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題名 貿易期望理論在中美經濟上的適用性 : 半導體的案例研究與貿易期望理論的關係
Applicability of Trade Expectation Theory on Sino-American Economics Case Study of Semiconductors in Relation to Trade Expectation Theory作者 紀凱逸
Jeter, Jared Owen貢獻者 盧業中
Lu, Yeh-Chung
紀凱逸
Jeter, Jared Owen關鍵詞 貿易預期理論
半導體供應鏈
貿易依賴理論
戴爾·柯普蘭
經濟脫鉤
經濟相互依賴
Trade Expectation Theory
Semiconductor Supply Chains
Trade Dependency Theory
Dale Copeland
Economic Decoupling
Economic Interdependence日期 2025 上傳時間 4-Aug-2025 14:37:45 (UTC+8) 摘要 本論文旨在探討戴爾·柯普蘭 所提出之「貿易預期理論 對中美貿易關係之適用性。研究目的在於證明該理論相較於「貿易依賴理論，不僅更能解釋當前大國行為，亦具有作為預測未來事件之分析模型之潛力。 本研究將採用觀察性資料與歷史資料，試圖建立一致性的分析模式，並應用於當前中美貿易衝突情境中，以驗證二者間之相關性。此外，論文亦將參考目前從事相關領域實地研究之專家學者之觀點與意見，以增強研究之學術深度與實證基礎。 本研究將以跨太平洋半導體產業為個案分析對象，原因在於該產業為當今全球最具關鍵性的戰略性商業資源之一。本論文之主要假設為：隨著各方對穩定貿易體系之信心逐漸下滑，並且雙邊敵意行動日益升高，全球貿易將逐步走向類似冷戰時期地緣政治格局之區域性封閉體系。 透過本研究所獲得之統計與觀察性結果顯示，中美間之地緣經濟貿易模式確實呈現出與貿易預期理論所主張之論點相符之趨勢，足以佐證其理論之解釋力與預測效用。
This thesis studies the applicability of Dale Copeland’s Trade Expectation Theory on the Sino-American trading relationship. The objective of this thesis prove that Trade Expectation Theory is not only more superior to Trade Dependency Theory in explaining the recent actions of the great powers but also can be used to provide a predictive model for upcoming events. This study will employ observational and historical data to establish a consistent pattern that can be applies to the current conflict in order to prove correlation. This paper will also employ expert opinions from those currently engaged with in-field research. This thesis will be using a case study on the trans-Pacific semiconductor production industry as this resource is one of if not the most critical commercial good in the world today. The primary hypothesis posits that as confidence in stable trade lines decline and as increasingly hostile escalations occur on both sides, we will begin to see the development of gradually isolated trading spheres reminiscent of cold war era geopolitics. The statistical and observational results of this study indicate that there is consistent pattern of geoeconomic trade patterns in line with the assertions made by trade expectation theory.參考文獻 1. Adams, Michelle. “Where Are All the North American Semiconductor Fabs Being Built (2024 Edition)? - Z2Data.” Z2data.com, 2024, www.z2data.com/insights/where-are-all-the-north-american-semiconductor-fabs-being-built-2024. 2. Allen, Gregory C. “China’s New Strategy for Waging the Microchip Tech War.” Www.csis.org, 3 May 2023, www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-new-strategy-waging-microchip-tech-war. 3. Associated Press. “Timeline: Chinese Leader Xi Jinping’s Rise and Rule.” AP NEWS, 23 Oct. 2022, apnews.com/article/congress-xi-jinping-beijing-china-government-and-politics-36f8476c2f604282c08178d661111686. 4. BBC. “US Bans Sale of Huawei, ZTE Tech amid Security Fears.” BBC News, 26 Nov. 2022, www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-63764450. 5. Berg, Ryan C., et al. “Mineral Demands for Resilient Semiconductor Supply Chains.” Www.csis.org, 15 May 2024, www.csis.org/analysis/mineral-demands-resilient-semiconductor-supply-chains. 6. Buhi, J. (2014). Foreign Policy and the Chinese Constitutions during the Hu Jintao Administration. Boston College International & Comparative Law Review, 37(2), 241–279. 7. Cha, V. D. (2023). Collective Resilience: Deterring China’s Weaponization of Economic Interdependence. International Security, 48(1), 91–124. https://doi-org.proxyone.lib.nccu.edu.tw:8443/10.1162/isec_a_00465 8. Chen, T. C., & Hsu, C. (2021). China’s human rights foreign policy in the Xi Jinping era: Normative revisionism shrouded in discursive moderation. British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 23(2), 228–247. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120957611 9. Chen, X. J. (2006). China and the US Trade Embargo, 1950-1972. American Journal of Chinese Studies, 13(2), 169–186. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44288827 10. China, Acclime. “China’s Semiconductor Industry: The Path to Self-Sufficiency.” Acclime China, 20 Aug. 2024, china.acclime.com/news-insights/semiconductor-industry/. 11. CIA. “A COMPARISON of the US and SOVIET ECONOMIES: EVALUATING the PERFORMANCE of the SOVIET SYSTEM | CIA FOIA (Foia.cia.gov).” Www.cia.gov, 1 Oct. 1985, www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp86t00591r000300460003-9. 12. Copeland, D. C. (1996). Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations. International Security, 20(4), 5–41. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539041 13. Corder, Mike. “Dutch Semiconductor Machine Export Restrictions to Come into Force in September.” AP News, 30 June 2023, apnews.com/article/netherlands-china-semiconductors-chips-exports-asml-6e8cb7f8095632d4cd9d1cb364652494. 14. Crow, Alexis, and Sir Robin Niblett. “How US-China Relationship Is Impacting the Global Trade.” World Economic Forum, 5 Jan. 2024, www.weforum.org/agenda/2024/01/demystifying-the-idea-of-trade-decoupling/#:~:text=The%20technological%20decoupling%20between%20the%20US%20and%20China%20does%20not. Accessed 26 Sept. 2024. 15. CSIS. “Southbound | Center for Strategic and International Studies.” Southbound.csis.org, July 2019, southbound.csis.org/. 16. David Shepardson and David Lawder. (May 14th, 2024). What are Biden’s new tariffs on Chinese goods? What are Biden's new tariffs on China goods? | Reuters 17. De Guzman, Chad, and Koh Ewe. “How China’s Social Policies Keep Hurting Its Economy.” TIME, 24 Jan. 2024, time.com/6576849/china-social-policies-negative-economic-effects/. 18. Dhingra, S. (2019). Brexit and the Future of Trade. Political Quarterly, 90, 21–31. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12645 19. Diksha Madhok. “ASML Forced to Suspend Some China Exports after US Escalates Tech Battle.” CNN, CNN, 2 Jan. 2024, www.cnn.com/2024/01/02/tech/asml-china-exports-suspension-intl-hnk/index.html. 20. Dunaway, Steven. “The U.S.-China Economic Relationship: Separating Facts from Myths.” Council on Foreign Relations, 13 Sept. 2009, www.cfr.org/expert-brief/us-china-economic-relationship-separating-facts-myths#:~:text=China%20is%20highly%20dependent%20on. 21. Esarey, A., & Han, R. (2024). The Xi Jinping Effect: An Overview. In A. Esarey & R. Han (Eds.), The Xi Jinping Effect (pp. 1–22). University of Washington Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/jj.18501143.4 22. Finley, David D. “Detente and Soviet-American Trade: An Approach to a Political Balance Sheet’s.” Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. 8, no. 1-2, Mar. 1975, pp. 66–97, https://doi.org/10.1016/0039-3592(75)90022-8. Accessed 27 Oct. 2021. 23. Fravel, Taylor. “Revising Deng’s Foreign Policy.” Thediplomat.com, 17 Jan. 2012, thediplomat.com/2012/01/revising-dengs-foreign-policy-2/. 24. Gaido, D. (2016). Rudolf Hilferding on English Mercantilism. History of Political Economy, 48(3), 449–470. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-3638631 25. Galantucci, R. A. (2015). The Repercussions of Realignment: United States-China Interdependence and Exchange Rate Politics. International Studies Quarterly, 59(3), 423–435. https://doi-org.proxyone.lib.nccu.edu.tw:8443/10.1111/isqu.12178 26. Gartzke, E., Li, Q., & Boehmer, C. (2001). Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict. International Organization, 55(2), 391–438. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3078636 27. Gendler, Alex. “America’s Trade Wars: Past and Present.” Voanews.com, 2025, projects.voanews.com/trade-wars/. 28. Harding, Harry. A Fragile Relationship. Brookings Institution Press, 26 July 2000. 29. Hernandez, Joe. “A Trade Dispute between the U.K. And the EU Erupts over Post-Brexit Deal.” NPR, 16 June 2022, www.npr.org/2022/06/16/1105390566/trade-dispute-uk-eu-erupts-post-brexit-deal. 30. Hickert, Cameron, and Jeffrey Ding. “Read What Top Chinese Officials Are Hearing about AI Competition and Policy.” New America, 29 Nov. 2018, www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/read-what-top-chinese-officials-are-hearing-about-ai-competition-and-policy/. 31. Ito, K. (2024). Comment on “Supply Chain Decoupling: Geopolitical Debates and Economic Dynamism in East Asia.” Asian Economic Policy Review, 19(1), 80–81. https://doi-org.proxyone.lib.nccu.edu.tw:8443/10.1111/aepr.12441 32. Johnson, Tana, and Andrew Heiss. “Liberal Institutionalism.” Routledge EBooks, vol. 3, 14 Feb. 2023, pp. 120–132, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003266365-12. 33. Keane, Sean. “Huawei Ban Timeline: Detained CFO Makes Deal with US Justice Department.” CNET, 30 Sept. 2021, www.cnet.com/news/privacy/huawei-ban-timeline-detained-cfo-makes-deal-with-us-justice-department/. 34. Khan, A., Mann, D., & Peterson. (2021). The Semiconductor Supply Chain: Assessing National Competitiveness CSET Issue Brief. https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/The-Semiconductor-Supply-Chain-Issue-Brief.pdf 35. Kucik, Jeffrey. “Dependencies in the US Semiconductor Industry | Wilson Center.” Www.wilsoncenter.org, 28 Mar. 2024, www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/dependencies-us-semiconductor-industry. 36. Lee, J.-Y., Han, E., & Zhu, K. (2022). Decoupling from China: how U.S. Asian allies responded to the Huawei ban. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 76(5), 486–506. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2021.2016611 37. Lee, Jane Lanhee, and Stephen Nellis. “Explainer: What Is “FDPR” and Why Is the U.S. Using It to Cripple China’s Tech Sector?” Reuters, 8 Oct. 2022, www.reuters.com/technology/what-is-fdpr-why-is-us-using-it-cripple-chinas-tech-sector-2022-10-07/. 38. Lee, Yimou, and Sarah Wu. ““Tip of the Iceberg”: Taiwan’s Spy Catchers Hunt Chinese Poachers of Chip Talent.” Reuters, 8 Apr. 2022, www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/tip-iceberg-taiwans-spy-catchers-hunt-chinese-poachers-chip-talent-2022-04-08/ 39. Leffler, Melvyn P, and Odd Arne Westad. The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 1, Cambridge; New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010. 40. Li, M. (2011). Ideological dilemma: Mao’s China and the Sino-Soviet split, 1962-63. Cold War History, 11(3), 387–419. https://doi.org/10.1080/14682745.2010.498822 41. Library of Congress. “The Soviet Union and the United States - Revelations from the Russian Archives | Exhibitions - Library of Congress.” Loc.gov, Library of Congress, 2024, www.loc.gov/exhibits/archives/sovi.html. 42. Longley, Robert. “The Ups and Downs of Détente during the Cold War.” ThoughtCo, 2017, www.thoughtco.com/detente-cold-war-4151136. 43. Loth, Wilfried. Overcoming the Cold War : A History of Détente, 1950-1991. New York, Palgrave, 2002. 44. Luo, Y., & Van Assche, A. (2023). The rise of techno-geopolitical uncertainty: Implications of the United States CHIPS and Science Act. Journal of International Business Studies, 54. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41267-023-00620-3 45. Macrotrends. “China Exports 1960-2024.” Macrotrends.net, 2024, www.macrotrends.net/global-metrics/countries/CHN/china/exports. 46. Martin, Nik. “Trump Tariffs Drive China, EU to Diversify Trade.” Dw.com, Deutsche Welle, 10 Apr. 2025, www.dw.com/en/trump-tariffs-drive-china-eu-to-diversify-trade/a-72176478. Accessed 10 Apr. 2025. 47. Martin, Ronald. “First Red Scare | United States History [1917–1920] | Britannica.” Www.britannica.com, www.britannica.com/event/First-Red-Scare. 48. Medeiros, E. S. (2009). China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification. RAND Corporation. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg850af 49. Miller, Chris. “The Chips That Make Taiwan the Center of the World.” Time, 5 Oct. 2022, time.com/6219318/tsmc-taiwan-the-center-of-the-world/. 50. Momoko, K. (2022). Taiwan’s TSMC as a Focal Point of US-China High-Tech Conflict. Asia-Pacific Review, 29(1), 5–12. https://doi-org.proxyone.lib.nccu.edu.tw:8443/10.1080/13439006.2022.2055407 51. Moorhouse, R. (2014). The devils’ alliance: Hitler’s pact with Stalin, 1939-1941. Basic Books, a member of the Perseus Books Group. https://archive.org/details/devilsalliancehi0000moor_x9r7 52. MORITSUGU, KEN, and DIDI TANG. “China and US Partners Are Moving Closer as Trump Returns to the White House.” AP News, 22 Jan. 2025, apnews.com/article/china-us-allies-trump-553114fe86d7c4b7d3a5e2251d47c981. 53. Mui, Christine. “Trump’s CHIPS Demand Creates a $52 Billion Headache for Congress - POLITICO.” POLITICO, Politico, 6 Mar. 2025, www.politico.com/news/2025/03/06/trumps-chips-demand-creates-a-52-billion-headache-for-congress-00215214. 54. Long Piao, & Hsin-Che Wu. (2023). The Effect of the Chinese Government’s Political Propaganda and Individual Characteristics on Anti-US Sentiment. Asian Survey, 63(3), 381–406. https://doi-org.proxyone.lib.nccu.edu.tw:8443/10.1525/as.2023.1808498 55. Powers-Riggs, Aidan. “Taipei Fears Washington Is Weakening Its Silicon Shield.” Foreign Policy, 17 Feb. 2023, foreignpolicy.com/2023/02/17/united-states-taiwan-china-semiconductors-silicon-shield-chips-act-biden/. 56. Qureshi, A. H. (2024). 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Cambridge, Massachusetts, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 26 Sept. 2011. 69. World Integrated Trade Soultion. “East Asia & Pacific Trade Balance, Exports, Imports by Country 2022 | WITS Data.” Worldbank.org, 2022, wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/EAS/Year/2022/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Partner/by-country. Accessed 26 Mar. 2025. 70. “World Merchandise Trade, 1960-2021 | the Geography of Transport Systems.” Transportgeography.org, 25 Nov. 2017, transportgeography.org/contents/chapter7/globalization-international-trade/world-merchandise-trade/. 71. Zinkula, Jacob. “The World’s Biggest Chipmaker Is Making a Multi-Billion Dollar Investment in the US Even Though It’ll Cost Way More to Make Chips There. Here’s Why It Decided to Do It Anyway.” Business Insider, 17 Dec. 2022, www.businessinsider.com/why-tsmc-chipmaker-investing-billions-us-cost-more-make-chips-2022-12. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際研究英語碩士學位學程(IMPIS)
112862009資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112862009 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 盧業中 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Lu, Yeh-Chung en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 紀凱逸 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Jeter, Jared Owen en_US dc.creator (作者) 紀凱逸 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Jeter, Jared Owen en_US dc.date (日期) 2025 en_US dc.date.accessioned 4-Aug-2025 14:37:45 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 4-Aug-2025 14:37:45 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 4-Aug-2025 14:37:45 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0112862009 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/158610 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國際研究英語碩士學位學程(IMPIS) zh_TW dc.description (描述) 112862009 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本論文旨在探討戴爾·柯普蘭 所提出之「貿易預期理論 對中美貿易關係之適用性。研究目的在於證明該理論相較於「貿易依賴理論，不僅更能解釋當前大國行為，亦具有作為預測未來事件之分析模型之潛力。 本研究將採用觀察性資料與歷史資料，試圖建立一致性的分析模式，並應用於當前中美貿易衝突情境中，以驗證二者間之相關性。此外，論文亦將參考目前從事相關領域實地研究之專家學者之觀點與意見，以增強研究之學術深度與實證基礎。 本研究將以跨太平洋半導體產業為個案分析對象，原因在於該產業為當今全球最具關鍵性的戰略性商業資源之一。本論文之主要假設為：隨著各方對穩定貿易體系之信心逐漸下滑，並且雙邊敵意行動日益升高，全球貿易將逐步走向類似冷戰時期地緣政治格局之區域性封閉體系。 透過本研究所獲得之統計與觀察性結果顯示，中美間之地緣經濟貿易模式確實呈現出與貿易預期理論所主張之論點相符之趨勢，足以佐證其理論之解釋力與預測效用。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This thesis studies the applicability of Dale Copeland’s Trade Expectation Theory on the Sino-American trading relationship. The objective of this thesis prove that Trade Expectation Theory is not only more superior to Trade Dependency Theory in explaining the recent actions of the great powers but also can be used to provide a predictive model for upcoming events. This study will employ observational and historical data to establish a consistent pattern that can be applies to the current conflict in order to prove correlation. This paper will also employ expert opinions from those currently engaged with in-field research. This thesis will be using a case study on the trans-Pacific semiconductor production industry as this resource is one of if not the most critical commercial good in the world today. The primary hypothesis posits that as confidence in stable trade lines decline and as increasingly hostile escalations occur on both sides, we will begin to see the development of gradually isolated trading spheres reminiscent of cold war era geopolitics. The statistical and observational results of this study indicate that there is consistent pattern of geoeconomic trade patterns in line with the assertions made by trade expectation theory. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents Chapter 1: Introduction - 1 1.1 Research Motivation - 2 1.2 Research Questions - 3 1.3 Literature Review - 7 1.4 Research Scope - 15 1.5 Limitations - 15 1.6 Structure of Research - 16 Chapter 2: Framework and Methodology - 19 2.1 Theoretical Framework - 19 2.2 Hypothesis - 22 2.3 Research Methodology - 23 Chapter 3: Case Study on Sino-American Semiconductor Competiton - 27 3.1 Role of Taiwanese Involvement - 27 3.2 American semiconductor Production and its Effects on Trade Expectation - 33 3.3 Chinese semiconductor Production and its Effects on Trade Expectation - 39 Chapter 4: Application of Copeland Model to Sino-American Competiton - 45 4.1 The Process and Effects of Economic Decoupling (2012-2024) - 45 4.2 Comparative Observation of Sino-American vs. Soviet-American Economic Expectations – 48 4.3 Timeline of Sino-American Economic Relation in Relation to Trade Expectations - 53 Chapter 5: Conclusion - 63 5.1 Evaluation of Case Study - 63 5.2 Future Application of Trade Expectation Theory - 64 Bibliography - 67 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1989011 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112862009 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 貿易預期理論 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 半導體供應鏈 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 貿易依賴理論 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 戴爾·柯普蘭 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經濟脫鉤 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經濟相互依賴 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Trade Expectation Theory en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Semiconductor Supply Chains en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Trade Dependency Theory en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Dale Copeland en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Economic Decoupling en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Economic Interdependence en_US dc.title (題名) 貿易期望理論在中美經濟上的適用性 : 半導體的案例研究與貿易期望理論的關係 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Applicability of Trade Expectation Theory on Sino-American Economics Case Study of Semiconductors in Relation to Trade Expectation Theory en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 1. 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