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題名 CEO Compensation, Career Horizons, and Corporate Social Responsibility
作者 李佳玲; 許永明
Lee, Chia-Ling; Shiu, Yung-Ming
貢獻者 會計系; 風管系
日期 2025-08
上傳時間 24-Sep-2025 09:53:51 (UTC+8)
摘要 This study examines the effects of chief executive officer (CEO) short-term (bonuses) and long-term (equity) incentives on corporate social responsibility (CSR) decisions, distinguishing between short-term and long-term CSR, as well as core versus peripheral CSR activities. Using a sample of publicly listed US firms from the S&P 1500 index, we find that cash bonuses reduce CEO engagement in CSR, while equity incentives encourage greater engagement, particularly as the CEO nears retirement. Our results support the “short-term horizon” problem associated with bonuses and equity incentives are found to enhance CSR engagement for CEOs approaching retirement. After controlling for fixed effects, we find that equity incentives are more effective in motivating engagement in core CSR activities than in peripheral, suggesting equity incentives can help mitigate the short-term horizon problem and promote sustained CSR involvement.
關聯 經濟論文
資料類型 article
dc.contributor 會計系; 風管系-
dc.creator (作者) 李佳玲; 許永明-
dc.creator (作者) Lee, Chia-Ling; Shiu, Yung-Ming-
dc.date (日期) 2025-08-
dc.date.accessioned 24-Sep-2025 09:53:51 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 24-Sep-2025 09:53:51 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 24-Sep-2025 09:53:51 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/159639-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) This study examines the effects of chief executive officer (CEO) short-term (bonuses) and long-term (equity) incentives on corporate social responsibility (CSR) decisions, distinguishing between short-term and long-term CSR, as well as core versus peripheral CSR activities. Using a sample of publicly listed US firms from the S&P 1500 index, we find that cash bonuses reduce CEO engagement in CSR, while equity incentives encourage greater engagement, particularly as the CEO nears retirement. Our results support the “short-term horizon” problem associated with bonuses and equity incentives are found to enhance CSR engagement for CEOs approaching retirement. After controlling for fixed effects, we find that equity incentives are more effective in motivating engagement in core CSR activities than in peripheral, suggesting equity incentives can help mitigate the short-term horizon problem and promote sustained CSR involvement.-
dc.format.extent 142 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) 經濟論文-
dc.title (題名) CEO Compensation, Career Horizons, and Corporate Social Responsibility-
dc.type (資料類型) article-