| dc.contributor | 會計系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 俞洪昭 | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2017-12 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 13-May-2026 16:24:03 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 13-May-2026 16:24:03 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 13-May-2026 16:24:03 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=182523 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 財務報表重編為近年來審計研究之重要議題，其原因係由於重編代表管理當局公開承認其過去所發佈之財務報表存在錯誤，必須更正。因此，學術界多以財務報表重編來衡量公司之財報品質。最近的文獻探討當公司重編財務報表之後，該採取何種行動方能挽回投資大眾對公司財務報表之信心。研究發現重編公司可能採取之行動包括：更換會計師、更換CEO 或減少CEO 之權益報酬、更換審計委員會成員以及更換董事會之獨立董事。本研究認為上述之行動在實務上均有其侷限性，且效果可能有限，因此本研究試圖測試公司是否可透過減少審計委員會權益報酬之方式，讓市場相信審計委員會成員之獨立性提高，進而提升重編後盈餘之資訊內涵。本研究試圖測試以下三個研究問題，第一：權益誘因是否會傷害審計委員會之獨立性，造成公司財務報表重編的可能；第二：當公司發生重編後，是否會透過減少審計委員會權益報酬比重，來提升審計委員會之獨立性。第三：市場是否認為減少審計委員會權益報酬比重可以增進審計委員會監督之效率，進而恢復對公司盈餘品質之信心。本研究之主要貢獻有三，第一，本研究試圖以delta 與vega 來衡量權益報酬對審計委員會之誘因，測試delta 與vega 是否與公司財務報表重編發生之可能性具正向關係。第二，由於主管機關並未規範公司應如何決定審計委員會成員之薪酬，然而，權益報酬可能會使得審計委員會成員之財富受到公司績效之影響，導致其獨立性下降，進而造成財務報表容易發生錯誤。本研究之實證結果可提供審計委員會之監督有效性會受其薪酬影響之證據，主管機關可據以訂定規範。最後，除了過去文獻的發現之外，本研究證實減少審計委會權益報酬可能為公司發生財務報表重編之後，有效提升市場信心的途徑。 | |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Restatements have received much attention because restatements by themselves represent an acknowledgement that companies’ financial statements are not in accordance with GAAP. More recent studies turn attention to actions restating companies take to respond to the credibility impairment of their financial statements. These actions include changing CEO/CFO, reducing CEOs’ option compensation, dismissing auditors, and discharging outside directors. Because these actions may practically infeasible to many restating firms, I test whether restating companies reduce equity-based compensation paid to their audit committees with an aim to improve audit committee independence, therefore increasing the information content of post-restatement earnings. I will test three research questions in sequence to prove the existence of this new action. The first research question tests whether equity-based compensation threatens audit committee independence, resulting in higher likelihood of restatements. The second research question examines whether restating companies react to restatements by reducing the portions of equity-based compensation to enhance audit committee independence. The final research question tests whether the information content of restating firms’ earnings improves after they reduce the portion of audit committees’ equity-based compensation. My study contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, using equity’s delta and vega, I provide first-step understanding of the association between audit committees’ equity incentives and their oversight effectiveness. Second, even though all audit committee members are mandated to be fully independent when they are newly appointed, they may become less independent as they receive equity-based compensation during their tenure. Therefore, my study bears policy implication as to how audit committees should be compensated to ensure their effectiveness over time. Finally, I show that restating firms successfully restore the public confidence of their financial reporting by reducing the portions of equity-based compensation, resulting in improved information content of earnings after restatement. | |
| dc.format.extent | 116 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 科技部, MOST105-2410-H004-089, 105.08-106.07 | |
| dc.title (題名) | 減少審計委員會權益報酬是否可以增加重編公司盈餘之資訊內涵 | |
| dc.title (題名) | Can Reducing Audit Committee＇s Equity-Based Compensation Improve the Information Content of Earnings Following Restatements? | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | report | |
