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題名 Experimental Evidence on Voting Rationality and Decision Framing
作者 徐麗振;宋玉生
Hsu, Li-Chen ; Sung, Yusen
關鍵詞 Decision Framing; Experiments; Instrumental Theory of Voter Turnout
日期 2002-06
上傳時間 6-Jan-2009 15:16:59 (UTC+8)
摘要 Electorate sizes of 20, 40, and 70 subjects are used to test the paradox of voter turnout.
     Payoff schemes are designed to induce subjects to vote instrumentally. Our experimental
     evidence indicates that subjects do vote instrumentally, but instrumental voting may not fully
     explain voter turnouts in some real elections. In addition, theoretical studies associated with
     instrumental voting, e.g., the expected utility maximization model, the minimax regret model, and
     game-theoretic models cannot successfully explain the resulting voter turnouts. Our
     experimental evidence also shows that subjects are more willing to vote when the problem is
     framed as they will lose something if they make wrong decisions rather than they will gain
     something if they make right decisions, but only in relatively small sizes of electorates. This
     suggests that as the subject perceives himself to be less pivotal, the asymmetric incentive
     attributable to framing provides less influence on his voting decisions.
關聯 經濟論文叢刊,30(2),247-272
資料類型 article
DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.6277/ter.2002.302.5
dc.creator (作者) 徐麗振;宋玉生zh_TW
dc.creator (作者) Hsu, Li-Chen ; Sung, Yusen-
dc.date (日期) 2002-06en_US
dc.date.accessioned 6-Jan-2009 15:16:59 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.available 6-Jan-2009 15:16:59 (UTC+8)-
dc.date.issued (上傳時間) 6-Jan-2009 15:16:59 (UTC+8)-
dc.identifier.uri (URI) https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/22244-
dc.description.abstract (摘要) Electorate sizes of 20, 40, and 70 subjects are used to test the paradox of voter turnout.
     Payoff schemes are designed to induce subjects to vote instrumentally. Our experimental
     evidence indicates that subjects do vote instrumentally, but instrumental voting may not fully
     explain voter turnouts in some real elections. In addition, theoretical studies associated with
     instrumental voting, e.g., the expected utility maximization model, the minimax regret model, and
     game-theoretic models cannot successfully explain the resulting voter turnouts. Our
     experimental evidence also shows that subjects are more willing to vote when the problem is
     framed as they will lose something if they make wrong decisions rather than they will gain
     something if they make right decisions, but only in relatively small sizes of electorates. This
     suggests that as the subject perceives himself to be less pivotal, the asymmetric incentive
     attributable to framing provides less influence on his voting decisions.
-
dc.format application/en_US
dc.language enen_US
dc.language en-USen_US
dc.language.iso en_US-
dc.relation (關聯) 經濟論文叢刊,30(2),247-272en_US
dc.subject (關鍵詞) Decision Framing; Experiments; Instrumental Theory of Voter Turnout-
dc.title (題名) Experimental Evidence on Voting Rationality and Decision Framingen_US
dc.type (資料類型) articleen
dc.identifier.doi (DOI) 10.6277/ter.2002.302.5en_US
dc.doi.uri (DOI) http://dx.doi.org/10.6277/ter.2002.302.5en_US