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題名 經理人團隊能力是否為投資人所認知 —以股東大會投票通過率為例
Do Investors Recognize Managerial Ability? Evidence from Shareholders' Meetings Voting Approval Rate
作者 許容瑄
Hsu, Jung-Hsuan
貢獻者 潘健民
許容瑄
Hsu, Jung-Hsuan
關鍵詞 經理人能力
投資人認知
股東投票
Managerial ability
Investor recognition
Shareholder voting
日期 2025
上傳時間 1-Jul-2025 14:17:56 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究旨在探討經理人團隊能力是否為投資人所認知，並以選任經理人議案之投票通過率作為投資人認知的衡量指標。股東會投票行為是股東參與公司治理與表達立場的具體形式，股東可以透過選任經理人議案之投票行為來表達其對經理人的支持度。本研究依照Demerjian et al. (2012)經理人能力衡量的方法，並在控制公司規模、財務狀況、持股結構等因素後，檢驗經理人能力與投票通過率之關聯性。 研究結果顯示，經理人團隊能力與投票通過率不相關。進一步進行追加測試後發現，ROA與股東投票平均贊成率呈現顯著正相關。因此，本研究推測投資人在選任經理人時，可能無法認知經理人團隊自身的能力，但能認知經理人可直接觀察之經營成果。
This study investigates if investors recognize the managerial ability of the top management team using the approval rate of managers’ appointments at shareholder meetings to proxy for investor recognition. This study follows Demerjian et al. (2012) to measure for managerial ability and examines the association between managerial ability and investor recognition. The empirical results show that managerial ability is not significantly associated with the shareholder approval rates. Further tests using ROA as an alternative proxy for managerial ability and find a positive association between ROA and shareholders’ approval. Taken together, this study suggests that investors may not recognize the inherent ability of the top management team but the observable performance outcomes.
參考文獻 Andreou, P. C., I. Karasamani, C. Louca, and D. Ehrlich. 2017. The impact of managerial ability on crisis-period corporate investment. Journal of Business Research 79: 107–122. Anggraini, P. G., and M. Sholihin. 2023. What do we know about managerial ability? A systematic literature review. Management Review Quarterly 73 (1): 1–30. Armstrong, C. S., I. D. Gow, and D. F. Larcker. 2013. The efficacy of shareholder voting: Evidence from equity compensation plans. Journal of Accounting Research 51 (5): 909–950. Baik, B., D. B. Farber, and S. Lee. 2011. CEO ability and management earnings forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (5): 1645–1668. Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1169–1208. Bethel, J. E., and S. Gillan. 2002. The impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on shareholder voting. Financial Management 31 (4): 29–54. Black, B. S. 1990. Shareholder passivity reexamined. Michigan Law Review 89 (3): 520–608. Bodnaruk, A., and P. Ostberg. 2009. Does investor recognition predict returns? Journal of Financial Economics 91 (2): 208–226. Cai, J., J. L. Garner, and R. A. Walkling. 2009. Electing directors. Journal of Finance 64 (5): 2389–2421. Chang, Y. Y., S. Dasgupta, and G. Hilary. 2010. CEO ability, pay, and firm performance. Management Science 56 (10): 1633–1652. Choi, S. J., J. E. Fisch, and M. Kahan. 2013. Who calls the shots? How mutual funds vote on director elections. Harvard Business Law Review 3: 35–81. Demerjian, P., B. Lev, and S. McVay. 2012. Quantifying managerial ability: A new measure and validity tests. Management Science 58 (7): 1229–1248. Demerjian, P., B. Lev, M. Lewis, and S. McVay. 2013. Managerial ability and earnings quality. Accounting Review 88 (2): 463–498. David, T., A. Giuli, and A. Romec. 2023. CEO reputation and shareholder voting. Journal of Corporate Finance 83 (4): 102476. Fee, C. E., and C. J. Hadlock. 2003. Raids, rewards, and reputations in the market for managerial talent. Review of Financial Studies 16 (4): 1315–1357. Fischer, P. E., J. Gramlich, B. P. Miller, and H. D. White. 2009. Investor perceptions of board performance: Evidence from uncontested director elections. Journal of Accounting and Economics 48 (2–3): 172–189. Gordon, L. A., and J. Pound. 1993. Information, ownership structure, and shareholder voting: Evidence from shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposals. Journal of Finance 48 (2): 697–718. Green, T. C., and R. Jame. 2013. Company name fluency, investor recognition, and firm value. Journal of Financial Economics 109 (3): 813–834. Hayes, R. M., and S. Schaefer. 1999. How much are differences in managerial ability worth? Journal of Accounting and Economics 27 (2): 125–148. Hettler, B., J. Cordeiro, and A. Forst. 2024. Proving their mettle: Managerial ability and firm performance in trying times. Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics 20 (1): 100393. Iliev, P., K. V. Lins, D. P. Miller, and L. Roth. 2015. Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World. Review of Financial Studies 28 (8): 2167–2202. Lehavy, R., and R. G. Sloan. 2008. Investor recognition and stock returns. Review of Accounting Studies 13 (2): 327–361. Listokin, Y. 2008. Management always wins the close ones. American Law and Economics Review 10 (2): 159–184. Matvos, G., and M. Ostrovsky. 2010. Heterogeneity and peer effects in mutual fund proxy voting. Journal of Financial Economics 98 (1): 90–112. Merton, R. C. 1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42 (3): 483–510. Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1): 293–315. Milbourn, T. T. 2003. CEO reputation and stock-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2): 233–262. Rajgopal, S., T. Shevlin, and V. Zamora. 2006. CEOs' outside employment opportunities and the lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts. Journal of Finance 61 (4): 1813–1844. Ting, I. W. K., I. Tebourbi, W.-M. Lu, and Q. L. Kweh. 2021. The effects of managerial ability on firm performance and the mediating role of capital structure: Evidence from Taiwan. Financial Innovation 7 (1): 89. Yermack, D. 2010. Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance. Annual Review of Financial Economics 2 (1): 103–125.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
112353040
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112353040
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 潘健民zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 許容瑄zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Hsu, Jung-Hsuanen_US
dc.creator (作者) 許容瑄zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Hsu, Jung-Hsuanen_US
dc.date (日期) 2025en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Jul-2025 14:17:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Jul-2025 14:17:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Jul-2025 14:17:56 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0112353040en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/157677-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 112353040zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究旨在探討經理人團隊能力是否為投資人所認知，並以選任經理人議案之投票通過率作為投資人認知的衡量指標。股東會投票行為是股東參與公司治理與表達立場的具體形式，股東可以透過選任經理人議案之投票行為來表達其對經理人的支持度。本研究依照Demerjian et al. (2012)經理人能力衡量的方法，並在控制公司規模、財務狀況、持股結構等因素後，檢驗經理人能力與投票通過率之關聯性。 研究結果顯示，經理人團隊能力與投票通過率不相關。進一步進行追加測試後發現，ROA與股東投票平均贊成率呈現顯著正相關。因此，本研究推測投資人在選任經理人時，可能無法認知經理人團隊自身的能力，但能認知經理人可直接觀察之經營成果。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study investigates if investors recognize the managerial ability of the top management team using the approval rate of managers’ appointments at shareholder meetings to proxy for investor recognition. This study follows Demerjian et al. (2012) to measure for managerial ability and examines the association between managerial ability and investor recognition. The empirical results show that managerial ability is not significantly associated with the shareholder approval rates. Further tests using ROA as an alternative proxy for managerial ability and find a positive association between ROA and shareholders’ approval. Taken together, this study suggests that investors may not recognize the inherent ability of the top management team but the observable performance outcomes.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 壹、 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 研究架構 3 貳、 文獻探討與研究假說 4 第一節 經理人能力 4 第二節 投資人認知 6 第三節 股東投票 8 第四節 研究假說 11 參、 研究方法 12 第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 12 第二節 變數定義與衡量 16 肆、 實證結果與分析 21 第一節 敘述性統計 21 第二節 樣本相關檢定 25 第三節 實證結果分析 28 伍、 追加測試 30 第一節 產業間之差異—製造業與非製造業 30 第二節 以ROA作為經理人能力之代理變數 34 陸、 結論與建議 40 參考文獻 42zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1444645 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112353040en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經理人能力zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 投資人認知zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 股東投票zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Managerial abilityen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Investor recognitionen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Shareholder votingen_US
dc.title (題名) 經理人團隊能力是否為投資人所認知 —以股東大會投票通過率為例zh_TW
dc.title (題名) Do Investors Recognize Managerial Ability? Evidence from Shareholders' Meetings Voting Approval Rateen_US
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Andreou, P. C., I. Karasamani, C. Louca, and D. Ehrlich. 2017. The impact of managerial ability on crisis-period corporate investment. Journal of Business Research 79: 107–122. Anggraini, P. G., and M. Sholihin. 2023. What do we know about managerial ability? A systematic literature review. Management Review Quarterly 73 (1): 1–30. Armstrong, C. S., I. D. Gow, and D. F. Larcker. 2013. The efficacy of shareholder voting: Evidence from equity compensation plans. Journal of Accounting Research 51 (5): 909–950. Baik, B., D. B. Farber, and S. Lee. 2011. CEO ability and management earnings forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (5): 1645–1668. Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effect of managers on firm policies. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1169–1208. Bethel, J. E., and S. Gillan. 2002. The impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on shareholder voting. Financial Management 31 (4): 29–54. Black, B. S. 1990. Shareholder passivity reexamined. Michigan Law Review 89 (3): 520–608. Bodnaruk, A., and P. Ostberg. 2009. Does investor recognition predict returns? Journal of Financial Economics 91 (2): 208–226. Cai, J., J. L. Garner, and R. A. Walkling. 2009. Electing directors. Journal of Finance 64 (5): 2389–2421. Chang, Y. Y., S. Dasgupta, and G. Hilary. 2010. CEO ability, pay, and firm performance. Management Science 56 (10): 1633–1652. Choi, S. J., J. E. Fisch, and M. Kahan. 2013. Who calls the shots? How mutual funds vote on director elections. Harvard Business Law Review 3: 35–81. Demerjian, P., B. Lev, and S. McVay. 2012. Quantifying managerial ability: A new measure and validity tests. Management Science 58 (7): 1229–1248. Demerjian, P., B. Lev, M. Lewis, and S. McVay. 2013. Managerial ability and earnings quality. Accounting Review 88 (2): 463–498. David, T., A. Giuli, and A. Romec. 2023. CEO reputation and shareholder voting. Journal of Corporate Finance 83 (4): 102476. Fee, C. E., and C. J. Hadlock. 2003. Raids, rewards, and reputations in the market for managerial talent. Review of Financial Studies 16 (4): 1315–1357. Fischer, P. E., J. Gramlich, B. P. Miller, and H. D. White. 2009. Investor perceptions of board performance: Evidence from uncontested director elections. Journal of Accounting and Economics 48 (2–3): 172–189. Gordon, L. A., and J. Pound. 1993. Information, ownership structure, and shareholder voting: Evidence from shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposals. Journal of Finance 48 (2): 697–718. Green, T. C., and R. Jame. 2013. Company name fluency, investor recognition, and firm value. Journal of Financial Economics 109 (3): 813–834. Hayes, R. M., and S. Schaefer. 1999. How much are differences in managerial ability worth? Journal of Accounting and Economics 27 (2): 125–148. Hettler, B., J. Cordeiro, and A. Forst. 2024. Proving their mettle: Managerial ability and firm performance in trying times. Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics 20 (1): 100393. Iliev, P., K. V. Lins, D. P. Miller, and L. Roth. 2015. Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World. Review of Financial Studies 28 (8): 2167–2202. Lehavy, R., and R. G. Sloan. 2008. Investor recognition and stock returns. Review of Accounting Studies 13 (2): 327–361. Listokin, Y. 2008. Management always wins the close ones. American Law and Economics Review 10 (2): 159–184. Matvos, G., and M. Ostrovsky. 2010. Heterogeneity and peer effects in mutual fund proxy voting. Journal of Financial Economics 98 (1): 90–112. Merton, R. C. 1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42 (3): 483–510. Morck, R., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1): 293–315. Milbourn, T. T. 2003. CEO reputation and stock-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 68 (2): 233–262. Rajgopal, S., T. Shevlin, and V. Zamora. 2006. CEOs' outside employment opportunities and the lack of relative performance evaluation in compensation contracts. Journal of Finance 61 (4): 1813–1844. Ting, I. W. K., I. Tebourbi, W.-M. Lu, and Q. L. Kweh. 2021. The effects of managerial ability on firm performance and the mediating role of capital structure: Evidence from Taiwan. Financial Innovation 7 (1): 89. Yermack, D. 2010. Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance. Annual Review of Financial Economics 2 (1): 103–125.zh_TW