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題名 投資人如何評價經理人團隊年齡：以股東大會議案贊成率為例
How Do Investors Evaluate Vintage of the Top Management Team? Evidence from Voting Approval Rate in the Shareholders' Meeting
作者 蔣明珊
Jiang, Ming-Shan
貢獻者 潘健民
Pan, Chien-Min
蔣明珊
Jiang, Ming-Shan
關鍵詞 年齡
經理人團隊
投資人認可
Board Age
Top Management Team
Shareholder Approval
日期 2025
上傳時間 1-Jul-2025 14:17:13 (UTC+8)
摘要 管理階層的個人特質日益成為投資人關注焦點，投資人對經理人團隊與個別成員特質的認知，尤其是年齡，可能是影響股東決策的重要依據。本研究以日本東京證券交易所之上市企業為樣本，探討經理人團隊與個人年齡結構對投資人認可之影響。實證結果顯示，經理人團隊平均年齡及最高年齡愈高，股東大會議案贊成率顯著降低；最年輕成員之年齡則對投資人認可無明顯影響。個人層級方面，經理人年齡愈高亦使股東認可度下降。惟追加測試顯示，投資人尤對年齡介於50至59歲之經理人團隊表現正面認可，且針對不同產業之年齡特質關注重點不一，突顯產業異質性對投資人認知之調節效果。
The characteristics of management teams have been drawing significant public attention. Characteristics of the top management teams and top executives, particularly age, may influence shareholders’ decisions. This study investigates the relationship between the age structures of management team and shareholders’ approval, using data from firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Empirical results show that average age and maximum age of the top management team is significantly associated with lower shareholder approval rates, while the age of the youngest board member is not. At the individual level, older CEO age is also linked to lower shareholder support in the main tests; however, additional tests reveal that this negative effect of CEO age is significant only among firms in the manufacturing industry. Moreover, when the sample is divided by team age structure, shareholders tend to view teams aged between 50 and 59 more favorably, while teams with members aged 60 and above are associated with reduced shareholder support. These findings highlight that both age structure and industry characteristics jointly shape investor perceptions of corporate leadership.
參考文獻 岡室博之, 2006. 〈高度成長期の新規上場企業のコーポレート・ガバナンスと企業家の役割〉. 《経済研究》57 (4): 303–313. Adams, R. B., and D. Ferreira. 2009. Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics 94 (2): 291–309. Agmon, T., and D. R. Lessard. 1977. Investor recognition of corporate international diversification. Journal of Finance 32 (4): 1049–1055. Bamber, L. S., J. X. Jiang, and I. Y. Wang. 2010. What's my style? The influence of top managers on voluntary corporate financial disclosure. Accounting Review 85 (4): 1131–1162. Bebchuk, L. A., A. Brav, and W. Jiang. 2015. The long-term effects of hedge fund activism. Columbia Law Review 115 (5): 1085–1155 Belenzon, S., A. Shamshur, and R. Zarutskie. 2019. CEO's age and the performance of closely held firms. Strategic Management Journal 40 (6): 917–944. Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1169–1208. Black, B. S. 1990. Shareholder passivity reexamined. Michigan Law Review 89 (3): 520–608. Borokhovich, K. A., R. Parrino, and T. Trapani. 1996. Outside directors and CEO selection. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31 (3): 337–355. Brickley, J. A., R. C. Lease, and C. W. Smith Jr. 1988. Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 267-291. Cai, J., T. Nguyen, and R. Walkling. 2022. Director appointments: It is who you know. Review of Financial Studies 35 (4): 1933–1982. Conrad, H. 2010. From seniority to performance principle: The evolution of pay practices in Japanese firms since the 1990s. Social Science Japan Journal 13 (1): 115–135. Davis, J. G., and M. Garcia-Cestona. 2023. CEO age, financial reporting quality, and the role of clawback provisions. Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting 12 (1): 1–20. Eckel, C. C., and P. J. Grossman. 2008. Men, women and risk aversion: Experimental evidence. Working paper, Virginia Tech and Saint Cloud State University. Ertimur, Y., F. Ferri, and V. Muslu. 2011. Shareholder activism and CEO pay. Review of Financial Studies 24 (2): 535–592. Fellner, G., and B. Maciejovsky. 2007. Risk attitude and market behavior: Evidence from experimental asset markets. Journal of Economic Psychology 28 (3): 338–50. Foerster, S. R., and G. A. Karolyi. 1999. The effects of market segmentation and investor recognition on asset prices: Evidence from foreign stocks listing in the United States. Journal of Finance 54 (3): 981–1013. Fujii, H., K. Iwata, S. Kaneko, and S. Managi. 2013. Corporate environmental and economic performance of Japanese manufacturing firms: Empirical study for sustainable development. Business Strategy and the Environment 22 (3): 187–201. Ge, W., D. Matsumoto, and J. L. Zhang. 2011. Do CFOs have style? An empirical investigation of the effect of individual CFOs on accounting practices. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (4): 1141–1179. Geiger, M. A., and D. S. North. 2006. Does hiring a new CFO change things? An investigation of changes in discretionary accruals. Accounting Review 81 (4): 781–809. Gore, A., S. Matsunaga, and E. Yeung. 2008. The relation between financial monitoring and equity incentives for chief financial officers. Working paper, George Washington University, University of Oregon, and University of Georgia. Hambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review 9 (2): 193–206. Hambrick, D. C. 2007. Upper echelons theory: An update. Academy of Management Review 32 (2): 334–343. Haider, I., N. Sultana, H. Singh, and Y. H. Tham. 2020. CEO age and analysts forecast properties. Asian Review of Accounting 28 (1): 1–23. Haider, J., and H. X. Fang. 2016. Board size, ownership concentration and future firm risk. Chinese Management Studies 10 (4): 692–709. Holland, J. L. 1966. A psychological classification scheme for vocations and major fields. Journal of Counseling Psychology 13 (3): 278. Holland, J.L. 1973. Making vocational choices: A theory of careers. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Holland, J. L. 1997. Making vocational choices: A theory of vocational personalities and work environments. Psychological Assessment Resources. Hong, G. H., A. Ito, Y. U. Saito, and A. T. N. Nguyen. 2020. Structural changes in Japanese firms: Business dynamism in an aging society. IMF Working Papers, 2020/182, International Monetary Fund. Keusch, T. 2023. Shareholder activists and frictions in the CEO labor market. Accounting Review 98 (5): 353–374. Kelly, D. J. 1990. Ethics: The tone at the top. Strategic Finance 71 (10): 12-13. King, M. R., and D. Segal. 2009. The long-term effects of cross-listing, investor recognition, and ownership structure on valuation. Review of Financial Studies 22 (6): 2393–2421. Kodama, N., and H. Li. 2018. Manager characteristics and firm performance. Discussion Paper 18-E-060, RIETI. Krause, R., K. A. Whitler, and M. Semadeni. 2014. Power to the principals! An experimental look at shareholder say-on-pay voting. Academy of Management Journal 57(1): 94–115. Lakatos, Z. 2020. Do larger boards improve shareholder value creation?—Effects of the board size on business performance in Eastern Central Europe. Society and Economy 42 (3): 245–279. Lehavy, R., and R. G. Sloan. 2008. Investor recognition and stock returns. Review of Accounting Studies 13: 327–361. Leland, H. E., and D. H. Pyle. 1977. Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation. Journal of Finance 32 (2): 371–387. Manner, M. H. 2010. The impact of CEO characteristics on corporate social performance. Journal of Business Ethics 93: 53–72. Matemilola, B. T., A. N. Bany-Ariffin, W. N. W. Azman-Saini, and A. M. Nassir. 2018. Does top managers’ experience affect firms’ capital structure? Research in International Business and Finance 45: 488–498. Merkle, C., and C. J. Sextroh. 2021. Value and momentum from investors’ perspective: Evidence from professionals’ risk-ratings. Journal of Empirical Finance 62: 159-178. Merton, R. C. 1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42 (3): 483–510. Mian, S. 2001. On the choice and replacement of chief financial officer. Journal of Financial Economics 60 (1): 143–75. Myers, S. C. and N. S. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13 (2): 187–221. Nakano, M. and P. Nguyen. 2012. Board size and corporate risk taking: Further evidence from Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review 20 (4): 369–387. Nakano, M. and P. Nguyen. 2013. Board vintage and risk-taking: An empirical analysis based on Japanese firms. Working Paper, present at European Accounting Association 36th. Annual Congress, 7 May 2013, Paris, France. Ono, H., 2010. Lifetime employment in Japan: Concepts and measurements. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 24 (1): 1–27. Osagie, J., G. S. Osho, and C. Sutton. 2005. The impacts of institutional stock ownership on stock returns and performance: A financial market perspective. Journal of Business and Economics Research 3 (3): 65-70. Pukthuanthong, K., R. Roll, and T. Walker. 2007. How employee stock options and executive equity ownership affect long-term IPO operating performance. Journal of Corporate Finance 13 (5): 695–720. Ranasinghe, D., L. A. Unda, and S. Wright. 2024. Do women mind the non-GAAP? Board gender diversity and non-GAAP disclosure quality. European Accounting Review 33 (3): 713–739. Sanders, W. G. and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal 50 (5): 1055–1078. Serfling, M. A. 2014. CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies. Journal of Corporate Finance 25: 251–273. Shen, Y. 2021. CEO characteristics: a review of influential publications and a research agenda. Accounting and Finance 61: 361–385. Smith, M. P. 1996. Shareholder activism by institutional investors: Evidence from CalPERS. Journal of Finance 51 (1): 227–252. Tanaka, T. 2019. Gender diversity on Japanese corporate boards. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 51: 19–31. Vroom, V. H., and B. Pahl. 1971. Relationship between age and risk taking among managers. Journal of Applied Psychology 55 (5): 399–405. Waelchli, U. and J. Zeller. 2013. Old captains at the helm: Chairman age and firm performance. Journal of Banking and Finance 37 (5): 1612–1628. Wiersema, M. F. and A. Bird. 1993. Organizational demography in japanese firms: Group heterogeneity, individual dissimilarity, and top management team turnover. Academy of Management Journal 36 (5): 996–1025. Wiersema, M. F. and K. A. Bantel. 1992. Top management team demography and corporate strategic change. Academy of Management Journal 35 (1): 91–121. Yermack, D. 2010. Shareholder voting and corporate governance. Annual Review of Financial Economics 2 (1): 103–125. Yim, S. 2013. The acquisitiveness of youth: CEO age and acquisition behavior. Journal of Financial Economics 108 (1): 250–273.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
112353016
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112353016
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 潘健民zh_TW
dc.contributor.advisor Pan, Chien-Minen_US
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 蔣明珊zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Jiang, Ming-Shanen_US
dc.creator (作者) 蔣明珊zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Jiang, Ming-Shanen_US
dc.date (日期) 2025en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2025 14:17:13 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Jul-2025 14:17:13 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2025 14:17:13 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0112353016en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/157674-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 112353016zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 管理階層的個人特質日益成為投資人關注焦點，投資人對經理人團隊與個別成員特質的認知，尤其是年齡，可能是影響股東決策的重要依據。本研究以日本東京證券交易所之上市企業為樣本，探討經理人團隊與個人年齡結構對投資人認可之影響。實證結果顯示，經理人團隊平均年齡及最高年齡愈高，股東大會議案贊成率顯著降低；最年輕成員之年齡則對投資人認可無明顯影響。個人層級方面，經理人年齡愈高亦使股東認可度下降。惟追加測試顯示，投資人尤對年齡介於50至59歲之經理人團隊表現正面認可，且針對不同產業之年齡特質關注重點不一，突顯產業異質性對投資人認知之調節效果。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) The characteristics of management teams have been drawing significant public attention. Characteristics of the top management teams and top executives, particularly age, may influence shareholders’ decisions. This study investigates the relationship between the age structures of management team and shareholders’ approval, using data from firms listed in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Empirical results show that average age and maximum age of the top management team is significantly associated with lower shareholder approval rates, while the age of the youngest board member is not. At the individual level, older CEO age is also linked to lower shareholder support in the main tests; however, additional tests reveal that this negative effect of CEO age is significant only among firms in the manufacturing industry. Moreover, when the sample is divided by team age structure, shareholders tend to view teams aged between 50 and 59 more favorably, while teams with members aged 60 and above are associated with reduced shareholder support. These findings highlight that both age structure and industry characteristics jointly shape investor perceptions of corporate leadership.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 第壹章、緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 研究架構 4 第貳章、文獻探討與假說 5 第一節 高層理論與經理人特質 5 第二節 經理人年齡與企業經營 7 第三節 投資人認知 9 第四節 研究假說 12 第參章、研究方法 13 第一節 實證模型與變數定義 13 第二節 資料來源與樣本取樣 17 第肆章、實證結果與分析 20 第一節 敘述性統計 20 第二節 相關係數 22 第三節 經理人團隊年齡與股東贊成率之迴歸分析結果 25 第伍章、追加測試 28 第一節 年齡分層 28 第二節 製造業與非製造業 34 第陸章、結論與建議 40 第一節 研究結論 40 第二節 研究限制 41 第三節 研究建議 42 參考文獻 44zh_TW
dc.format.extent 2186572 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112353016en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 年齡zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經理人團隊zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 投資人認可zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Board Ageen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Top Management Teamen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Shareholder Approvalen_US
dc.title (題名) 投資人如何評價經理人團隊年齡：以股東大會議案贊成率為例zh_TW
dc.title (題名) How Do Investors Evaluate Vintage of the Top Management Team? Evidence from Voting Approval Rate in the Shareholders' Meetingen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 岡室博之, 2006. 〈高度成長期の新規上場企業のコーポレート・ガバナンスと企業家の役割〉. 《経済研究》57 (4): 303–313. Adams, R. B., and D. Ferreira. 2009. Women in the boardroom and their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics 94 (2): 291–309. Agmon, T., and D. R. Lessard. 1977. Investor recognition of corporate international diversification. Journal of Finance 32 (4): 1049–1055. Bamber, L. S., J. X. Jiang, and I. Y. Wang. 2010. What's my style? The influence of top managers on voluntary corporate financial disclosure. Accounting Review 85 (4): 1131–1162. Bebchuk, L. A., A. Brav, and W. Jiang. 2015. The long-term effects of hedge fund activism. Columbia Law Review 115 (5): 1085–1155 Belenzon, S., A. Shamshur, and R. Zarutskie. 2019. CEO's age and the performance of closely held firms. Strategic Management Journal 40 (6): 917–944. Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1169–1208. Black, B. S. 1990. Shareholder passivity reexamined. Michigan Law Review 89 (3): 520–608. Borokhovich, K. A., R. Parrino, and T. Trapani. 1996. Outside directors and CEO selection. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31 (3): 337–355. Brickley, J. A., R. C. Lease, and C. W. Smith Jr. 1988. Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments. Journal of Financial Economics 20: 267-291. Cai, J., T. Nguyen, and R. Walkling. 2022. Director appointments: It is who you know. Review of Financial Studies 35 (4): 1933–1982. Conrad, H. 2010. From seniority to performance principle: The evolution of pay practices in Japanese firms since the 1990s. Social Science Japan Journal 13 (1): 115–135. Davis, J. G., and M. Garcia-Cestona. 2023. CEO age, financial reporting quality, and the role of clawback provisions. Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting 12 (1): 1–20. Eckel, C. C., and P. J. Grossman. 2008. Men, women and risk aversion: Experimental evidence. Working paper, Virginia Tech and Saint Cloud State University. Ertimur, Y., F. Ferri, and V. Muslu. 2011. Shareholder activism and CEO pay. Review of Financial Studies 24 (2): 535–592. Fellner, G., and B. Maciejovsky. 2007. Risk attitude and market behavior: Evidence from experimental asset markets. Journal of Economic Psychology 28 (3): 338–50. Foerster, S. R., and G. A. Karolyi. 1999. The effects of market segmentation and investor recognition on asset prices: Evidence from foreign stocks listing in the United States. Journal of Finance 54 (3): 981–1013. Fujii, H., K. Iwata, S. Kaneko, and S. Managi. 2013. Corporate environmental and economic performance of Japanese manufacturing firms: Empirical study for sustainable development. Business Strategy and the Environment 22 (3): 187–201. Ge, W., D. Matsumoto, and J. L. Zhang. 2011. Do CFOs have style? An empirical investigation of the effect of individual CFOs on accounting practices. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (4): 1141–1179. Geiger, M. A., and D. S. North. 2006. Does hiring a new CFO change things? An investigation of changes in discretionary accruals. Accounting Review 81 (4): 781–809. Gore, A., S. Matsunaga, and E. Yeung. 2008. The relation between financial monitoring and equity incentives for chief financial officers. Working paper, George Washington University, University of Oregon, and University of Georgia. Hambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review 9 (2): 193–206. Hambrick, D. C. 2007. Upper echelons theory: An update. Academy of Management Review 32 (2): 334–343. Haider, I., N. Sultana, H. Singh, and Y. H. Tham. 2020. CEO age and analysts forecast properties. Asian Review of Accounting 28 (1): 1–23. Haider, J., and H. X. Fang. 2016. Board size, ownership concentration and future firm risk. Chinese Management Studies 10 (4): 692–709. Holland, J. L. 1966. A psychological classification scheme for vocations and major fields. Journal of Counseling Psychology 13 (3): 278. Holland, J.L. 1973. Making vocational choices: A theory of careers. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Holland, J. L. 1997. Making vocational choices: A theory of vocational personalities and work environments. Psychological Assessment Resources. Hong, G. H., A. Ito, Y. U. Saito, and A. T. N. Nguyen. 2020. Structural changes in Japanese firms: Business dynamism in an aging society. IMF Working Papers, 2020/182, International Monetary Fund. Keusch, T. 2023. Shareholder activists and frictions in the CEO labor market. Accounting Review 98 (5): 353–374. Kelly, D. J. 1990. Ethics: The tone at the top. Strategic Finance 71 (10): 12-13. King, M. R., and D. Segal. 2009. The long-term effects of cross-listing, investor recognition, and ownership structure on valuation. Review of Financial Studies 22 (6): 2393–2421. Kodama, N., and H. Li. 2018. Manager characteristics and firm performance. Discussion Paper 18-E-060, RIETI. Krause, R., K. A. Whitler, and M. Semadeni. 2014. Power to the principals! An experimental look at shareholder say-on-pay voting. Academy of Management Journal 57(1): 94–115. Lakatos, Z. 2020. Do larger boards improve shareholder value creation?—Effects of the board size on business performance in Eastern Central Europe. Society and Economy 42 (3): 245–279. Lehavy, R., and R. G. Sloan. 2008. Investor recognition and stock returns. Review of Accounting Studies 13: 327–361. Leland, H. E., and D. H. Pyle. 1977. Informational asymmetries, financial structure, and financial intermediation. Journal of Finance 32 (2): 371–387. Manner, M. H. 2010. The impact of CEO characteristics on corporate social performance. Journal of Business Ethics 93: 53–72. Matemilola, B. T., A. N. Bany-Ariffin, W. N. W. Azman-Saini, and A. M. Nassir. 2018. Does top managers’ experience affect firms’ capital structure? Research in International Business and Finance 45: 488–498. Merkle, C., and C. J. Sextroh. 2021. Value and momentum from investors’ perspective: Evidence from professionals’ risk-ratings. Journal of Empirical Finance 62: 159-178. Merton, R. C. 1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42 (3): 483–510. Mian, S. 2001. On the choice and replacement of chief financial officer. Journal of Financial Economics 60 (1): 143–75. Myers, S. C. and N. S. Majluf. 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13 (2): 187–221. Nakano, M. and P. Nguyen. 2012. Board size and corporate risk taking: Further evidence from Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review 20 (4): 369–387. Nakano, M. and P. Nguyen. 2013. Board vintage and risk-taking: An empirical analysis based on Japanese firms. Working Paper, present at European Accounting Association 36th. Annual Congress, 7 May 2013, Paris, France. Ono, H., 2010. Lifetime employment in Japan: Concepts and measurements. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 24 (1): 1–27. Osagie, J., G. S. Osho, and C. Sutton. 2005. The impacts of institutional stock ownership on stock returns and performance: A financial market perspective. Journal of Business and Economics Research 3 (3): 65-70. Pukthuanthong, K., R. Roll, and T. Walker. 2007. How employee stock options and executive equity ownership affect long-term IPO operating performance. Journal of Corporate Finance 13 (5): 695–720. Ranasinghe, D., L. A. Unda, and S. Wright. 2024. Do women mind the non-GAAP? Board gender diversity and non-GAAP disclosure quality. European Accounting Review 33 (3): 713–739. Sanders, W. G. and D. C. Hambrick. 2007. Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal 50 (5): 1055–1078. Serfling, M. A. 2014. CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies. Journal of Corporate Finance 25: 251–273. Shen, Y. 2021. CEO characteristics: a review of influential publications and a research agenda. Accounting and Finance 61: 361–385. Smith, M. P. 1996. Shareholder activism by institutional investors: Evidence from CalPERS. Journal of Finance 51 (1): 227–252. Tanaka, T. 2019. Gender diversity on Japanese corporate boards. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 51: 19–31. Vroom, V. H., and B. Pahl. 1971. Relationship between age and risk taking among managers. Journal of Applied Psychology 55 (5): 399–405. Waelchli, U. and J. Zeller. 2013. Old captains at the helm: Chairman age and firm performance. Journal of Banking and Finance 37 (5): 1612–1628. Wiersema, M. F. and A. Bird. 1993. Organizational demography in japanese firms: Group heterogeneity, individual dissimilarity, and top management team turnover. Academy of Management Journal 36 (5): 996–1025. Wiersema, M. F. and K. A. Bantel. 1992. Top management team demography and corporate strategic change. Academy of Management Journal 35 (1): 91–121. Yermack, D. 2010. Shareholder voting and corporate governance. Annual Review of Financial Economics 2 (1): 103–125. Yim, S. 2013. The acquisitiveness of youth: CEO age and acquisition behavior. Journal of Financial Economics 108 (1): 250–273.zh_TW