)浪潮自國際間席捲而來。在ESG倡議下,我國金融監督管理委員會亦積極推動深化永續治理文化、精進永續資訊揭露範圍與強化利害關係人溝通。ESG已成為企業內部控制及法令遵循所必須正視的問題。而金融機構間併購交易,於整體金融市場之規模競爭、金融秩序穩定、股東及各方利害關係人權益影響重大。本文透過ESG治理趨勢所開展之各項理論基礎,探討股東行動主義對於金融機構併購之影響及各方關係人面臨利益衝突調和之議題,其次以美國比較法及法律經濟分析研究金融機構董事於面對不同併購交易型態時,其受託及監督責任義務在ESG脈絡下之發展趨勢及審查標準,並以個案研究分析提出對於上述議題之省思與建議。
The wave of ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) has swept in from the international community. Under the ESG initiative, Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) has also been actively promoting the deepening of a sustainable governance culture, enhancing the scope of sustainability information disclosure, and strengthening communication with stakeholders. ESG has become an essential issue that companies must address in terms of internal control and compliance. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) among financial institutions carry significant implications for market competitiveness, financial stability, and the rights and interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. This article explores the theoretical foundations derived from the ESG governance trend, examining the influence of shareholder activism on financial institutions M&A, as well as the issue of balancing conflicting interests among stakeholders. This article further, from U.S. comparative law and economic analysis perspective, analyzes how the fiduciary duties of directors in financial institutions and the applicable standards of judicial review are evolving under the ESG sequence across different types of M&A transactions. Case studies are employed to provide critical insights and recommendations on the aforementioned issues.
參考文獻 一、中文部分 王全三、林正芳&荷世平(2003),永續性發展的歷史演進、理論基礎與新理論觀點,會計研究月刊。 王志誠(2016),董事之監督義務-兆豐銀行遭美國紐約州金融服務署裁罰一・八億美元案之省思,月旦法學雜誌,2016年12月259期。 王莫昀,寶佳林家宏,推股東行動主義-投資金融業 保障股東權益,中國時報2018年2月2日,https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20180202000567-260110?chdtv。 承立平(2016),寇斯廠商理論之精義:產權整合與公司治理。思與言:人文與社會科學期刊,54(4),3-40。 林仁光(2004),公司治理之理論與實踐-經營者支配或股東支配之衝突與調整,台大法學論叢第33卷第3期。 林國彬(2013),公司出售或控制權出售時之股東利益最大化原則─論德拉瓦州法院Revlon/QVC Doctrine之適用範圍. 臺北大學法學論叢,87,119–176。 林國彬(2020),企業併購交易中董事受任人義務之探討-以交易保護措施與受任人逸脫義務條款之衝突為核心. 臺灣財經法學論叢,2(1),85–155。 金融監督管理委員會,公司治理3.0 永續發展藍圖新聞稿,2024年2月22日。 金融監督管理委員會,上市櫃公司永續發展行動方案(2023年)新聞稿,2023年3月28日。 張心悌(2014),合併案之股東提案權,月旦法學教室,2014年6月15日,第141期,27-29。 曾宛如(2008),公司管理與資本市場法制專論/曾宛如著 (初版),元照。 黃仲豪(2024),ESG資訊揭露趨勢與重點,會計研究月刊,459, 56–60。 黃朝琮(2019),效率市場概念於美國公司法上之應用,政大法學評論第162期。 黃朝琮(2021),股東會投票顧問機構之運作與規範,臺北大學法學論叢,2021年6月,第118期第177-263頁。 傅家竑(2023),淺談國際投票顧問業務及我國發展現況,證券暨期貨月刊第41卷第3期,2023年3月16日。 劉連煜(2022),現代公司法,2022年9月版。 蔡昌憲(2023),董事會之永續治理角色與董事監督義務. 臺灣財經法學論叢,5(1), 155–218。 蘇怡慈(2019),股東優位主義與企業社會責任實踐之實證研究。臺灣財經法學論叢,1(1),241-262。 二、英文部分 Berle, Adolf A. and Means, Gardiner C. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property. Routledge. Blair, M. M., & Stout, L. A. (1999). A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law. Virginia Law Review, 85(2), 247–328. https://doi.org/10.2307/1073662. Bainbridge, S. (2003). Director primacy: The means and ends of corporate governance. Northwestern University Law Review, 97(2), 547–606. Bebchuk, L. A., Brav, A., & Jiang, W. (2015). The long-term effects of hedge fund activism. Columbia Law Review, 115(5), 1085-1156. Boot, A., Krahnen, J., Senbet, L., & Spatt, C.(2023), The Controversy over Proxy Voting: The Role of Fund Managers and Proxy Advisors. Financial Analysts Journal, 79(4), 8–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/0015198X.2023.2240081 Coase, R. H. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica (London), 4, 386–405. Clark, Gordon L., Feiner, Andreas and Viehs, Michael (2015). From the Stockholder to the Stakeholder: How Sustainability Can Drive Financial Outperformance. Oxford University. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2508281. Coffee, John C. & Palia, D. (2016). The wolf at the door: The impact of hedge fund activism on corporate governance. Journal of Corporation Law, 41(3), 545-607. Retrieved from https://proxyone.lib.nccu.edu.tw/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/wolf-at-door-impact-hedge-fund-activism-on/docview/1799379143/se-2 Coffee, John C. and Palia, Darius, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism: Evidence and Implications (September 15, 2014). European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 266/2014, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 489. Dodd, E. M. (1932). For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees? Harvard Law Review, 45(7), 1145–1163. https://doi.org/10.2307/1331697. Ernst & Young (February 2022), Long-Term Value and Corporate Governance Survey, How can boards strengthen governance to accelerate their ESG journeys, https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-com/en_gl/topics/attractiveness/ey-long-term-value-and-corporate-governance-survey-february-2022.pdf. Easterbrook, F. H., & Fischel, D. R. (1981). The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer. Harvard Law Review, 94(6), 1161–1204. https://doi.org/10.2307/1340753. Friedman, M. (2020, Sep 13). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits: [SpecialSections]. New York Times. Retrieved from https://proxyone.lib.nccu.edu.tw/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/social-responsibility-business-is-increase/docview/2441921739/se-2. Gilson, R. J. (1981). A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers. Stanford Law Review, 33(5), 819–891. https://doi.org/10.2307/1228401. Greenfield, K. (2006). The Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities. University of Chicago Press. Gillan, S. L., & Starks, L. T. (2007). The Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 19(1), 55–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2007.00125.x. Gilson, R. J., & Gordon, J. N. (2013). The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights. Columbia Law Review, 113(4), 863–927. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23491833 Hovatter, N. R. (2022). DEFENDING ESG: A NEW STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR DEFENSIVE MEASURES THAT IMPACT ESG RATINGS. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 171(1), 203–234. Haeberle, Kevin S. (2015), Stock-Market Law and the Accuracy of Public Companies' Stock Prices, 2015 Colum.Bus.L.Rev.121, 133-34. Harris, L. (2003). Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners. Oxford University Press. Hansmann, H., & Kraakman, R. (2001). The end of history for corporate law. Georgetown Law Journal, 89(2), 439-468. Retrieved from https://proxyone.lib.nccu.edu.tw/login?url=https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/end-history-corporate-law/docview/231565424/se-2. Jeffrey N. Gordon. (2022). The Rejected Threat of Corporate Vote Suppression: The Rise and Fall of the Anti-Activist Pill. Columbia Business Law Review, 2022(1). https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2022i1.9981. Jensen, M.C. (1986) Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. American Economic Review, 76, 323-329. Jensen, Michael C. (2000). Theory of the Firm: Governance, Residual Claims and Organizational Forms. Harvard University Press. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. Just, Ruben, Friedrich Sommer, Tim Heubeck, & Reinhard Meckl. Sustainability as a Stumbling Block in Closing Acquisitions? The Joint Effect of Target and Acquirer ESG Performance on Time to Completion. Finance research letters 58 (2023): 104422. Katharine V. Jackson (2011), Towards A Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance: A Comparative Analysis, 7 Hastings Bus. L.J. 309, 325. https://repository.uclawsf.edu/hastings_business_law_journal/vol7/iss2/4. Kahan, Marcel and Rock, Edward B., Anti-Activist Poison Pills (August 11, 2017). NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 17-08, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 364/2017. Lipton, Martin & Mirvis, Theodore (Mar. 23, 2012), Harvard’s Shareholder Rights Project Is Wrong, HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/23/harvards-shareholder-rights-project-is-wrong. Malenko, Andrey Malenko, Nadya and Spatt, Chester (July 2021), Creating Controversy in Proxy Voting Advice. NBER Working Paper No. w29036, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3889143. Manne, H. G. (1965). Mergers and the market for corporate control. The Journal of Political Economy, 73(2), 110–120. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1829527 Michael J. Mauboussin & Dan Callhan (2024, June 4). Stock Market Concentration How Much Is Too Much?, Morgan Stanley Investment Management. https://www.morganstanley.com/im/publication/insights/articles/article_stockmarketconcentration.pdf. MSCI ESG Research LLC, ESG Ratings Process (April 2024), https://www.msci.com/documents/1296102/34424357/MSCI+ESG+Ratings+Methodology+-+Process.pdf/820e4152-4804-fe33-0a67-8ee4c6a8fd7d?t=1666300410683. Petrucci, Caley and Subramanian, Guhan, Pills in a World of Activism and ESG (May 8, 2022). The University of Chicago Business Law Review (2022, Forthcoming). Refinitiv, Environmental, social and governance scores from LSEG (Dec. 2023), https://www.lseg.com/content/dam/data-analytics/en_us/documents/methodology/lseg-esg-scores-methodology.pdf. Smith, M. P. (1996). Shareholder Activism by Institutional Investors: Evidence from CalPERS. The Journal of Finance, 51(1), 227–252. https://doi.org/10.2307/2329308 Strine, L. E., Smith, K. M., & Steel, R. S. (2021). Caremark and ESG, perfect together: A practical approach to implementing an integrated, efficient, and effective caremark and EESG strategy. Iowa Law Review, 106(4), 1885–1922. Whelan,T., Atz,U. & Holt, T. and Clark, C.(2021), ESG and Financial Performance: Uncovering the Relationship by Aggregating Evidence from 1,000 Plus Studies Published between 2015 –2020, https://www.stern.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/assets/documents/NYU-RAM_ESG-Paper_2021%20Rev_0.pdf Winkler, A. (2004). Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at the End of History. Law and Contemporary Problems, 67(4), 109–133. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27592066.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際金融碩士學位學程
112ZB1046
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112ZB1046
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 陳明進zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Chen, Ming-Chinen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 林佳穎zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lin, Chia-Yinen_US
dc.creator (作者) 林佳穎zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Lin, Chia-Yinen_US
dc.date (日期) 2025en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2-Jun-2025 14:45:30 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 2-Jun-2025 14:45:30 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Jun-2025 14:45:30 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0112ZB1046en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/157231-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國際金融碩士學位學程zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 112ZB1046zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) ESG(環境、社會及公司治理)浪潮自國際間席捲而來。在ESG倡議下,我國金融監督管理委員會亦積極推動深化永續治理文化、精進永續資訊揭露範圍與強化利害關係人溝通。ESG已成為企業內部控制及法令遵循所必須正視的問題。而金融機構間併購交易,於整體金融市場之規模競爭、金融秩序穩定、股東及各方利害關係人權益影響重大。本文透過ESG治理趨勢所開展之各項理論基礎,探討股東行動主義對於金融機構併購之影響及各方關係人面臨利益衝突調和之議題,其次以美國比較法及法律經濟分析研究金融機構董事於面對不同併購交易型態時,其受託及監督責任義務在ESG脈絡下之發展趨勢及審查標準,並以個案研究分析提出對於上述議題之省思與建議。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The wave of ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) has swept in from the international community. Under the ESG initiative, Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) has also been actively promoting the deepening of a sustainable governance culture, enhancing the scope of sustainability information disclosure, and strengthening communication with stakeholders. ESG has become an essential issue that companies must address in terms of internal control and compliance. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) among financial institutions carry significant implications for market competitiveness, financial stability, and the rights and interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. This article explores the theoretical foundations derived from the ESG governance trend, examining the influence of shareholder activism on financial institutions M&A, as well as the issue of balancing conflicting interests among stakeholders. This article further, from U.S. comparative law and economic analysis perspective, analyzes how the fiduciary duties of directors in financial institutions and the applicable standards of judicial review are evolving under the ESG sequence across different types of M&A transactions. Case studies are employed to provide critical insights and recommendations on the aforementioned issues.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 研究問題 2 第三節 研究架構 3 第四節 研究方法 3 第二章 ESG對金融機構併購之影響 4 第一節 ESG基本概念之發展 4 第二節 公司治理理論 5 第一項 公司本質與公司治理 5 第二項 代理理論 6 第三節 ESG浪潮下之公司社會責任 8 第一項 股東優先主義 11 第二項 利害關係人主義 12 第三項 董事優位主義 13 第四節 股東及機構投資人參與金融機構併購之方式 14 第一項 機構投資人盡職治理 14 第二項 股東行動主義 16 第三項 參與併購之方式 19 第四項 投票顧問機構與利益衝突 22 第五節 監理機關 23 第六節 小結 24 第三章 ESG治理趨勢下之董事責任與併購交易 26 第一節 美國併購市場發展及併購防禦措施 26 第二節 ESG下董事受託義務之發展 27 第一項 Unocal審查原則 28 第二項 Revlon規則 30 第三節 併購防禦措施與ESG關聯 33 第四章 個案分析 38 第一節 合併案介紹 38 第二節 問題探討 47 第一項 ESG股東行動主義之省思 48 第二項 追求公司利益最大化之合併案評估 53 第五章 結論與建議 60 第一節 結論 60 第二節 建議 61 參考文獻 63zh_TW
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112ZB1046en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) ESGzh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 環境zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 社會及公司治理zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 金融機構併購zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 股東行動主義zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 董事受託義務zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 併購防禦措施zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) ESGen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Environmenten_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Social and Governanceen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Financial Institution M&Aen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Shareholder Activismen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Fiduciary Dutyen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Anti-takeover Defenseen_US
dc.title (題名) ESG面向對金融機構併購之影響zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Impacts on the Merger and Acquisition of Financial Institutions from ESG Perspectiveen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 一、中文部分 王全三、林正芳&荷世平(2003),永續性發展的歷史演進、理論基礎與新理論觀點,會計研究月刊。 王志誠(2016),董事之監督義務-兆豐銀行遭美國紐約州金融服務署裁罰一・八億美元案之省思,月旦法學雜誌,2016年12月259期。 王莫昀,寶佳林家宏,推股東行動主義-投資金融業 保障股東權益,中國時報2018年2月2日,https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20180202000567-260110?chdtv。 承立平(2016),寇斯廠商理論之精義:產權整合與公司治理。思與言:人文與社會科學期刊,54(4),3-40。 林仁光(2004),公司治理之理論與實踐-經營者支配或股東支配之衝突與調整,台大法學論叢第33卷第3期。 林國彬(2013),公司出售或控制權出售時之股東利益最大化原則─論德拉瓦州法院Revlon/QVC Doctrine之適用範圍. 臺北大學法學論叢,87,119–176。 林國彬(2020),企業併購交易中董事受任人義務之探討-以交易保護措施與受任人逸脫義務條款之衝突為核心. 臺灣財經法學論叢,2(1),85–155。 金融監督管理委員會,公司治理3.0 永續發展藍圖新聞稿,2024年2月22日。 金融監督管理委員會,上市櫃公司永續發展行動方案(2023年)新聞稿,2023年3月28日。 張心悌(2014),合併案之股東提案權,月旦法學教室,2014年6月15日,第141期,27-29。 曾宛如(2008),公司管理與資本市場法制專論/曾宛如著 (初版),元照。 黃仲豪(2024),ESG資訊揭露趨勢與重點,會計研究月刊,459, 56–60。 黃朝琮(2019),效率市場概念於美國公司法上之應用,政大法學評論第162期。 黃朝琮(2021),股東會投票顧問機構之運作與規範,臺北大學法學論叢,2021年6月,第118期第177-263頁。 傅家竑(2023),淺談國際投票顧問業務及我國發展現況,證券暨期貨月刊第41卷第3期,2023年3月16日。 劉連煜(2022),現代公司法,2022年9月版。 蔡昌憲(2023),董事會之永續治理角色與董事監督義務. 臺灣財經法學論叢,5(1), 155–218。 蘇怡慈(2019),股東優位主義與企業社會責任實踐之實證研究。臺灣財經法學論叢,1(1),241-262。 二、英文部分 Berle, Adolf A. and Means, Gardiner C. 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