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題名 審計委員會在董事會之地位對會計師重要嗎？
Does Audit Committee Status Matter to the Auditors?
作者 俞洪昭
貢獻者 會計系
關鍵詞 審計委員會; 會計異常; 審計品質; 多重董事權; 地位
Audit committee; Accounting irregularities; Audit quality; Multiple directorship; Status
日期 2019-11
上傳時間 13-May-2026 16:24:06 (UTC+8)
摘要 雖然過去的研究發現有效的審計委員會 (以下簡稱 AC) 有助於提升會計師的審計品質，最近的研究試圖探討並未被法令規範、但可能傷害 AC 有效性之因素。Badolato et al. (2014) 發現只有當 AC在董事會之地位夠高時，其財務專長方能提高盈餘品質。本研究探討兩個與 AC 地位如何影響審計品質之問題：第一，會計師是否對 AC 地位有所反應？此問題之重要性在於，如果低地位真會傷害 AC 之有效性，會計師應將其納入審計風險之評估中。如果低地位之 AC 無法有效監督公司，而會計師又與其討論關鍵查核事項，則新式查核報告將流於形式，無法真正提高審計品質。第二，因為 AC 地位通常係透過多重董事權之數目加以衡量，高地位意味著有較大之多重董事權。過去文獻發現，具有多重董事權之董事通常會傾向對較大或獲利能力較高之公司付出較多努力，以獲得較高之聲譽。此發現對於會計師之重要性在於：就算 AC 之地位較高，該 AC 並不一定會對公司付出與會計師之預期相符的努力。因此，本研究進一步探討 AC 地位較高之公司，其盈餘品質是否會因為 AC 付出較少之努力而下降。為了回答上述第一個問題，本研究採用多重董事權數目建立兩個 AC 地位之指標變數，以探討會計師是否會因 AC 之地位較低，而收取較高的審計公費、投入更多的查核努力、發出較多之修正式查核意見以及撤銷審計合約。為了回答上述第二個問題，本研究根據過去文獻，以公司之市場價值來捕捉多重董事權對董事之重要性，接著將此重要性指標與 AC 地位指標相交乘，探討該交乘項是否影響公司之績效調整裁決性應計、會計異常與財務報表重編。本研究之貢獻有三：第一，雖然 Badolato et al. (2014) 從需求面發現 AC 地位之重要性，該地位之高低對於會計師之影響目前並無任何證據。由於美國沙氏法改變了會計師的管制與法律責任環境，吾人有必要瞭解供給面的會計師是如何因應 AC 地位之高低。第二，雖然過去的研究發現股東及董事會會究責無效的 AC，但並未探討會計師如何因應無效的 AC。本研究探討會計師是否會將AC 地位視為潛在審計風險之來源，並加以因應。如果會計師無法認知到地位會傷害 AC 之有效性，審計品質將會下降。最後，瞭解會計師如何因應 AC 地位對於市場參與者來說非常重要，因為會計師在查核過程中與 AC 之互動，是影響財報品質的要素。
While prior research shows that effective audit committees (ACs) improve audit quality, recent studies explore factors that are not considered by SOX but may harm AC effectiveness. Badolato et al. (2014) empirically show that ACs' financial expertise is associated with higher earnings quality only when ACs have high status on the boards. This study examines two important questions related to the association between AC status and audit quality. First, there is a lack of research on how the auditors react to AC status. This issue is important because, if low status really harms AC effectiveness, it should be considered in auditors' risk assessments. If low-status ACs cannot effectively monitor firms and the auditors discuss key audit matters with ACs without knowing that these ACs only have low status, the efficacy of the new extended audit report will decrease. Second, since ACs' status is measured by the number of multiple directorship (MD), higher status implies larger MDs. Prior literature shows that directors tend to put more effort on larger and profitable firms to gain better reputation. This finding is important to the auditors because, even though an AC has high status, it may not be as effective as the auditors expect if this AC only allocates less effort to oversee the firm. Therefore, this study further explores whether earnings quality is lower for firms whose ACs have high status but devote less effort to monitoring firms' financial reporting. To address the first question, I use the numbers of MDs to create two AC status indicator variables. I then test whether auditors are more likely to charge higher audit fees, exert more audit effort, issue modified audit opinion, and/or resign when their clients have low-status ACs. To examine the second question, I follow prior studies and use firms' market capitalization to capture directorship importance (DI). I then relate a variable interacting this DI measure and AC status indicators to three proxies for firms' earnings quality: absolute values of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, accounting irregularities, and restatements.My study makes three contributions to the literature. First, while Badolato et al.'s (2014) findings may be valid from the demand-side perspective, the effects of AC status on the auditors is not well understood. Because SOX has changed the regulatory and legal environment facing the auditors, it is important to know how the supply-side auditors react to AC status. Second, while prior studies find that shareholders and boards hold ACs accountable for ineffectiveness, there is no empirical evidence regarding how the auditors react to ineffective ACs. This study examines whether the auditors consider AC status as a source of potential audit risk and take actions to protect themselves. If the auditors are unable to recognize that AC status impairs AC effectiveness, this inability may harm audit quality. Finally, understanding how auditors react to ACs' status is of interest to market participants because the interactions between the auditors and ACs during the audits affects the quality of financial statements.
關聯 科技部, MOST107-2410-H004-035, 107.08-108.07
資料類型 report
dc.contributor 會計系
dc.creator (作者) 俞洪昭
dc.date (日期) 2019-11
dc.date.accessioned 13-May-2026 16:24:06 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 13-May-2026 16:24:06 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 13-May-2026 16:24:06 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=182525-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) 雖然過去的研究發現有效的審計委員會 (以下簡稱 AC) 有助於提升會計師的審計品質，最近的研究試圖探討並未被法令規範、但可能傷害 AC 有效性之因素。Badolato et al. (2014) 發現只有當 AC在董事會之地位夠高時，其財務專長方能提高盈餘品質。本研究探討兩個與 AC 地位如何影響審計品質之問題：第一，會計師是否對 AC 地位有所反應？此問題之重要性在於，如果低地位真會傷害 AC 之有效性，會計師應將其納入審計風險之評估中。如果低地位之 AC 無法有效監督公司，而會計師又與其討論關鍵查核事項，則新式查核報告將流於形式，無法真正提高審計品質。第二，因為 AC 地位通常係透過多重董事權之數目加以衡量，高地位意味著有較大之多重董事權。過去文獻發現，具有多重董事權之董事通常會傾向對較大或獲利能力較高之公司付出較多努力，以獲得較高之聲譽。此發現對於會計師之重要性在於：就算 AC 之地位較高，該 AC 並不一定會對公司付出與會計師之預期相符的努力。因此，本研究進一步探討 AC 地位較高之公司，其盈餘品質是否會因為 AC 付出較少之努力而下降。為了回答上述第一個問題，本研究採用多重董事權數目建立兩個 AC 地位之指標變數，以探討會計師是否會因 AC 之地位較低，而收取較高的審計公費、投入更多的查核努力、發出較多之修正式查核意見以及撤銷審計合約。為了回答上述第二個問題，本研究根據過去文獻，以公司之市場價值來捕捉多重董事權對董事之重要性，接著將此重要性指標與 AC 地位指標相交乘，探討該交乘項是否影響公司之績效調整裁決性應計、會計異常與財務報表重編。本研究之貢獻有三：第一，雖然 Badolato et al. (2014) 從需求面發現 AC 地位之重要性，該地位之高低對於會計師之影響目前並無任何證據。由於美國沙氏法改變了會計師的管制與法律責任環境，吾人有必要瞭解供給面的會計師是如何因應 AC 地位之高低。第二，雖然過去的研究發現股東及董事會會究責無效的 AC，但並未探討會計師如何因應無效的 AC。本研究探討會計師是否會將AC 地位視為潛在審計風險之來源，並加以因應。如果會計師無法認知到地位會傷害 AC 之有效性，審計品質將會下降。最後，瞭解會計師如何因應 AC 地位對於市場參與者來說非常重要，因為會計師在查核過程中與 AC 之互動，是影響財報品質的要素。
dc.description.abstract (摘要) While prior research shows that effective audit committees (ACs) improve audit quality, recent studies explore factors that are not considered by SOX but may harm AC effectiveness. Badolato et al. (2014) empirically show that ACs' financial expertise is associated with higher earnings quality only when ACs have high status on the boards. This study examines two important questions related to the association between AC status and audit quality. First, there is a lack of research on how the auditors react to AC status. This issue is important because, if low status really harms AC effectiveness, it should be considered in auditors' risk assessments. If low-status ACs cannot effectively monitor firms and the auditors discuss key audit matters with ACs without knowing that these ACs only have low status, the efficacy of the new extended audit report will decrease. Second, since ACs' status is measured by the number of multiple directorship (MD), higher status implies larger MDs. Prior literature shows that directors tend to put more effort on larger and profitable firms to gain better reputation. This finding is important to the auditors because, even though an AC has high status, it may not be as effective as the auditors expect if this AC only allocates less effort to oversee the firm. Therefore, this study further explores whether earnings quality is lower for firms whose ACs have high status but devote less effort to monitoring firms' financial reporting. To address the first question, I use the numbers of MDs to create two AC status indicator variables. I then test whether auditors are more likely to charge higher audit fees, exert more audit effort, issue modified audit opinion, and/or resign when their clients have low-status ACs. To examine the second question, I follow prior studies and use firms' market capitalization to capture directorship importance (DI). I then relate a variable interacting this DI measure and AC status indicators to three proxies for firms' earnings quality: absolute values of performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, accounting irregularities, and restatements.My study makes three contributions to the literature. First, while Badolato et al.'s (2014) findings may be valid from the demand-side perspective, the effects of AC status on the auditors is not well understood. Because SOX has changed the regulatory and legal environment facing the auditors, it is important to know how the supply-side auditors react to AC status. Second, while prior studies find that shareholders and boards hold ACs accountable for ineffectiveness, there is no empirical evidence regarding how the auditors react to ineffective ACs. This study examines whether the auditors consider AC status as a source of potential audit risk and take actions to protect themselves. If the auditors are unable to recognize that AC status impairs AC effectiveness, this inability may harm audit quality. Finally, understanding how auditors react to ACs' status is of interest to market participants because the interactions between the auditors and ACs during the audits affects the quality of financial statements.
dc.format.extent 116 bytes-
dc.format.mimetype text/html-
dc.relation (關聯) 科技部, MOST107-2410-H004-035, 107.08-108.07
dc.subject (關鍵詞) 審計委員會; 會計異常; 審計品質; 多重董事權; 地位
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Audit committee; Accounting irregularities; Audit quality; Multiple directorship; Status
dc.title (題名) 審計委員會在董事會之地位對會計師重要嗎？
dc.title (題名) Does Audit Committee Status Matter to the Auditors?
dc.type (資料類型) report