| dc.contributor | 國貿系 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | 潘振宇 | - |
| dc.creator (作者) | Konishi, Hideo;Pan, Chen-Yu;Simeonov, Dimitar | - |
| dc.date (日期) | 2026-06 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 7-May-2026 10:20:17 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 7-May-2026 10:20:17 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 7-May-2026 10:20:17 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=182319 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | We examine a team contest in which players exert effort to compete against other teams for a prize, which is then divided among the members of the winning team according to a specified sharing rule. Assuming that players vary in their observable abilities to contribute to team performance, we study the structure of stable teams under different sharing rules. A head-hunting attempt is successful if the targeted player benefits from switching teams and the offering team’s probability of winning increases as a result. A team structure is defined as stable when no such successful head-hunting opportunities exist. We show that when all teams adopt an egalitarian prize-sharing rule, complete ability sorting arises, resulting in the greatest inter-team inequality. In contrast, when teams use substantially unequal sharing rules, the stable team structure features lower inter-team inequality but greater intra-team inequality. These results reveal a trade-off between intra-team and inter-team inequality in the formation of stable teams. | - |
| dc.format.extent | 120 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Social Choice and Welfare, pp.1-34 | - |
| dc.title (題名) | Formation of teams in contests: tradeoffs between inter- and intra-team inequalities | - |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | - |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1007/s00355-026-01663-9 | - |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-026-01663-9 | - |
