| dc.contributor | 會計系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 梁嘉紋;金成隆 | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2017-10 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 14-May-2026 15:26:17 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 14-May-2026 15:26:17 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 14-May-2026 15:26:17 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=182574 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | 企業合作聯盟有助於組織達成其可能無法獨立達成之目標，並替企業來有形及無形的 新資源，許多大企業有不少比例的收入及利潤即來自企業間的合作聯盟，例如：合資 企業及策略聯盟。過去文獻多是探討企業採取合資企業及策略聯盟之動機及其為企業 帶來的好處，或是探討企業間合作聯盟之效果，但較少有研究探討企業間合作聯盟形 成是否會影響高階經理人之薪酬，以及在企業合作聯盟期間經理人的薪酬契約如何設 計。此兩年期之計畫旨在探討有關企業間合作聯盟的薪酬合約設計之相關議題，計畫 第一年著重於探討企業合作聯盟於形成階段的高階經理人薪酬，意即企業是否提供高 階經理人誘因去組成合資企業或策略聯盟，以及這樣的額外薪酬溢價是否受到管理能 力的影響，計畫第二年則探討在與其他企業合作聯盟期間之薪酬契約設計，主要探討 當企業有策略聯盟時，薪酬委員會是否考慮管理者利益轉移之潛在風險，以及合約之 設計是否提供高階經理人與聯盟企業合作之誘因。相信透過此兩年期計畫可更完整地 了解企業合作聯盟及高階經理人薪酬之關聯性，研究結果將具管理意涵，並對企業合 作聯盟的文獻與經理人薪酬契約的文獻有更進一步的貢獻。 | |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Corporate alliances help organizations to achieve goals they could not attain on their own and bring new resources to the partners in the form of tangible or intangible assets. Many leading corporations derive a significant share of their revenues and/or profit from inter-firm cooperative alliances such as joint ventures and strategic alliances. An extant of literature examines the motivations for joint ventures and strategic alliances and documents the performance consequences of such inter-firm alliances. However, how compensation contracts are designed to evaluate CEO efforts in forming inter-firm alliances and how these contracts are designed during the duration of such inter-firm alliances have been less studied in the literature. This two-year project aims to examine the compensation contract design issues related to the inter-firm alliances. The first-year project of this research focuses on CEO compensation for the formation of inter-firm alliances and examines whether firms provide CEOs incentives to form joint ventures and/or strategic alliances and to what extent managerial ability affects CEO compensation related to forming corporate alliances. The second year of the project then investigates the compensation contract design issues during the duration of inter-firm alliances with other firms (i.e. post-formation period). Specifically, I examine whether compensation committees consider the potential risk of managerial diversion when firms have strategic alliances and whether contract design provides CEO incentives to cooperate with the alliance firms. I believe that this two-year project will enhance our understanding about corporate alliances by examining the dynamic setting of corporate alliances and CEO incentives. | |
| dc.format.extent | 116 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 科技部, MOST103-2410-H004-033-MY2, 103.08-105.07 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | 企業合作聯盟; 高階經理人薪酬; 管理能力; 企業複雜度; 管理者利益移轉 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Corporate alliances; executive compensation; managerial ability; business complexity; managerial diversion | |
| dc.title (題名) | 企業合作聯盟與高階經理人薪酬之研究 | |
| dc.title (題名) | Corporate Alliances and Executive Compensation | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | report | |
