| dc.contributor | 會計系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 金成隆;陳美惠 | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2021-11 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 13-May-2026 16:24:50 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 13-May-2026 16:24:50 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 13-May-2026 16:24:50 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=182554 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 本計畫為二年期計畫，第一年擬探討”關係”基礎的政治權力（以下簡稱QUPPP），地方政治關聯與中國政府補貼之間的關聯性。 本計畫QUPPP的衡量方法為: 在公司總部所在省份出生或工作的中央官員的數量。在中國，補貼分兩個階段進行;即，中央政府首先向各省分配補貼，然後省或地方官員被充分授權進一步將中央政府分配而來的補貼，分配給轄區內的公司。根據政治家的區域偏袒主義的論點，本計畫預測: (1)擁有較多QUPPP的公司比擁有較少QUPPP的公司，會獲得更多的政府補貼; (2)擁有當地政治關係的公司，也會比沒有這種聯繫的公司獲得更多的補貼； (3)當企業位於具有較高的QUPPP省份，並且具有當地政治關係時，它們將獲得最大的補貼福利。最後，本計畫預期上述預測主要是基於非稅收的補貼，而不是基於稅收的補貼。
本計畫第二年主要是從市場參與者的角度，探討”關係”基礎的政治權力(簡稱QUPPP)（以及因為”關係”基礎的政治權力”而收受的補貼, 簡稱”因為QUPPP而收受的補貼”），對於市場參與者的影響。市場參與者包括財務分析師與債權人。本計畫預測分析師的股票推薦與” QUPPP（或因為” QUPPP而收受的補貼）之間存在關聯。 具體而言，本計畫預期: (1)分析師對於擁有較高QUPPP的公司（或因擁有較高QUPPP而獲得較多補貼的公司），比對QUPPP較低的公司（或因擁有較低QUPPP而獲得較低補貼的公司），會發布更佳的股票建議; (2) 公司如果同時(a)擁有較高的QUPPP，且(b)具有”當地”的政治關係時，會獲得最佳的分析師推薦；本計畫進一步探討上述預測是否主要由稅收或非稅收補貼所產生。本計畫也從銀行角度探討QUPPP的影響；本計畫預期: (1)銀行對於擁有較高QUPPP的公司（或因擁有較高QUPPP而獲得較多補貼的公司），會提供較優惠的貸款條件（包括價格和非價格條款）; (2)公司如果同時(a)擁有較高的QUPPP，且(b)具有”當地”的政治關係時，銀行會提供更有利的貸款條件。 | |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The objective of my first-year project is to examine the association between quanxi-based proximity to political power (hereafter QUPPP), local political connections, and government subsidies in China setting. The QUPPP is measured by the number of central officers who were born or worked in provinces where the firm’s headquarter is located. In China, subsidies are granted in two phases; i.e., central government first distributes subsidies to provinces, and then provincial or local officials are delegated to further offer subsidies granted from central government to firms in their jurisdiction. First, based on the argument of the politicians’ regional favoritism, I predict that firms with more QUPPP receive more government subsidies than their counterpart with less QUPPP. Second, I predict that firms with local political connections also receive greater subsidies than their counterpart without such connections. Third, I further predict that firms receive the greatest subsidy benefits both when they are located in high-QUPPP provinces and have local political connections. I conjecture that the above predictions are driven mainly by non-tax based subsidies, rather than by tax-based subsidies.
The objective of my second-year project is to explore the economic consequences of quanxi-based proximity to political power (hereafter QUPPP) (or subsidies due to QUPPP) from the viewpoints of investors and creditors, respectively. First, I predict that there is association between analysts’ recommendation and QUPPP (or subsidies due to QUPPP); specifically, analysts make more favorable stock recommendation for firms with high QUPPP (or high subsidies due to high QUPPP) than for those with low QUPPP.(or low subsidies due to low QUPPP) Second, I predict that firms receive the most favorable both when they are located in provinces with higher QUPPP and when they have local political connections. I further examine whether the above predictions are driven mainly by tax-based or non-tax based subsidies. Third, I predict that banks impose more favorable loan terms (price and non-price terms) for firms with high QUPPP than for those with low QUPPP. Finally, I further predict that banks impose the most favorable loan terms both when firms are located in high QUPPP and have local political connections. | |
| dc.format.extent | 116 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 科技部, MOST108-2410-H004-062-MY2, 108.08-110.07 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | ”關係”基礎的政治權力; 補貼; 地方政治關係; 分析師; 銀行; 貸款條款(價格/非價格條款) | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | “guanxi”-based political geography; subsidies; local political connections; analyst; loan terms (price and non-price terms) | |
| dc.title (題名) | ”關係”基礎的政治權力、政府補貼與經濟後果：來自中國的證據 | |
| dc.title (題名) | Quanxi-Based Proximity to Political Power, Government Subsidies and Economic Consequence: Evidence from China | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | report | |
