| dc.contributor | 經濟系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 洪福聲 | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2018-08 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 16-Jul-2025 11:12:43 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 16-Jul-2025 11:12:43 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 16-Jul-2025 11:12:43 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/158048 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 近期的一些實證文獻發現一國的逃漏稅嚴重程度與該國金融發展程度呈反向關係；亦即，金融發展程度愈高的國家，逃漏稅就愈不嚴重。這一個兩年期計畫擬建立理論模型，從金融市場的兩個不同的角度，分別探討一國金融發展程度，對該國資本投資者逃漏稅決策及該國政府逃漏稅稽查政策的影響。第一年的計畫擬考量金融市場的道德危機問題，延續訊息不對稱文獻，假設貸款者(lender)資本投資計劃的成功機率與其努力程度呈正相關，並且投資的成功與否只有貸款者知道。銀行若要知道投資的真實狀態，必須花費確認成本(costly state verification)。此外，若貸款者成功生產資本，可將資本分配到地上經濟或地下經濟部門從事生產。地上經濟的資本所得必須納稅，但地下經濟部門可以逃漏稅。我們將這個架構建立在一個兩期跨代(overlapping generations)的內生經濟成長模型，並延續文獻，將狀態確認成本的高低當成一國金融發展程度，探討狀態確認成本與貸款者逃漏稅決策及政府最適逃漏稅稽查政策的關係。第二年的計畫將著重在金融市場的訊息分享。近期實證文獻也發現一國金融機構訊息分享的深度(the depth of information sharing)愈深，該國的逃漏稅愈不嚴重。我們將延伸現存的訊息分享研究，將資本投資者逃漏稅及政府最適逃漏稅稽查納入一個三期的跨代內生成長模型中，分別比較當金融機構分享前一期資本投資者計畫成功與否的訊息及不分享的狀況下，比較這兩個狀況下，投資者逃漏稅決策及政府最適逃漏稅稽查政策。此外，我們也會設一個參數，代表金融機構訊息分享的深度，以探討訊息分享深度對一國逃漏稅的影響。最後，我們也會比較在這兩個不同角色下，政府最適的逃漏稅稽查政策的差異。 | |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Recent empirical works have found that tax evasion is negatively correlated with the level of financial development. This proposed two-year project intends to develop theoretical models with endogenous growth from two different perspectives of financial development and yields conclusions that are consistent with recent empirical works. In the first-year project, we develop a model of two-period-lived overlapping generations that incorporates moral hazard problem with costly state verification and tax evasion. In the model, borrowers seek external funding from banks for capital investment and the probability of success of the investment depends on the borrower’s costly effort. Moreover, borrowers are able to evade capital income tax by concealing a fraction of capital (after the project is successful) in the informal/underground sector. We will examine the optimal contracts between banks and borrowers, the optimal decision of tax evasion by borrowers, and the optimal policy of tax enforcement (obtained by maximizing social welfare). Then, by using the level of the costly state verification as the indicator of financial development, we will analyze the relationship between the costly state verification and government optimal policy of tax enforcement. In the second-year project, we will focus on information sharing in credit market. A recent study has found that the incidence of tax evasion is negatively correlated with the depth of information sharing in financial market. We will extend recent studies of information sharing into a model with three-period-lived overlapping generations with tax evasion and government policy of tax enforcement. Our focus will be the relation between the depth of information sharing and the optimal policy of tax enforcement. Finally, we will compare the difference of optimal policy of tax enforcement between the first-year and the second-year projects. | |
| dc.format.extent | 116 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 科技部, MOST105-2410-H004-005, 105.08-106.07 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 訊息不對稱; 狀態確認成本; 訊息分享; 最適逃漏稅稽查; 內生經濟成長 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Asymmetric Information; Costly State Verification; Information Sharing; Optimal Tax Enforcement; Endogenous Growth | |
| dc.title (題名) | 逃漏稅、金融發展與經濟成長：狀態確認成本與訊息分享的角色 | |
| dc.title (題名) | Tax Evasion, Financial Development, and Economic Growth: the Roles of Costly State Verification and Information Sharing | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | report | |
