| dc.creator (作者) | 林忠正 | zh_TW |
| dc.date (日期) | 2004-05 | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 6-Jan-2009 15:23:06 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.available | 6-Jan-2009 15:23:06 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.date.issued (上傳時間) | 6-Jan-2009 15:23:06 (UTC+8) | - |
| dc.identifier.uri (URI) | https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/22314 | - |
| dc.description.abstract (摘要) | The most serious theoretical difficulty regarding shirking-type efficiency wage models is that the introduction of the so-called bonding scheme eliminates involuntary unemployment. This paper develops a shirking-adverse selection model where the resulting key feature is that labor quality within an individual firm negatively depends on the average amount of bonds in the market. Under this situation, a larger bond required by an individual firm will lower the firm`s labor quality and will discourage it from bonding its employees to the limit. This adverse selection problem gives rise to the possibility that bonding cannot eventually eliminate involuntary unemployment. Moreover, a larger bond required by a firm also worsens the labor quality within all other firms (negative externalities). The presence of these negative externalities implies that the profit-maximizing size of bonds required by individual firms in the market may be too large from the viewpoint of social welfare. This opens a possible role for bonding legislation to achieve an equilibrium Pareto superior to the competitive equilibrium. | - |
| dc.format | application/ | en_US |
| dc.language | en | en_US |
| dc.language | en-US | en_US |
| dc.language.iso | en_US | - |
| dc.relation (關聯) | Economic Modelling,21(3),545-560 | en_US |
| dc.subject (關鍵詞) | Shirking;Adverse selection;Bonding;Labor quality;Externalities | - |
| dc.title (題名) | Bonding Shirking and Adverse Selection | en_US |
| dc.type (資料類型) | article | en |
