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題名 歐盟外交政策制定程序的變化：克里米亞危機期間及 2022 年俄烏戰爭後歐盟對俄制裁之比較研究
The Change in the EU Foreign Policy Formulation Process : A Comparative Analysis of Sanctions on Russia During the Crimean Crisis and the 2022 Invasion作者 潘元霆
Akos, Pinter貢獻者 蘇卓馨
Su, Cho-Hsin
潘元霆
Akos, Pinter關鍵詞 歐洲聯盟
共同外交與安全政策
歐盟制裁
多層級治理
政府間主義
超國家主義
European Union
Common Foreign and Security Policy
EU Sanctions
Multilevel Governance
Intergovernmentalism
Supranationalism日期 2026 上傳時間 2-三月-2026 12:21:33 (UTC+8) 摘要 本論文透過分析歐盟在2014年克里米亞遭俄羅斯併吞以及2022年俄羅斯對烏克蘭發動全面侵略後所實施的制裁措施，探討歐洲聯盟共同外交與安全政策（Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP）的演變與當代運作方式。在歐洲安全威脅顯著升高、以及對美國領導地位信心下降的背景下，本文聚焦於在《里斯本條約》既有框架之下，歐盟外交政策形成與執行過程所發生的變化。 本研究的核心假設為：儘管CFSP的決策機制在形式上仍然維持政府間主義，並受制於一致同意原則，但歐盟各機構，尤其是歐盟執委會，已在實務上對外交政策的形成與執行方式進行非正式調整，以克服會員國否決、拖延與規避的問題。本文運用多層級治理理論，分析超國家、國家及次國家層級行為者在歐盟對俄制裁的設計、通過與執行過程中如何相互作用。 透過比較2014年以精準、有限為特徵的制裁體系，與2022年後所採取的廣泛、跨部門制裁體系之質性個案研究，本文指出：歐盟外交政策的政治決策核心並未發生根本性改變，一致同意與國家主權仍然主導CFSP。然而，研究同時顯示，這種表面上的制度延續性掩蓋了實務層面上的重大變化。 歐盟制裁的範圍與雄心已出現顯著擴張。2014年的制裁措施主要為高度針對性設計，目的在於表達譴責並促使談判，同時盡量降低對歐盟自身經濟的衝擊。當時歐盟對俄羅斯能源的高度依賴，嚴重限制了政策選項，使制裁必須經過精細校準，以避免系統性風險。相較之下，2022年後歐盟實施了其歷史上最為全面的制裁體系，涵蓋金融市場、運輸、科技、能源與海運服務等領域。這些制裁不僅對俄羅斯造成重大衝擊，也對歐盟自身經濟帶來實質成本，反映出歐盟對威脅的認知已從區域性危機轉變為對歐洲安全的存在性挑戰。 此一轉變顯著提升了歐盟執委會的角色。執委會具備規範制定專業、單一市場權限與行政能力，得以起草精細的法律定義、協調各會員國的執行標準，並監控制裁規避行為。新制度機制的建立，例如「凍結與沒收工作小組」（Freeze and Seize Task Force）、與歐洲司法合作組織（Eurojust）的強化合作，以及國際制裁特使職位的設立，顯示執委會在未正式侵蝕理事會政治權威的情況下，已大幅擴展其操作性角色。因此，本文否定了認為歐盟即將陷入決策癱瘓的悲觀論述，也拒絕了宣稱歐盟已超越政府間主義的過度樂觀觀點。 本文同時指出歐盟多層級治理結構中「反對者」的實際侷限。儘管匈牙利及其他會員國多次威脅行使否決權並拖延制裁決策，這些行為極少真正改變歐盟政策的整體走向。相反地，反對立場多半被用作談判籌碼，以換取豁免條款、過渡期或其他讓步，而非真誠試圖阻止集體行動。研究發現，當面對其他會員國形成的高度政治共識時，持反對立場的政府通常最終仍會透過談判讓步或建設性棄權而被迫接受決定。 尤為重要的是，本文明確區分政治決策與法律執行兩個層面。制裁的通過是一個兩階段過程：首先是在CFSP架構下、需一致同意的政治決定；其次則是依據歐盟法所通過、通常以合格多數決表決的具法律拘束力之規則。此一結構使執委會即使在政治權威仍屬政府間主義的情況下，仍能在制裁的技術設計與執行層面發揮更大影響力。其結果是一種「執行層面日益集中與歐洲化，而決策層面仍維持政府間、共識導向」的制度格局。 總體而言，本文認為歐盟已透過非正式的制度演化，對地緣政治壓力作出部分調適；然而，這也引發了一個關鍵問題：未來是否必須進行條約改革，才能使政治決策機制與歐盟日益增長的全球角色、野心與責任相互契合。
This thesis examines the evolution and contemporary functioning of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) through the lens of EU sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Set against a backdrop of heightened security threats in Europe and declining confidence in US leadership, the thesis addresses the change in the EU foreign policy formulation process and its implementation under the existing Lisbon Treaty framework. The central hypothesis is that, while CFSP decision-making remains formally intergovernmental and constrained by unanimity requirements, EU institutions, most notably the European Commission, have informally adapted foreign policy formulation and implementation practices to overcome member state vetoes, delays and circumventions. Using multilevel governance theory, the thesis analyses how supranational, national and sub-national actors interact in the design, adoption and enforcement of EU sanctions. Through a qualitative case study comparing the targeted sanctions regime of 2014 with the broad, sectorwide sanctions adopted after 2022, the thesis concludes EU’s political decision-making core has not fundamentally changed as unanimity and national sovereignty continue to dominate CFSP. However, the research shows that this formal continuity masks substantial change beneath the surface. The scope and ambition of EU sanctions have expanded dramatically. In 2014, sanctions were narrowly targeted, designed to signal disapproval and incentivize negotiation while minimizing economic disruption within the EU itself. Energy dependence on Russia strongly constrained policy options, and sanctions were carefully calibrated to avoid systemic shocks. By contrast, after 2022 the EU adopted its most extensive sanctions regime in history, encompassing financial markets, transport, technology, energy, and maritime services. These sanctions imposed significant costs not only on Russia but also on EU economies, reflecting a fundamental shift in threat perception from a regional crisis to an existential challenge to European security. This transformation elevated the role of the European Commission, which possesses the regulatory expertise, internal market competence and administrative capacity required to draft detailed legal definitions, harmonize national enforcement practices and monitor circumvention. The creation of new institutional mechanisms, such as the Freeze and Seize Task Force, enhanced cooperation with Eurojust and the appointment of an International Sanctions Envoy, illustrates how the Commission has expanded its operational role without formally encroaching on the Council’s political authority. The thesis therefore rejects both alarmist narratives predicting imminent EU paralysis and overly optimistic claims that the Union has transcended intergovernmentalism. The thesis also highlights the limits of dissent within the EU’s multilevel governance structure. While Hungary and other member states have repeatedly threatened vetoes and delayed sanctions, these actions have rarely altered the overall trajectory of EU policy. Instead, dissent has functioned primarily as leverage to extract exemptions, transitional periods, or other concessions rather than as a genuine attempt to halt collective action. The study finds that when faced with overwhelming political consensus among other member states, dissenting governments are typically compelled to acquiesce whether through negotiated concessions or constructive abstention. Importantly, the thesis distinguishes between political decision-making and legal implementation. Sanction adoption is a two-step process. A political decision under CFSP requiring unanimity, followed by legally binding regulations adopted under EU law, often by qualified majority voting. This structure has allowed the Commission to exert greater influence over the technical design and enforcement of sanctions even as political authority remains intergovernmental. The result is a system in which implementation has become increasingly centralized and Europeanized, while decision-making remains intergovernmental and consensus driven. Overall, the thesis concludes that the EU has partially adapted to geopolitical pressures through informal institutional evolution, raising the question of whether future treaty reform will be necessary to align political decision-making with the Union’s growing ambitions and responsibilities as a global actor.參考文獻 Alan W. 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European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/berlinplus_/berlinplus_en.pdf Zsiros, S. (2025, December 23). The EU wants to end the era of national vetoes – but it's complicated. Euronews. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/12/23/the-eu-wants-to-end-the-era-of-national-vetoes-but-its-complicated 描述 碩士
國立政治大學
國際研究英語碩士學位學程(IMPIS)
112862022資料來源 http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112862022 資料類型 thesis dc.contributor.advisor 蘇卓馨 zh_TW dc.contributor.advisor Su, Cho-Hsin en_US dc.contributor.author (作者) 潘元霆 zh_TW dc.contributor.author (作者) Akos, Pinter en_US dc.creator (作者) 潘元霆 zh_TW dc.creator (作者) Akos, Pinter en_US dc.date (日期) 2026 en_US dc.date.accessioned 2-三月-2026 12:21:33 (UTC+8) - dc.date.available 2-三月-2026 12:21:33 (UTC+8) - dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 2-三月-2026 12:21:33 (UTC+8) - dc.identifier (其他 識別碼) G0112862022 en_US dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/161852 - dc.description (描述) 碩士 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國立政治大學 zh_TW dc.description (描述) 國際研究英語碩士學位學程(IMPIS) zh_TW dc.description (描述) 112862022 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) 本論文透過分析歐盟在2014年克里米亞遭俄羅斯併吞以及2022年俄羅斯對烏克蘭發動全面侵略後所實施的制裁措施，探討歐洲聯盟共同外交與安全政策（Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP）的演變與當代運作方式。在歐洲安全威脅顯著升高、以及對美國領導地位信心下降的背景下，本文聚焦於在《里斯本條約》既有框架之下，歐盟外交政策形成與執行過程所發生的變化。 本研究的核心假設為：儘管CFSP的決策機制在形式上仍然維持政府間主義，並受制於一致同意原則，但歐盟各機構，尤其是歐盟執委會，已在實務上對外交政策的形成與執行方式進行非正式調整，以克服會員國否決、拖延與規避的問題。本文運用多層級治理理論，分析超國家、國家及次國家層級行為者在歐盟對俄制裁的設計、通過與執行過程中如何相互作用。 透過比較2014年以精準、有限為特徵的制裁體系，與2022年後所採取的廣泛、跨部門制裁體系之質性個案研究，本文指出：歐盟外交政策的政治決策核心並未發生根本性改變，一致同意與國家主權仍然主導CFSP。然而，研究同時顯示，這種表面上的制度延續性掩蓋了實務層面上的重大變化。 歐盟制裁的範圍與雄心已出現顯著擴張。2014年的制裁措施主要為高度針對性設計，目的在於表達譴責並促使談判，同時盡量降低對歐盟自身經濟的衝擊。當時歐盟對俄羅斯能源的高度依賴，嚴重限制了政策選項，使制裁必須經過精細校準，以避免系統性風險。相較之下，2022年後歐盟實施了其歷史上最為全面的制裁體系，涵蓋金融市場、運輸、科技、能源與海運服務等領域。這些制裁不僅對俄羅斯造成重大衝擊，也對歐盟自身經濟帶來實質成本，反映出歐盟對威脅的認知已從區域性危機轉變為對歐洲安全的存在性挑戰。 此一轉變顯著提升了歐盟執委會的角色。執委會具備規範制定專業、單一市場權限與行政能力，得以起草精細的法律定義、協調各會員國的執行標準，並監控制裁規避行為。新制度機制的建立，例如「凍結與沒收工作小組」（Freeze and Seize Task Force）、與歐洲司法合作組織（Eurojust）的強化合作，以及國際制裁特使職位的設立，顯示執委會在未正式侵蝕理事會政治權威的情況下，已大幅擴展其操作性角色。因此，本文否定了認為歐盟即將陷入決策癱瘓的悲觀論述，也拒絕了宣稱歐盟已超越政府間主義的過度樂觀觀點。 本文同時指出歐盟多層級治理結構中「反對者」的實際侷限。儘管匈牙利及其他會員國多次威脅行使否決權並拖延制裁決策，這些行為極少真正改變歐盟政策的整體走向。相反地，反對立場多半被用作談判籌碼，以換取豁免條款、過渡期或其他讓步，而非真誠試圖阻止集體行動。研究發現，當面對其他會員國形成的高度政治共識時，持反對立場的政府通常最終仍會透過談判讓步或建設性棄權而被迫接受決定。 尤為重要的是，本文明確區分政治決策與法律執行兩個層面。制裁的通過是一個兩階段過程：首先是在CFSP架構下、需一致同意的政治決定；其次則是依據歐盟法所通過、通常以合格多數決表決的具法律拘束力之規則。此一結構使執委會即使在政治權威仍屬政府間主義的情況下，仍能在制裁的技術設計與執行層面發揮更大影響力。其結果是一種「執行層面日益集中與歐洲化，而決策層面仍維持政府間、共識導向」的制度格局。 總體而言，本文認為歐盟已透過非正式的制度演化，對地緣政治壓力作出部分調適；然而，這也引發了一個關鍵問題：未來是否必須進行條約改革，才能使政治決策機制與歐盟日益增長的全球角色、野心與責任相互契合。 zh_TW dc.description.abstract (摘要) This thesis examines the evolution and contemporary functioning of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) through the lens of EU sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Set against a backdrop of heightened security threats in Europe and declining confidence in US leadership, the thesis addresses the change in the EU foreign policy formulation process and its implementation under the existing Lisbon Treaty framework. The central hypothesis is that, while CFSP decision-making remains formally intergovernmental and constrained by unanimity requirements, EU institutions, most notably the European Commission, have informally adapted foreign policy formulation and implementation practices to overcome member state vetoes, delays and circumventions. Using multilevel governance theory, the thesis analyses how supranational, national and sub-national actors interact in the design, adoption and enforcement of EU sanctions. Through a qualitative case study comparing the targeted sanctions regime of 2014 with the broad, sectorwide sanctions adopted after 2022, the thesis concludes EU’s political decision-making core has not fundamentally changed as unanimity and national sovereignty continue to dominate CFSP. However, the research shows that this formal continuity masks substantial change beneath the surface. The scope and ambition of EU sanctions have expanded dramatically. In 2014, sanctions were narrowly targeted, designed to signal disapproval and incentivize negotiation while minimizing economic disruption within the EU itself. Energy dependence on Russia strongly constrained policy options, and sanctions were carefully calibrated to avoid systemic shocks. By contrast, after 2022 the EU adopted its most extensive sanctions regime in history, encompassing financial markets, transport, technology, energy, and maritime services. These sanctions imposed significant costs not only on Russia but also on EU economies, reflecting a fundamental shift in threat perception from a regional crisis to an existential challenge to European security. This transformation elevated the role of the European Commission, which possesses the regulatory expertise, internal market competence and administrative capacity required to draft detailed legal definitions, harmonize national enforcement practices and monitor circumvention. The creation of new institutional mechanisms, such as the Freeze and Seize Task Force, enhanced cooperation with Eurojust and the appointment of an International Sanctions Envoy, illustrates how the Commission has expanded its operational role without formally encroaching on the Council’s political authority. The thesis therefore rejects both alarmist narratives predicting imminent EU paralysis and overly optimistic claims that the Union has transcended intergovernmentalism. The thesis also highlights the limits of dissent within the EU’s multilevel governance structure. While Hungary and other member states have repeatedly threatened vetoes and delayed sanctions, these actions have rarely altered the overall trajectory of EU policy. Instead, dissent has functioned primarily as leverage to extract exemptions, transitional periods, or other concessions rather than as a genuine attempt to halt collective action. The study finds that when faced with overwhelming political consensus among other member states, dissenting governments are typically compelled to acquiesce whether through negotiated concessions or constructive abstention. Importantly, the thesis distinguishes between political decision-making and legal implementation. Sanction adoption is a two-step process. A political decision under CFSP requiring unanimity, followed by legally binding regulations adopted under EU law, often by qualified majority voting. This structure has allowed the Commission to exert greater influence over the technical design and enforcement of sanctions even as political authority remains intergovernmental. The result is a system in which implementation has become increasingly centralized and Europeanized, while decision-making remains intergovernmental and consensus driven. Overall, the thesis concludes that the EU has partially adapted to geopolitical pressures through informal institutional evolution, raising the question of whether future treaty reform will be necessary to align political decision-making with the Union’s growing ambitions and responsibilities as a global actor. en_US dc.description.tableofcontents Chapter I. Introduction 1 Research motivation 2 Structure of the thesis 3 Research Questions 3 Literature Review 4 Theoretical Framework 6 EU level 6 National level 6 Non-governmental actors 7 Research Methodology 7 Limitations 8 Chapter II. The Common Foreign and Security Policy as defined by the Treaties 10 Historical overview 10 On the Road to the Union 10 Treaty of Maastricht 12 The objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 12 Tools of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 13 Institutional Positions within the Second Pillar 13 Treaty of Amsterdam 14 The establishment of the position of High Representative 15 Lisbon Treaty 16 Defence Policy 17 Legal Identity and Decisions 17 Unanimity and QMV 17 The “double hat” reform 18 The European External Action Service 19 The Role of the Commission and the European Parliament 19 Conclusion 21 Chapter III. Case Study on EU sanctions against the Russian Federation following the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 25 Historical overview 25 The EU foreign policy “toolshed” 26 Military Power 27 Political/Diplomatic 27 Economic sanctions 29 Sanctions of the European Union against the Russian Federation after the Annexation of Crimea 29 Sanctions of the European Union against the Russian Federation after the beginning of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022 34 The sanctions 34 Conclusion 38 Chapter IV. Multi-level governance and the dissident problem 41 Multi-level Governance Framework 41 National level: Hungary 42 Viktor Orbán 42 The Hungarian State 44 Sub-National level: OTP and MOL 46 International level: The EU 47 Chapter V. Conclusion 56 Bibliography 60 zh_TW dc.format.extent 1027738 bytes - dc.format.mimetype application/pdf - dc.source.uri (資料來源) http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112862022 en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) 歐洲聯盟 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 共同外交與安全政策 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 歐盟制裁 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 多層級治理 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 政府間主義 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) 超國家主義 zh_TW dc.subject (關鍵詞) European Union en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Common Foreign and Security Policy en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) EU Sanctions en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Multilevel Governance en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Intergovernmentalism en_US dc.subject (關鍵詞) Supranationalism en_US dc.title (題名) 歐盟外交政策制定程序的變化：克里米亞危機期間及 2022 年俄烏戰爭後歐盟對俄制裁之比較研究 zh_TW dc.title (題名) The Change in the EU Foreign Policy Formulation Process : A Comparative Analysis of Sanctions on Russia During the Crimean Crisis and the 2022 Invasion en_US dc.type (資料類型) thesis en_US dc.relation.reference (參考文獻) Alan W. 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