| dc.contributor | Issues & Studies | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Kim, Dongchan | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 金東燦 | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2025-03 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 27-Jun-2025 11:21:29 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 27-Jun-2025 11:21:29 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 27-Jun-2025 11:21:29 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/157593 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This paper seeks to explain China’s motivations for pursuing its temporary and tactical détente with the United States in 2023 that culminated in a summit in San Francisco at the end of that year. Against the background of the country’s increasingly assertive foreign policy under Xi Jinping, this paper evaluates two hypotheses for its motivations behind the San Francisco détente: Is China seeking a temporary and tactical détente to repair the damage to its reputation and solidify economic ties with important partners in the West and elsewhere with the aim to stabilize its domestic economy, or is it seeking a window of opportunity to see its strategic environment better consolidated and more favorable for the expansion its global influence? This paper acknowledges that both explanations — strategic weakness and compromise — have explanatory power and are not necessarily mutually exclusive. At the same time, the country’s efforts to consolidate an international order among like-minded states in the anti-US bloc offer a more compelling explanation for its tactical détente with the United States since 2023. Finally, this paper notes some caveats and implications of this conclusion and offers suggestions for further study. | |
| dc.format.extent | 647626 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Issues & Studies, Vol.61, No.1, 2550001 (26 pages) | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | China’s foreign policy; the Xi Jinping era; US–China strategic competition; temporary and tactical détente; San Francisco summit | |
| dc.title (題名) | A Show of Strength or Weakness? China’s Motivation for Temporary and Tactical Détente in the US–China Strategic Competition | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1142/S1013251125500018 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251125500018 | |
