| dc.contributor | 財管系; 金融系 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | 車倫周; 金帛春 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | Cha, Yunju; Kim, Baek-Chun | - |
| dc.date (日期) | 2025-11 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 9-Jan-2026 10:00:32 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 9-Jan-2026 10:00:32 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 9-Jan-2026 10:00:32 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=180568 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | We examine whether busy directors are uninformed due to time constraints or informed but choose not to monitor. They earn significant profits and trade larger volumes from their sales, suggesting they are well informed, particularly on bad news. However, firms with profitable busy directors tend to underperform and their net sales predict future stock price crashes. The results suggest that their inefficient monitoring stem from selective discretion rather than information scarcity, challenging the notion that time constraints limit busy directors’ access to firm information. | - |
| dc.format.extent | 109 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Applied Economics Letters, pp.1-6 | - |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Busy directors; insider trading; firm value; future stock price crashes | - |
| dc.title (題名) | Are busy directors uninformed or unmotivated to monitor? Evidence from insider trading | - |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | - |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1080/13504851.2025.2591290 | - |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1080/13504851.2025.2591290 | - |
