| dc.creator (作者) | 徐麗振;宋玉生 | zh_TW |
| dc.creator (作者) | Hsu, Li-Chen ; Sung, Yusen | - |
| dc.date (日期) | 2002-06 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 6-Jan-2009 15:16:59 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 6-Jan-2009 15:16:59 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 6-Jan-2009 15:16:59 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/item?item_id=23174 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | Electorate sizes of 20, 40, and 70 subjects are used to test the paradox of voter turnout.\r\nPayoff schemes are designed to induce subjects to vote instrumentally. Our experimental\r\nevidence indicates that subjects do vote instrumentally, but instrumental voting may not fully\r\nexplain voter turnouts in some real elections. In addition, theoretical studies associated with\r\ninstrumental voting, e.g., the expected utility maximization model, the minimax regret model, and\r\ngame-theoretic models cannot successfully explain the resulting voter turnouts. Our\r\nexperimental evidence also shows that subjects are more willing to vote when the problem is\r\nframed as they will lose something if they make wrong decisions rather than they will gain\r\nsomething if they make right decisions, but only in relatively small sizes of electorates. This\r\nsuggests that as the subject perceives himself to be less pivotal, the asymmetric incentive\r\nattributable to framing provides less influence on his voting decisions. | - |
| dc.format | application/ | en_US |
| dc.language | en | en_US |
| dc.language | en-US | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | 經濟論文叢刊,30(2),247-272 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Decision Framing; Experiments; Instrumental Theory of Voter Turnout | - |
| dc.title (題名) | Experimental Evidence on Voting Rationality and Decision Framing | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
| dc.identifier.doi (DOI) | 10.6277/ter.2002.302.5 | en_US |
| dc.doi.uri (DOI) | http://dx.doi.org/10.6277/ter.2002.302.5 | en_US |
