| dc.contributor | 國貿系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 楊光華 | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2016-11 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 7-Apr-2026 13:28:48 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 7-Apr-2026 13:28:48 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 7-Apr-2026 13:28:48 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=181954 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 反傾銷協定中規定傾銷差額的計算方法有三：通常是比較「正常價值之加權平均」與「可資比 較之出口價格的加權平均」，或比較「逐筆交易之正常價值」與「可資比較之逐筆交易的出口價格」； 惟另外時亦可採取比較「正常價值之加權平均」與「可資比較之逐筆交易的出口價格」的方法以處 理無法用前述兩比較方法所考量到之出口價格呈現因不同的買主、地區或期間而有顯著差異的模 式。反傾銷協定儘管明文上述三種比較法之使用，但對於在各比較法中得否採用「歸零法則」—— 即將比較之後高於正常價值的負傾銷差額歸零，不得用以抵銷正的傾銷差額的作法，卻隻字未提。
經過一連串極具爭議性有關「歸零法則」的案件，世貿組織上訴機構已確立無論是在調查階段、 或是複查階段（含定期行政複查、落曰複查及新出口商複查），也無論是採取加權平均比較或逐筆交 易比較，均不得使用歸零法則。眼看未被烏拉圭回合談判明文禁止的歸零法則，就要因為世貿組織 近來司法權獨大的畸型發展而壽終正寢；然而近來美國國内反傾銷案件進行集中傾銷調查比例之增 加，卻讓幾乎要消聲匿跡的歸零法則重新獲得舞台，因為集中傾銷得使用之「加權平均對逐筆交易」 比較法，是否不得採用歸零法則仍在未定之天。不過這個歸零法則的最後碉堡，隨著「美國一洗衣 機（韓國）」、「美國一反傾銷方法論（中國）」兩案爭端小組的成立也進入了烽火狀態。
以上述案件之裁決為基礎，本研究旨在問答下列問題：到底美國以統計方法為基礎所確認之集 中傾銷是否符合反傾銷協第2.4.2條第2句所規定之要件？ 一旦認定集中傾銷，得否對案件中非屬於 集中傾銷的交易亦採用「加權平均對逐筆交易比較」？最後，當然也是最為核心的問題，採用上述 例外比較法時，是否得採用「歸零法則」？同時本研究也探討反傾銷案件於世貿組織爭訟後之履行 問題。觀察美國對於「歸零法則」系列案件裁決之履行，不難理解為何僅是朝以後履行的方式無法 真正地解決反傾銷類的爭端，因為反傾銷稅的課徵均是持續多年。除此之外，由於裁決機構不可能 對於判定集中傾銷的方法給予操作型的建議，上述有關集中傾銷的案件裁決，其履行是否符合原裁 決建議，無可避免地會再度成為爭議，而履行審查的訟爭將進一步延宕爭端終局解決的時間。這場 「歸零法則」的最後爭戰無疑地會非常漫長！ | |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The WTO Antidumping Agreement provided three different comparison methods to determine dumping margin. Normally, weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction comparison should be applied while exceptionally weighted average-to-transaction comparison may be applied if there is a pattern of export prices which differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods and such difference cannot be taken into account appropriately by the former two comparison methods. Although the Agreement explicitly provides for the three aforementioned comparison methods, it does not have any word on whether any of the three comparisons can use “zeroing”，which is a method of disregarding negative margin, i.e., the price over normal value, or not dumped part, and offering no offset of the dumped part.
Through a series of controversial “Zeroing” cases, it has been well settled by the WTO Appellate Body that no zeroing is allowed regardless of which stage is at: the stage of original investigation, or administrative reviews (including periodic review, sunset review and new shipper review), and also regardless of which of the two comparison methods is applied: weighted average-to-weighted average or transaction-to-transaction. It seems that “zeroing,” which was not ruled out in the Uruguay Round negotiations, has been dying along with the institutionally defective growth of judicial power in the WTO system. The recent increase of the targeted dumping investigations among the US’ domestic antidumping cases however, has given the almost gone “zeroing” a new arena because average-to-transaction comparison is allowed in targeted dumping investigations and it is unsettled whether such comparison method can apply zeroing. This last fortress for “zeroing”, nevertheless, is also under fire lately after the panels were composed for both the cases of US-Washing Machine (Korea) and US-A”tidumping Methodologies (China).
Based on the rulings of the above cases, the study is aimed to answer the following questions. Does the targeted dumping identified by the U.S. statistical-oriented approach meet the requirements set forth in the provision of the second sentence of Article 2.4.2 of the Antidumping Agreement? Is it allowed to apply weighted-average-to-transaction even to non-targeted dumping sales once targeted dumping is found? Last, but also the most important question is whether zeroing is allowed when the exceptional comparison method is applied in targeted dumping. Moreover, the study also explores the compliance issues in antidumping type of dispute settlement. If we follow closely the way how the U.S. implemented the rulings of the series of zeroing cases, it is not difficult to understand why the perspective implementation approach cannot really solve the problem of an antidumping dispute because the levy of anti-dumping duties lasts many years. In addition, it is impossible for the adjudicating body to provide operational guidance on how to identify targeted dumping. Therefore the compliance of the rulings of the aforementioned targeted dumping cases will inevitably become subject to disputes again, and such dispute will further delay the final compliance. No doubt, this last battle for zeroing will be a very long one! | |
| dc.format.extent | 116 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 科技部, MOST104-2410-H004-066, 104.08-105.07 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 集中傾銷（目標傾銷）; 歸零法則; 傾銷差額; 反傾銷協定; 公平比較 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Targeted dumping; Zeroing; Dumping margin; Antidumping Agreement; Fair comparison | |
| dc.title (題名) | 「歸零法則」之終戰場—集中傾銷之WTO爭端案例研究 | |
| dc.title (題名) | The Last Battleground for Zeroing: a Case Study of WTO Disputes Involving Targeted Dumping | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | report | |
