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題名 獎酬制度與理專銷售行為
Incentives and Financial Advisors Sales Behavior作者 李政倫
Lee, Cheng-Lun貢獻者 周冠男
Robin K. Chou
李政倫
Lee, Cheng-Lun關鍵詞 獎酬制度
理財專員
銷售行為
績效管理
道德風險
Reward System
Financial Advisor
Sales Behavior
Performance Management
Moral Hazard日期 2026 上傳時間 2-Feb-2026 12:00:29 (UTC+8) 摘要 本研究採用混合研究法，首先透過文獻分析，歸納出獎酬制度的關鍵構面，包含：固定薪資與變動獎金比例、獎金發放頻率、績效衡量指標（財務指標與非財務指標），以及團體獎勵與個人獎勵機制。接著，以A銀行財富管理部門為個案研究對象，透過對其內部獎酬制度文件的分析，並對15位資深理專進行深度訪談，輔以對200位理專發放之問卷調查，蒐集量化與質化數據。高變動獎金比例顯著提升理專追求短期銷售目標的動機，但同時可能引發銷售高佣金、高風險產品的道德風險，忽略客戶的長期利益。相較於年度獎金，季度或月度獎金等較高頻率的獎勵發放，更能即時激勵理專的銷售動能，但可能導致月底或季末的業績衝刺現象，影響服務品質的穩定性。績效衡量指標若過度偏重財務指標（如：手續費收入、AUM成長），理專將傾向產品導向銷售；反之，若納入非財務指標（如：客戶滿意度、KYC落實度），則能有效引導其以客戶需求為中心的顧問式銷售行為。個人獎勵是驅動銷售業績的主要動力，但適度導入團隊獎勵機制，有助於促進資深與資淺理專間的經驗傳承與協同合作，提升團隊整體服務品質。本研究建議，金融機構在設計理專獎酬制度時，應在追求營運績效與維護客戶權益之間取得平衡。建議採行「混合式績效指標」，提高非財務指標的權重；建立「遞延獎金」與「追回機制（Clawback）」，以約束短期不當銷售行為；並透過團體獎勵機制，營造共榮的團隊文化。本研究成果期望能為國內金融機構優化理專獎酬制度提供具體之管理意涵與實務參考。
This research adopts a mixed-methods approach. First, through a literature review, key dimensions of reward systems are identified, including: the ratio of fixed salary to variable bonuses, the frequency of bonus distribution, performance measurement indicators (financial and non-financial), and group versus individual incentive mechanisms. Subsequently, the wealth management department of Bank A was selected as a case study. Data were collected through the analysis of its internal reward system documents, in-depth interviews with 15 senior financial advisors, and a questionnaire survey administered to 200 financial advisors, gathering both quantitative and qualitative data.The findings are as follows: A high proportion of variable bonuses significantly enhances the motivation of financial advisors to pursue short-term sales targets. However, it may also trigger moral hazards, such as selling high-commission, high-risk products, while neglecting the long-term interests of clients. Compared to annual bonuses, higher-frequency rewards, such as quarterly or monthly bonuses, provide more immediate motivation for sales momentum. This, however, may lead to a "sprint" for performance at the end of the month or quarter, affecting the stability of service quality. If performance metrics are overly focused on financial indicators (e.g., fee income, AUM growth), advisors tend to adopt a product-oriented sales approach. Conversely, incorporating non-financial indicators (e.g., customer satisfaction, KYC implementation) can effectively guide them toward client-needs-centered, advisory-based sales behaviors. Individual rewards are the primary driver of sales performance. However, the appropriate introduction of team-based rewards can foster knowledge sharing and collaboration between senior and junior advisors, thereby enhancing the overall service quality of the team. This study suggests that financial institutions should strike a balance between pursuing operational performance and safeguarding client interests when designing reward systems for financial advisors. It is recommended to adopt "hybrid performance indicators" that increase the weight of non-financial metrics, establish "deferred bonuses" and "clawback" mechanisms to curb improper short-term sales behaviors, and foster a collaborative team culture through group incentive mechanisms. The results of this research are expected to provide concrete managerial implications and practical references for domestic financial institutions in optimizing their financial advisor reward systems.參考文獻 王儷容、林瑞敬 (2018)。薪酬制度、內部控制與理專不當銷售行為之關聯性研究。會計評論，(66)，35-68。 李怡諄 (2020)。金融業理財專員人格特質、工作滿足與銷售績效之研究 (未出版之碩士論文)。國立政治大學，台北市。 陳春山 (2011)。代理問題與公司治理。台北：學稔文化。 金融監督管理委員會 (2019)。金融服務業公平待客原則。取自 [官方網址] Adams, J. S. (1963). Toward an understanding of inequity. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67(5), 422–436. Ananthakrishnan, P. N., & Madhavan, R. (2018). Incentives and the Quality of Financial Advice. The Review of Financial Studies, 31(12), 4819-4866. Barsky, A. (2008). Understanding the ethical cost of organizational goal-setting: A review and theory of links among goal-setting, unethical behavior, and mechanisms. Journal of Business Ethics, 81(1), 63-81. Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Spamann, H. (2010). The wages of failure: Executive compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008. Yale Journal on Regulation, 27, 257-282. Coughlan, A. T., & Sen, S. K. (1989). Sales force compensation: A review of management science models. Management Science, 35(10), 1157-1173. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior. New York: Plenum. Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57-74. Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288-307. Gerhart, B., & Fang, M. (2015). Pay, intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, and creativity. In The Oxford Handbook of Creativity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship. Oxford University Press. Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000). A fine is a price. The Journal of Legal Studies, 29(1), 1-17. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. Lin, C. H., & Lu, H. P. (2010). The influence of corporate culture on the relationship between job satisfaction and organizational commitment in the Taiwanese financial sector. Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal, 38(6), 755-768. Lo, D. (2003). Salesperson's compensation and incentive systems. Journal of Marketing Research, 40(4), 433-447. Locke, E. A. (1968). Toward a theory of task motivation and incentives. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 3(2), 157-189. Vroom, V. H. (1964). Work and motivation. New York: Wiley. Wang, C. Y., & Lin, T. C. (2012). A study of the relationship between relationship selling behavior and customer loyalty in the wealth management industry. Journal of Service Science and Management, 5(2), 177-186. 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
經營管理碩士學程(EMBA)
113932124資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0113932124 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 周冠男 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Robin K. Chou en_US dc.contributor.author (Authors) 李政倫 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (Authors) Lee, Cheng-Lun en_US dc.creator (作者) 李政倫 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Lee, Cheng-Lun en_US dc.date (日期) 2026 en_US dc.date.accessioned 2-Feb-2026 12:00:29 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 2-Feb-2026 12:00:29 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-Feb-2026 12:00:29 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (Other Identifiers) G0113932124 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/161344 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 經營管理碩士學程(EMBA) zh_TW dc.description (描述) 113932124 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本研究採用混合研究法，首先透過文獻分析，歸納出獎酬制度的關鍵構面，包含：固定薪資與變動獎金比例、獎金發放頻率、績效衡量指標（財務指標與非財務指標），以及團體獎勵與個人獎勵機制。接著，以A銀行財富管理部門為個案研究對象，透過對其內部獎酬制度文件的分析，並對15位資深理專進行深度訪談，輔以對200位理專發放之問卷調查，蒐集量化與質化數據。高變動獎金比例顯著提升理專追求短期銷售目標的動機，但同時可能引發銷售高佣金、高風險產品的道德風險，忽略客戶的長期利益。相較於年度獎金，季度或月度獎金等較高頻率的獎勵發放，更能即時激勵理專的銷售動能，但可能導致月底或季末的業績衝刺現象，影響服務品質的穩定性。績效衡量指標若過度偏重財務指標（如：手續費收入、AUM成長），理專將傾向產品導向銷售；反之，若納入非財務指標（如：客戶滿意度、KYC落實度），則能有效引導其以客戶需求為中心的顧問式銷售行為。個人獎勵是驅動銷售業績的主要動力，但適度導入團隊獎勵機制，有助於促進資深與資淺理專間的經驗傳承與協同合作，提升團隊整體服務品質。本研究建議，金融機構在設計理專獎酬制度時，應在追求營運績效與維護客戶權益之間取得平衡。建議採行「混合式績效指標」，提高非財務指標的權重；建立「遞延獎金」與「追回機制（Clawback）」，以約束短期不當銷售行為；並透過團體獎勵機制，營造共榮的團隊文化。本研究成果期望能為國內金融機構優化理專獎酬制度提供具體之管理意涵與實務參考。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This research adopts a mixed-methods approach. First, through a literature review, key dimensions of reward systems are identified, including: the ratio of fixed salary to variable bonuses, the frequency of bonus distribution, performance measurement indicators (financial and non-financial), and group versus individual incentive mechanisms. Subsequently, the wealth management department of Bank A was selected as a case study. Data were collected through the analysis of its internal reward system documents, in-depth interviews with 15 senior financial advisors, and a questionnaire survey administered to 200 financial advisors, gathering both quantitative and qualitative data.The findings are as follows: A high proportion of variable bonuses significantly enhances the motivation of financial advisors to pursue short-term sales targets. However, it may also trigger moral hazards, such as selling high-commission, high-risk products, while neglecting the long-term interests of clients. Compared to annual bonuses, higher-frequency rewards, such as quarterly or monthly bonuses, provide more immediate motivation for sales momentum. This, however, may lead to a "sprint" for performance at the end of the month or quarter, affecting the stability of service quality. If performance metrics are overly focused on financial indicators (e.g., fee income, AUM growth), advisors tend to adopt a product-oriented sales approach. Conversely, incorporating non-financial indicators (e.g., customer satisfaction, KYC implementation) can effectively guide them toward client-needs-centered, advisory-based sales behaviors. Individual rewards are the primary driver of sales performance. However, the appropriate introduction of team-based rewards can foster knowledge sharing and collaboration between senior and junior advisors, thereby enhancing the overall service quality of the team. This study suggests that financial institutions should strike a balance between pursuing operational performance and safeguarding client interests when designing reward systems for financial advisors. It is recommended to adopt "hybrid performance indicators" that increase the weight of non-financial metrics, establish "deferred bonuses" and "clawback" mechanisms to curb improper short-term sales behaviors, and foster a collaborative team culture through group incentive mechanisms. The results of this research are expected to provide concrete managerial implications and practical references for domestic financial institutions in optimizing their financial advisor reward systems. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents 誌謝 2 摘要 4 ABSTRACT 5 表目錄 9 圖目錄 9 第一章 緒論 10 第一節 研究背景與動機 10 第二節 研究目的 12 第三節 研究問題 12 第四節 研究範圍與對象 12 第五節 研究流程 13 第六節 論文結構 14 第二章 文獻探討 15 第一節 獎酬制度之理論基礎 15 第二節 獎酬制度之設計構面 18 第三節 激勵理論的延伸探討 22 第四節 理專銷售行為之探討 25 第五節 獎酬制度與銷售行為之關聯性研究 28 第六節 監理改革與公平待客原則之探討 30 第三章 研究設計與方法 30 第一節 研究架構 31 第二節 研究方法 31 第三節 研究對象與抽樣 32 第四節 資料蒐集方法 34 第五節 資料分析方法 36 第四章 研究結果與分析 37 第一節 個案公司獎酬制度現況分析 37 第二節 深度訪談質化分析 39 第三節 問卷調查量化分析 43 第四節 樣本背景變項之差異分析 46 第五節 獎酬制度對銷售行為之迴歸分析 47 第五章 結論與建議 49 第一節 研究結論 49 第二節 管理意涵與實務建議 51 第三節 研究限制與未來研究建議 53 參考文獻 54 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1126367 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0113932124 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 獎酬制度 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 理財專員 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 銷售行為 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 績效管理 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 道德風險 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) Reward System en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Financial Advisor en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Sales Behavior en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Performance Management en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Moral Hazard en_US dc.title (題名) 獎酬制度與理專銷售行為 zh_TW dc.title (題名) Incentives and Financial Advisors Sales Behavior en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) 王儷容、林瑞敬 (2018)。薪酬制度、內部控制與理專不當銷售行為之關聯性研究。會計評論，(66)，35-68。 李怡諄 (2020)。金融業理財專員人格特質、工作滿足與銷售績效之研究 (未出版之碩士論文)。國立政治大學，台北市。 陳春山 (2011)。代理問題與公司治理。台北：學稔文化。 金融監督管理委員會 (2019)。金融服務業公平待客原則。取自 [官方網址] Adams, J. S. (1963). Toward an understanding of inequity. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67(5), 422–436. Ananthakrishnan, P. N., & Madhavan, R. (2018). Incentives and the Quality of Financial Advice. The Review of Financial Studies, 31(12), 4819-4866. Barsky, A. (2008). Understanding the ethical cost of organizational goal-setting: A review and theory of links among goal-setting, unethical behavior, and mechanisms. Journal of Business Ethics, 81(1), 63-81. Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Spamann, H. (2010). The wages of failure: Executive compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008. Yale Journal on Regulation, 27, 257-282. Coughlan, A. T., & Sen, S. K. (1989). Sales force compensation: A review of management science models. Management Science, 35(10), 1157-1173. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior. New York: Plenum. Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14(1), 57-74. Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), 288-307. Gerhart, B., & Fang, M. (2015). Pay, intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, and creativity. In The Oxford Handbook of Creativity, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship. Oxford University Press. Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000). A fine is a price. The Journal of Legal Studies, 29(1), 1-17. Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. Lin, C. H., & Lu, H. P. (2010). The influence of corporate culture on the relationship between job satisfaction and organizational commitment in the Taiwanese financial sector. Social Behavior and Personality: An International Journal, 38(6), 755-768. Lo, D. (2003). Salesperson's compensation and incentive systems. Journal of Marketing Research, 40(4), 433-447. Locke, E. A. (1968). Toward a theory of task motivation and incentives. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 3(2), 157-189. Vroom, V. H. (1964). Work and motivation. New York: Wiley. Wang, C. Y., & Lin, T. C. (2012). A study of the relationship between relationship selling behavior and customer loyalty in the wealth management industry. Journal of Service Science and Management, 5(2), 177-186. zh_TW
