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題名 經營層風險與企業經營績效之關聯性
作者 李少葳
Li, Shao-Wei
貢獻者 林宛瑩
李少葳
Li, Shao-Wei
關鍵詞 經營層換手
經營層年資
董監事股權質押
經營績效
Executive Turnover
Executive Tenure
Equity Pledging
Firm Performance
日期 2025
上傳時間 1-Sep-2025 14:40:10 (UTC+8)
摘要 本研究以2014年至2023年國內上市(櫃)企業作為研究對象，以經營層之異動及財務壓力衡量經營層風險，並納入董事與經理人年資衡量經營層特徵，探討經營層風險對及特徵對企業經營績效之影響。實證結果顯示，經營層之個別異動頻率、董監事持股質押比例均與企業績效呈顯著負向關係；董事年資亦與績效呈負向關聯，而經理人年資則呈現倒U型之非線性關係。進一步分析發現，當企業發生前期虧損且董事長或財務主管異動時，將進一步惡化其經營績效；相較之下，若為CEO異動，則可能帶來正向影響。具體而言，過於頻繁之經營層異動及過高之質押比例均可能削弱企業財務表現；反之，穩定且具經驗之管理團隊則有助於提升企業經營績效。本研究之實證結果可提供監管機關、信評機構、投資人及企業，了解企業經營層風險之參考。
Using a sample of Taiwanese listed companies in genera industries from 2014 to 2023, this study investigates how management turnover, financial pressure, and executive tenure affect firm performance. The empirical results show that higher management turnover frequency and share-pledged ratio are negatively associated with firm performance. Board tenure shows a negative relationship, while executive tenure exhibits an inverted U-shaped effect. Notably, when firms experience prior losses, changes in the chairman or CFO further harm firm performance, while changes in CEO may improve it. The findings highlight that excessive turnover and financial stress can weaken firm performance, whereas a stable and experienced management team can enhance it.
參考文獻 高蘭芬、邱正仁，2002，董監事股權質押對會計盈餘與股票報酬相關性之影響，臺大管理論叢，第13卷1期，127-162。 高蘭芬、陳安琳，2007，董監事股權質押、盈餘管理與公司績效相關性之研究，中華會計學刊，第6卷第2期，153-172。 黃旭輝，2006，經理人異動與股東財富效果，管理評論，第25卷第1期，23-45。 林宛瑩、許崇源、戚務君、陳宜伶，2009，公司治理與信用風險，臺大管理論叢，第19卷第2期，71-98。 Anderson, R., and Puleo, M. 2020. Insider share-pledging and equity risk. Journal of Financial Services Research. 58, 1–25. Bandiera, O., Hansen, S., Prat, A., and Sadun, R. 2020. CEO behavior and firm performance. Journal of Political Economy, 128(4): 1325–1369. Carpenter, M. A., Geletkanycz, M. A., and Sanders, W. G. 2004. Upper Echelons Research Revisited: Antecedents, Elements, and Consequences of Top Management Team Composition, Journal of Management, 30(6): 749–778. Chan, K., H.-K Chen, S. Y. Hu, and Y. J. Liu. 2018. Share pledges and margin call pressure. Journal of Corporate Finance 52: 96–117. Chikunda, P., Bhuiyan, M. B. U., Houqe, M. N., and Nguyen, L. T. M. 2025. Long-tenured CEOs and firm performance: Too much of a good thing? Evidence from New Zealand. Pacific Accounting Review. Advance online publication. Coughlan, A. T., and Schmidt, R. M. 1985. Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3): 43–66. Fabisik, K. 2019. Why Do U.S. CEOs Pledge Their Own Company's Stock? Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 19-60. Finkelstein, S., and Hambrick, D. C. 1990. Top-management-team tenure and organizational outcomes: The moderating role of managerial discretion. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(3): 484–503. Friedman, E., Johnson, S., and Mitton, T. 2003.Propping and tunneling. Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4): 732–750. Giambatista, R. C. 2004. Jumping through hoops: A longitudinal study of leader life cycles in the NBA. The Leadership Quarterly, 15(5): 607–624. Hambrick, D. C. 2007. Upper echelons theory: An update., Academy of Management Review, 32(2): 334–343. Hambrick, D. C., & Fukutomi, G. D. S. (1991). The seasons of a CEO’s tenure. Academy of Management Review, 16(4), 719–742. Hambrick, D. C., and Mason, P. A. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review, 9(2): 193–206. Han, H., Zhao, X., and Wang, Z. 2023. The Effect of Stock Pledge on Corporate Fraudulence: Evidence from China. Finance Research Letters, 57, 104195. Henderson, A. D., Miller, D., and Hambrick, D. C. 2006. How quickly do CEOs become obsolete? Industry dynamism, CEO tenure, and company performance. Strategic Management Journal, 27(5): 447–460. Huang, S., and Hilary, G. 2018. Zombie board: Board tenure and firm performance. Journal of Accounting Research, 56(4): 1285–1329. Jenter, D., and Lewellen, K. 2021. Performance-induced CEO turnover. The Review of Financial Studies, 34(2): 569–617. Lee, T.-S., and Yeh, Y.-H. 2004. Corporate governance and financial distress: Evidence from Taiwan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(3), 378–388. Li, V., and Wang, L. 2024. Frequent Executive Turnover and Accounting Information Quality. Journal of Accounting Literature. 43(1): 1–25. Luo, X., Kanuri, V. K., and Andrews, M. 2013. How does CEO tenure matter? The mediating role of firm-employee and firm-customer relationships. Strategic Management Journal, 35(4): 492–511. Miller, D. 1991. Stale in the saddle: CEO tenure and the match between organization and environment. Management Science. 37(1): 34–52. Nielsen, S. 2010. Top Management Team Diversity: A Review of Theories and Methodologies. International Journal of Management Reviews, 12(3): 301-316. Peni, E. 2014. CEO and Chairperson Characteristics and Firm Performance. Journal of Management & Governance, 18(1): 185–205. Plöckinger, M., Aschauer, E., Hiebl, M. R. W., and Rohatschek, R. 2016. The influence of individual executives on corporate financial reporting: A review and outlook from the perspective of upper echelons theory. Journal of Accounting Literature, 37(1), 55–75. Rachpradit, P., Tang, J. C. S., and Khang, D. B. 2012. CEO turnover and firm performance: Evidence from Thailand. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 12(2): 164–178. Shen, W., and Cannella, A. A. 2002. Revisiting the performance consequences of CEO succession: The impacts of successor type, postsuccession senior executive turnover, and departing CEO tenure. Academy of Management Journal. 45(4): 717–733. Siraji, M. 2019. The impact of CFO’s managerial characteristics on firm performance: Mediating role of capital structure decision. Journal of Economics and Finance (IOSR-JEF), 10(5): 6–13. Tushman, M. L., and Romanelli, E. 1985. Organizational evolution: A metamorphosis model of c onvergence and reorientation. Research in Organizational Behavior, 7: 171–222. Wang, G., Holmes, R. M., Oh, I.-S., & Zhu, W. 2016. Do CEOs matter to firm strategic actions and firm performance? A meta-analytic investigation based on upper echelons theory. Personnel Psychology, 69(4), 775–862. Xia, J., Wu, Z., Zhang, R., and Chen, X. 2022. Shareholder personal risk and firm risk: An empirical analysis of share pledges and firm debt policies. Frontiers in Psychology, 13, 1010162. Yamak, S., Nielsen, S., and Escribá-Esteve, A. 2014. The role of external environment in upper echelons theory: A review of existing literature and future research directions. Group & Organization Management, 39(1), 69–109. Zhang, R., Bhabra, G. S., Chou, H.-I., & Tan, E. K. M. 2019. CEO succession gap and firm performance .SSRN Working Paper No. 3456866. SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3456866. Zhang, Y., and Rajagopalan, N. 2004. When the known devil is better than an unknown god: An empirical study of the antecedents and consequences of relay CEO successions. Academy of Management Journal, 47(4): 483–500. Zhou, J., Li, W., Yan, Z., and Lyu, H. 2021. Controlling shareholder share pledging and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China. International Review of Financial Analysis, 77, 101839.
描述 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系
112353039
資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112353039
資料類型 thesis
dc.contributor.advisor 林宛瑩zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) 李少葳zh_TW
dc.contributor.author (Authors) Li, Shao-Weien_US
dc.creator (作者) 李少葳zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Li, Shao-Weien_US
dc.date (日期) 2025en_US
dc.date.accessioned 1-Sep-2025 14:40:10 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 1-Sep-2025 14:40:10 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 1-Sep-2025 14:40:10 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0112353039en_US
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/158996-
dc.description (描述) 碩士zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 會計學系zh_TW
dc.description (描述) 112353039zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究以2014年至2023年國內上市(櫃)企業作為研究對象，以經營層之異動及財務壓力衡量經營層風險，並納入董事與經理人年資衡量經營層特徵，探討經營層風險對及特徵對企業經營績效之影響。實證結果顯示，經營層之個別異動頻率、董監事持股質押比例均與企業績效呈顯著負向關係；董事年資亦與績效呈負向關聯，而經理人年資則呈現倒U型之非線性關係。進一步分析發現，當企業發生前期虧損且董事長或財務主管異動時，將進一步惡化其經營績效；相較之下，若為CEO異動，則可能帶來正向影響。具體而言，過於頻繁之經營層異動及過高之質押比例均可能削弱企業財務表現；反之，穩定且具經驗之管理團隊則有助於提升企業經營績效。本研究之實證結果可提供監管機關、信評機構、投資人及企業，了解企業經營層風險之參考。zh_TW
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Using a sample of Taiwanese listed companies in genera industries from 2014 to 2023, this study investigates how management turnover, financial pressure, and executive tenure affect firm performance. The empirical results show that higher management turnover frequency and share-pledged ratio are negatively associated with firm performance. Board tenure shows a negative relationship, while executive tenure exhibits an inverted U-shaped effect. Notably, when firms experience prior losses, changes in the chairman or CFO further harm firm performance, while changes in CEO may improve it. The findings highlight that excessive turnover and financial stress can weaken firm performance, whereas a stable and experienced management team can enhance it.en_US
dc.description.tableofcontents 致謝辭 I 摘要 II Abstract III 目錄 1 表目錄 3 第一章　緒論 4 第一節　研究動機與背景 4 第二節　研究目的 7 第三節　研究架構 8 第二章　文獻探討 9 第一節　高層梯隊理論 9 第二節　經營層異動 12 第三節　經營層年資 15 第四節　董監事股權質押行為 18 第三章　研究設計 20 第一節　個案分析 20 第二節　研究假說 22 第三節　實證模型與變數定義 25 第四節　研究樣本 27 第四章　實證分析 29 第一節　敘述性統計分析 29 第二節　相關分析 32 第三節　迴歸實證結果 36 第四節　額外測試 40 第五章　結論與建議 46 第一節　研究結論 46 第二節　研究限制與未來之研究建議 48 參考文獻 49zh_TW
dc.format.extent 1168593 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype application/pdf-
dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112353039en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經營層換手zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經營層年資zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 董監事股權質押zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 經營績效zh_TW
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Executive Turnoveren_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Executive Tenureen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Equity Pledgingen_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Firm Performanceen_US
dc.title (題名) 經營層風險與企業經營績效之關聯性zh_TW
dc.type (資料類型) thesisen_US
dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 高蘭芬、邱正仁，2002，董監事股權質押對會計盈餘與股票報酬相關性之影響，臺大管理論叢，第13卷1期，127-162。 高蘭芬、陳安琳，2007，董監事股權質押、盈餘管理與公司績效相關性之研究，中華會計學刊，第6卷第2期，153-172。 黃旭輝，2006，經理人異動與股東財富效果，管理評論，第25卷第1期，23-45。 林宛瑩、許崇源、戚務君、陳宜伶，2009，公司治理與信用風險，臺大管理論叢，第19卷第2期，71-98。 Anderson, R., and Puleo, M. 2020. Insider share-pledging and equity risk. Journal of Financial Services Research. 58, 1–25. Bandiera, O., Hansen, S., Prat, A., and Sadun, R. 2020. CEO behavior and firm performance. Journal of Political Economy, 128(4): 1325–1369. Carpenter, M. A., Geletkanycz, M. A., and Sanders, W. G. 2004. Upper Echelons Research Revisited: Antecedents, Elements, and Consequences of Top Management Team Composition, Journal of Management, 30(6): 749–778. Chan, K., H.-K Chen, S. Y. Hu, and Y. J. Liu. 2018. Share pledges and margin call pressure. Journal of Corporate Finance 52: 96–117. Chikunda, P., Bhuiyan, M. B. U., Houqe, M. N., and Nguyen, L. T. M. 2025. Long-tenured CEOs and firm performance: Too much of a good thing? Evidence from New Zealand. Pacific Accounting Review. Advance online publication. Coughlan, A. T., and Schmidt, R. M. 1985. Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance: An empirical investigation. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1-3): 43–66. Fabisik, K. 2019. Why Do U.S. CEOs Pledge Their Own Company's Stock? Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 19-60. Finkelstein, S., and Hambrick, D. C. 1990. Top-management-team tenure and organizational outcomes: The moderating role of managerial discretion. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(3): 484–503. Friedman, E., Johnson, S., and Mitton, T. 2003.Propping and tunneling. Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4): 732–750. Giambatista, R. C. 2004. Jumping through hoops: A longitudinal study of leader life cycles in the NBA. The Leadership Quarterly, 15(5): 607–624. Hambrick, D. C. 2007. Upper echelons theory: An update., Academy of Management Review, 32(2): 334–343. Hambrick, D. C., & Fukutomi, G. D. S. (1991). The seasons of a CEO’s tenure. Academy of Management Review, 16(4), 719–742. Hambrick, D. C., and Mason, P. A. 1984. Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review, 9(2): 193–206. Han, H., Zhao, X., and Wang, Z. 2023. The Effect of Stock Pledge on Corporate Fraudulence: Evidence from China. Finance Research Letters, 57, 104195. Henderson, A. D., Miller, D., and Hambrick, D. C. 2006. How quickly do CEOs become obsolete? Industry dynamism, CEO tenure, and company performance. Strategic Management Journal, 27(5): 447–460. Huang, S., and Hilary, G. 2018. Zombie board: Board tenure and firm performance. Journal of Accounting Research, 56(4): 1285–1329. Jenter, D., and Lewellen, K. 2021. Performance-induced CEO turnover. The Review of Financial Studies, 34(2): 569–617. Lee, T.-S., and Yeh, Y.-H. 2004. Corporate governance and financial distress: Evidence from Taiwan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(3), 378–388. Li, V., and Wang, L. 2024. Frequent Executive Turnover and Accounting Information Quality. Journal of Accounting Literature. 43(1): 1–25. Luo, X., Kanuri, V. K., and Andrews, M. 2013. How does CEO tenure matter? The mediating role of firm-employee and firm-customer relationships. Strategic Management Journal, 35(4): 492–511. Miller, D. 1991. Stale in the saddle: CEO tenure and the match between organization and environment. Management Science. 37(1): 34–52. Nielsen, S. 2010. Top Management Team Diversity: A Review of Theories and Methodologies. International Journal of Management Reviews, 12(3): 301-316. Peni, E. 2014. CEO and Chairperson Characteristics and Firm Performance. Journal of Management & Governance, 18(1): 185–205. Plöckinger, M., Aschauer, E., Hiebl, M. R. W., and Rohatschek, R. 2016. The influence of individual executives on corporate financial reporting: A review and outlook from the perspective of upper echelons theory. Journal of Accounting Literature, 37(1), 55–75. Rachpradit, P., Tang, J. C. S., and Khang, D. B. 2012. CEO turnover and firm performance: Evidence from Thailand. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 12(2): 164–178. Shen, W., and Cannella, A. A. 2002. Revisiting the performance consequences of CEO succession: The impacts of successor type, postsuccession senior executive turnover, and departing CEO tenure. Academy of Management Journal. 45(4): 717–733. Siraji, M. 2019. The impact of CFO’s managerial characteristics on firm performance: Mediating role of capital structure decision. Journal of Economics and Finance (IOSR-JEF), 10(5): 6–13. Tushman, M. L., and Romanelli, E. 1985. Organizational evolution: A metamorphosis model of c onvergence and reorientation. Research in Organizational Behavior, 7: 171–222. Wang, G., Holmes, R. M., Oh, I.-S., & Zhu, W. 2016. Do CEOs matter to firm strategic actions and firm performance? A meta-analytic investigation based on upper echelons theory. Personnel Psychology, 69(4), 775–862. Xia, J., Wu, Z., Zhang, R., and Chen, X. 2022. Shareholder personal risk and firm risk: An empirical analysis of share pledges and firm debt policies. Frontiers in Psychology, 13, 1010162. Yamak, S., Nielsen, S., and Escribá-Esteve, A. 2014. The role of external environment in upper echelons theory: A review of existing literature and future research directions. Group & Organization Management, 39(1), 69–109. Zhang, R., Bhabra, G. S., Chou, H.-I., & Tan, E. K. M. 2019. CEO succession gap and firm performance .SSRN Working Paper No. 3456866. SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3456866. Zhang, Y., and Rajagopalan, N. 2004. When the known devil is better than an unknown god: An empirical study of the antecedents and consequences of relay CEO successions. Academy of Management Journal, 47(4): 483–500. Zhou, J., Li, W., Yan, Z., and Lyu, H. 2021. Controlling shareholder share pledging and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China. International Review of Financial Analysis, 77, 101839.zh_TW