| dc.contributor.advisor | 溫偉任 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.advisor | Wen, Wei-Jen | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | 許哲睿 | zh_TW |
| dc.contributor.author (Authors) | Xu, Zhe-Rui | en_US |
| dc.creator (作者) | 許哲睿 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Xu, Zhe-Rui | en_US |
| dc.date (日期) | 2025 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 1-Sep-2025 14:55:06 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 1-Sep-2025 14:55:06 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 1-Sep-2025 14:55:06 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) | G0112351016 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/159060 | - |
| dc.description (描述) | 碩士 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國立政治大學 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 國際經營與貿易學系 | zh_TW |
| dc.description (描述) | 112351016 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 本研究以具互補要素之垂直供應鏈為例，當上游存在獨佔要素廠商會出現雙
重邊際化問題，即定價的垂直外部性;另一方面，具互補性之寡占要素廠商在定價時會對彼此產生水平外部性，這兩種外部性導致最終產品價格偏高、產出受限。面對此結構性困境，下游ODM廠商主要有兩種策略選擇：補貼新進模組廠商以增加競爭，或直接併購現有模組廠商進行垂直整合。本研究旨在建構理論框架，分析這兩種策略的效果差異。本研究採用垂直連續寡占模型，設定上游存在獨占廠商供應要素X，以及數家寡占廠商生產互補要素Y，下游為兩家雙占製造商使用Leontief 技術組裝最終產品。透過理論推導與數值分析，比較基準情境（無補貼、無整合）、補貼策略與垂直整合策略下的市場均衡。
研究發現，補貼策略的均衡型態高度依賴新進廠商進入時需支付的固定成本
和上游生產中間財之寡占廠商數量。當補貼成本很低時，雙方都會選擇補貼，形成(補貼,補貼)納許均衡；當成本很高時，則形成(不補貼,不補貼)均衡；在中等成本下，可能出現囚犯困境或膽小鬼賽局。這是因為受補貼的新進廠商為獨立經營，使競爭對手也能享受要素價格下降的外部效益，產生搭便車問題。相對而言，垂直整合策略展現出明顯優勢。研究證明，給定m≥4時，垂直整合為雙方優勢策略均衡。當兩家下游廠商都進行整合時，對於降低雙重邊際化問題有較好的效果。儘管併購成本必然高於補貼成本，但併購策略可避免外部性問題，同時透過策略性調整要素供給影響競爭對手成本，進而獲得更大競爭優勢。除了競爭優勢外，從社會福利角度分析，也可以發現雙方都整合的社會福利最高。並且市場結構參數（上游互補要素競爭程度）對策略效果具關鍵影響：當上游廠商競爭程度較低時，兩種策略效果都較顯著；隨著上游競爭加劇，策略效益逐漸收斂。
本研究透過理論模型與數值分析發現，垂直整合策略雖然成本較高，但能更
有效解決雙重邊際化問題，並可避免補貼策略可能產生的囚犯困境，在提升社會福利方面表現也較佳。這些發現對面臨類似市場結構的企業決策者和政策制定者具有重要參考價值。未來研究可進一步考慮產品差異化、生產要素替代性及多階層市場結構等擴展方向。 | zh_TW |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This study investigates a vertically structured supply chain involving complementary components, focusing on the issue of double marginalization that arises when an upstream monopolist supplies one input and several oligopolistic firms supply another complementary input. When both upstream layers possess market power and the inputs are complementary, double marginalization becomes more severe, leading to higher final product prices and restricted output. In response to this structural inefficiency, downstream ODM manufacturers face two strategi coptions: (1)subsidizing new module suppliers to increase upstream competition, or (2) acquiring existing module suppliers to achieve vertical integration. This research aims to construct a theoretical framework to compare these two strategies, analyze their effectiveness, and identify key influencing factors.
We employ a vertically sequential oligopoly model, where a monopolistic upstream supplier provides input X, while multiple oligopolistic firms produce the complementary input Y . Downstream, two duopolistic manufacturers assemble final products using Leontief technology, requiring fixed input proportions. We analyze market equilibrium outcomes under three scenarios: (i) the benchmark case without subsidies or integration, (ii) the subsidy strategy, and (iii) vertical integration.
Our findings show that the equilibrium outcome under the subsidy strategy is highly sensitive to the fixed entry cost for new module suppliers and the number of upstream oligopolists. When subsidy costs are low, both downstream firms choose to subsidize, resulting in a (subsidy, subsidy) Nash equilibrium. When the cost is high, both firms opt not to subsidize. At intermediate cost levels, strategic dilemmas may emerge, such as a prisoner’s dilemma or a chicken game, due to the free-rider problem—since subsidized entrants operate independently, rival firms also benefit from reduced input prices without bearing the cost.
In contrast, the vertical integration strategy shows clear and consistent advantages. The analysis demonstrates that when the number of upstream module suppliers satisfies m ≥ 4, vertical integration becomes the dominant strategy equilibrium for both down stream firms. Joint integration by both firms is particularly effective in mitigating double marginalization. Although acquisition involves higher costs than subsidies, integration avoids externalities and allows firms to strategically influence rival costs through input control, thereby enhancing competitive advantage.
From a social welfare perspective, full integration produces the highest welfare out come, followed by the subsidy strategy, with the benchmark case ranking last. The level of
upstream competition—captured by the number of oligopolistic input suppliers—is a critical determinant of strategy effectiveness: both strategies perform better when upstream competition is limited, but their benefits converge as upstream competition increases.
Overall, this study finds that despite higher implementation costs, vertical integration is more effective at resolving double marginalization, avoiding coordination failures, and achieving superior welfare outcomes. These results offer valuable insights for both corporate decision-makers and policy-makers facing similar supply chain structures. Future research could extend this framework by incorporating product differentiation, input substitutability, or multi-tiered market architectures. | en_US |
| dc.description.tableofcontents | 第一章緒論 1
第二章文獻回顧 5
第三章模型分析 9
3.1雙重邊際化下的基準模型 10
3.2補貼賽局：誘導新模組財廠商進入 12
3.3垂直整合：下游廠商併購中間財廠商 14
3.3.1模型結構與利潤函數 14
3.3.2下游產量均衡 15
3.3.3中間財市場與外部B廠商均衡 16
3.3.4均衡推導細節 16
3.3.5利潤條件與併購誘因 17
3.3.6併購外部性與產業意涵 18
3.4補貼與併購的比較與經濟涵義 18
3.5小結與後續分析方向 19
第四章均衡結果 21
4.1深化模型設定與分析重點 22
4.2補貼決策下的均衡分析 22
4.2.1補貼決策的理論架構 23
4.2.1.1基準（補貼前）均衡公式 24
4.2.1.2補貼後均衡推導與m敏感度 25
4.2.1.3納入補貼成本與廠商誘因 25
4.2.2補貼模型的均衡與賽局型態分析 26
4.2.2.1模型架構與數學推導 26
4.2.2.2固定成本與中間財家數m對均衡型態影響 28
4.2.3補貼賽局均衡條件與經濟涵義 29
4.2.3.1賽局策略矩陣 29
4.2.3.2均衡型態條件整理 29
4.2.4小結 39
4.3垂直整合下的均衡分析 39
4.3.1垂直整合理論架構與動機 40
4.3.1.1內部化雙重邊際化的理論基礎 40
4.3.1.2垂直整合對供應鏈結構的影響 41
4.3.1.3小結 42
4.3.2均衡解與數學推導 42
4.3.2.1皆不整合情境 43
4.3.2.2一家下游廠商整合情境 44
4.3.2.3兩家都整合情境的推導與分析 45
4.3.2.4三種市場結構下的結果比較 46
4.3.3垂直整合的策略賽局與經濟含意 47
4.3.3.1垂直整合決策之策略賽局矩陣與理論基礎 47
4.3.3.2均衡型態條件整理 47
4.3.3.3賽局的數值敏感度分析與利潤證明 50
4.3.3.4垂直整合決策的策略互動與經濟含意之解析 51
4.3.4小結 51
4.4垂直整合之產業意涵 52
4.5垂直整合與補貼機制之理論比較及社會福利分析 53
第五章結論 57
參考文獻 59 | zh_TW |
| dc.format.extent | 659583 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
| dc.source.uri (資料來源) | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112351016 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 互補要素 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 連續寡占 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 價格外部性 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 雙重邊際化 | zh_TW |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Complementary Factors | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Successive Oligopoly | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Price Externality | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Double Marginalization | en_US |
| dc.title (題名) | 補貼或併購？具互補要素垂直供應鏈中的競合關係 | zh_TW |
| dc.title (題名) | Subsidy or Merger? Strategic Coopetition in Vertically Related Supply Chains with Complementary Inputs | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | thesis | en_US |
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