| dc.contributor | 財管系 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | 周冠男 | |
| dc.creator (作者) | Lee, Yun-Chi;Chou, Robin K. | |
| dc.date (日期) | 2026-06 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 25-Jun-2026 10:53:11 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 25-Jun-2026 10:53:11 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 25-Jun-2026 10:53:11 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=183107 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | This study examines the influence of corporate venture capital (CVC) participation on CEO compensation convexity, measured by vega, in VC-backed IPO firms. Our analysis shows that CEOs in CVC-backed IPOs exhibit higher vega than those financed solely by independent venture capitalists (IVCs). This pattern, however, gradually wanes in the years following the IPO. In addition, the positive association between CVC involvement and vega is more evident among firms with lower risk exposure, firms led by more risk-averse CEOs, and firms with greater growth opportunities. Overall, the results suggest that CEO compensation structures in CVC-backed IPOs are more closely aligned with shareholder interests through managerial risk-taking incentives, and that this relation varies with both firm- and CEO-level conditions. | |
| dc.format.extent | 106 bytes | - |
| dc.format.mimetype | text/html | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, article:102180 | |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Managerial compensation; Risk-taking incentives; Corporate venture capital; Initial public offerings | |
| dc.title (題名) | Corporate Venture Capital and CEO Risk Incentives: Evidence from Venture Capital-Backed Initial Public Offerings | |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.1016/j.qref.2026.102180 | |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.qref.2026.102180 | |
